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Though jurists have traditionally understood the constitution as a separate kind of 
law that obligates only the state, courts increasingly understand constitutions as creating 
obligations for private actors such as private individuals, businesses, schools, and hospitals. 
The practice of applying rights “horizontally” to private actors raises a range of questions 
from the theoretical to the practical and from the jurisprudential to the political. 
I argue that we better understand the practical and political implications of such 
“horizontal rights” by studying them through the lens of republican political theory. 
Specifically, republicanism grounds (and foregrounds) the solidarity between citizens and 
the uniformity between public and private spheres that horizontality ascertains. Applying 
this framework, I examine constitutional debates, court cases, and political histories to 
show how courts have applied rights horizontally across time, place, and subject-matter. 
By situating my study in the larger historical-political context of each place, I examine the 
conditions that surround the horizontal application of constitutional rights to individual 
citizens and other private actors. 
Chapter I lays out this theoretical grounding, drawing on classical and neo-
republican theory to demonstrate the explanatory power of this framework. In the next two 
chapters, I examine the development of horizontal rights in national contexts, contrasting  
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efforts to bring solidarity to the private sphere in India and the United States (Chapter II), 
and comparing attempts to establish uniform standards to govern public and private spheres 
in Germany and South Africa (Chapter III). Chapter IV extends this discussion to the 
European Union, considering how the republican framework for horizontal effect accounts 
for duties and standards occurring across national boundaries. 
In accounting for the practical power of courts to determine the rights and duties of 
private entities, this project contributes to our knowledge of how constitutional politics 
shape conceptions of public and private in our increasingly pluralistic world. This research 
engages and contributes to law and courts scholarship in political science. However, its 
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How far do rights extend? Put differently, who is responsible for protecting and 
promoting constitutional rights? Traditionally, a constitution was a source of obligations 
for state actors, constraining government from violating rights, for example, or charging 
government to take positive action to support rights. As constitution-makers have 
undertaken more ambitious projects in recent decades, so too have understandings of 
governments’ obligations vis-à-vis rights expanded.1 However, this expansion of the 
objects of constitutions does not by itself account for a shift in the subject of 
constitutions, that is, whom constitutions address. Indeed, courts and constitution-makers 
have increasingly applied constitutional rights horizontally to obligate private actors, 
altering the relationships that constitutional rights engender.2  
Unsurprisingly, such a significant shift has faced pushback in scholarly and legal 
circles. In both venues, objections frequently stem from the fact that horizontal effect 
challenges some of the conventional understandings of liberal constitutionalism, namely, 
that we ought to maintain separate public and private spheres and, relatedly, that only the 
state should be responsible for upholding such public commitments as the constitution 
articulates. Of course, law has always been in the business of regulating private spaces 
and judges have long balanced claims of private actors against each other. The difference 
                                               
1 Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008; David Robertson, “Thick 
Constitutional Readings: When Classical Distinctions are Irrelevant,” Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol. 35, 2007. 




with horizontal effect comes in the fact that private actors incur some responsibility for 
and accountability to the constitution itself.  
Whereas both critics and proponents tend to assume a liberal framework in 
thinking about horizontal effect, this project proposes an alternative theoretical 
framework for understanding this development and understanding it in the larger tradition 
of constitutionalism. In particular, I argue that horizontal effect can be understood in 
terms of republicanism, that is, classical and neo-republican political theory. A republican 
framework introduces new concepts and theoretical points of reference to the discussion 
that better account for the normative shift that horizontal effect entails. In some instances, 
this framework confirms a tension between horizontal effect and prior understandings of 
constitutionalism, while in others it reveals how aspects of the constitutional projects 
themselves depart from traditional liberal premises.  
Though such a desire to align the private sphere with public goals or to establish 
constitutional duties of individuals is not necessarily irreconcilable with the conventional 
liberal account of constitutionalism, neither is it obviously native to it. The consistent 
decisions of American jurists to circumscribe the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state actors bears this out.3 Given this uncomfortable fit between the 
conventional narrative of liberal constitutionalism and horizontal rights, it is unsurprising 
that this topic has received attention in the legal scholarship, as scholars seek to defend, 
criticize, and simply understand this legal doctrine.  
                                               




For a long time, scholars took for granted the logic of liberal constitutionalism as 
expounded by such figures as John Locke.4 If we grant that the function of government is 
limited to such objects as ensuring security and protecting individual rights, then it seems 
clear that the primary purpose of a constitution is to hold government accountable to 
these ends and these ends only. In the American context, this understanding of 
constitutions is evinced by the language of such provisions as the Fourteenth Amendment 
(“No State shall make or enforce any law...”), as well as subsequent interpretations of this 
Amendment, from the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 to DeShaney v. Winnebago County in 
1989 that subscribe to a state action doctrine. 
As increasingly more countries adopted constitutions in the twentieth century, 
some would follow the United States, at least initially, in limiting most provisions of their 
constitutions to the actions of the state. However, after much debate, Germany adopted 
the concept of Drittwirkung, or indirect third party effect,5 in spite of the skepticism of 
some scholars and jurists. In particular, practitioners of private law had an institutional 
interest in keeping the private from being dominated by public law, and so insisted that 
any doctrine of horizontality bear on the private sphere indirectly (mediated through 
private law) rather than directly limiting the actions of individuals.6 This goes to show 
                                               
4 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ed. C. B. MacPherson, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. 
5 Renata Uitz, “Introduction,” The Constitution in Private Relations, Ed. Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz. 
Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven, 2005. 
6 Mattias Kumm and Victor Ferreres Comella, “What is So Special about Constitutional Rights in Private 
Litigation?” The Constitution in Private Relations, Ed. Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz. Utrecht, The 
Netherlands: Eleven, 2005; Stephen Gardbaum, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional Rights,” 




how even those countries that have adopted horizontal effect often attempt to uphold the 
conventional division between public and private, to some degree. 
Regardless of any hesitance and qualification, however, the concept of 
horizontality had entered onto the constitutional scene, leading to much scholarship on 
the subject in the law journals. Scholars have sought to understand the effects and limits 
of horizontality, as well as justify this innovation in constitutionalism. Today, no less 
than forty-eight national constitutions explicitly state that rights bind private actors.7 And 
this number does not include the several other countries whose constitutions point toward 
horizontality but depend on the courts to develop it more fully, such as Germany and 
India discussed herein. Moreover, the UK’s passing of the Human Rights Act led 
scholars to ask what rights obligations EU law entails for private entities, a debate that 
has culminated in recent decisions of the European Court of Justice.8 
While still acknowledging the tensions that horizontality creates within the long 
tradition of liberal constitutionalism, the general tendency of scholarship in the last 
couple of decades is to be more sympathetic to horizontal effect. In the United States 
context, the case Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)9 initially illustrated that decisions 
                                               
7 Comparative Constitutions Project, “Binding effect of constitutional rights,” Constitute, 
www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=binding&status=in_force&status=is_draft, 8 Jul. 2019. 
8 See for example Murray Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the Human Rights Act,” Public Law, 1998; 
Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. See also the 
three edited volumes on the subject of horizontality published in the years following the HRA: Human 
Rights in Private Law, Ed. Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez, Portland, OR: Hart, 2001; The 
Constitution in Private Relations, Ed. Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Eleven, 2005; 
Human Rights in the Private Sphere. Ed. Dawn Oliver and Jorg Fedtke. Abingdon, UK: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007. 
9 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court decided it could not enforce a racially restrictive covenant 




approximating horizontal effect were conceivable, and perhaps even desirable in the 
United States. Erwin Chemerinsky would make this very argument, stating that the state 
action doctrine is “anachronistic, harmful to the most important personal liberties, 
completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to the very goals that it originally intended 
to accomplish.”10 Moreover, in the context of the European Union, Eleni Frantziou 
maintains that the question of whether to apply rights horizontally ultimately amounts to 
a question of what “kind of society the EU is setting itself out to be and the values that lie 
in its core….”11 
More recently, scholars have made various arguments to illustrate how 
horizontality is already in effect in U.S. Constitutionalism, or not a particularly novel 
innovation in constitutionalism in general. Stephen Gardbaum argues that Article VI’s 
requirement that the Constitution be the “Supreme Law of the Land” effectively 
establishes indirect horizontal effect insofar as the Constitution must control the content 
of private law.12 Moreover, in his book Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet 
argues that whether a country has a formal state action doctrine or a doctrine of 
horizontal effect is of little import. In either case, a country maintains certain 
“background rules” of private law that necessarily confront and so already answer the 
substantive questions about the limits of private action and how public law bears on 
private relations.13 Finally, in the German context, Mattias Kumm argues that 
                                               
10 Erwin Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action,” Nw. U. L. Rev. Vol. 80, 1985, 506. 
11 Eleni Frantziou, The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering 
the Reasons for Horizontality,” European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2015, 675. 
12 Stephen Gardbaum, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of Constitutional Rights,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, 
2003. 




horizontality is just another development in the larger move toward “total 
constitutionalism” in contemporary law and politics. Denying that horizontality is 
particularly novel, Kumm sees it almost as inevitable as countries increasingly adopt 
more ambitious socio-economic rights in their constitutions.14 
In light of the challenge that horizontal effect potentially poses to the 
conventional liberal logic, it is not surprising that legal scholars have invested so much 
energy in trying to explain how this phenomenon does (or does not) comport with the 
larger tradition of constitutionalism. Amid such arguments, I argue that we can make 
sense of this development in the rights tradition by understanding horizontality as 
republican.  
Chapter I argues that horizontal effect is a republican vein in liberal 
constitutionalism by demonstrating that two key characteristics of horizontal effect 
approximate republican ideas. First, horizontal effect entails uniformity between the 
standards that govern public and private spaces. This concept of uniformity does not 
mean that public and private actors are subject to the constitution in exactly the same 
way, but rather that the same constitutional commitments serve as a source of obligation 
for public and private actors alike. This uniformity resembles the republican 
understanding of polity and public life as all-encompassing, in which public and private 
are not so distinct but are both subject to promoting the common good. Second, 
horizontal effect entails solidarity in the way it makes citizens responsible for each other. 
It creates individual duties out of public values that, previously, were understood to 
                                               




obligate only the state. That Mary Ann Glendon finds a conception of duty so 
conspicuously absent in the United States is not all that surprising in light of enduring 
tendency to emphasize only “rights talk.”15 Indeed, the idea that citizens may have duties 
rooted in public commitments is much more at home in a republican framework. 
However, a language of responsibility is injected into constitutional understandings when 
horizontal effect creates individual duties out of the same rights obligations that bind the 
state.  
Given horizontal effect’s resemblance to republican theory, why describe it as a 
republican vein within liberal constitutionalism rather than simply republican? Even if 
one concedes that horizontal effect itself departs from some aspects of the conventional 
liberal narrative, arguably, it still operates within a liberal framework. Indeed, the 
practice of horizontal effect depends on such concepts as constitutionalism and rights, 
and even public and private. For example, the standards that courts apply horizontally to 
private actors emerge from entrenched principles of a constitution (typically understood 
as a liberal construct), rather than a less determined republican politics. Additionally, 
while horizontal effect does engender individual duties, these duties still emerge from the 
prior concept of rights (another liberal concept). On the other hand, horizontal effect 
necessarily challenges any belief of rights as trumps. This is because horizontal effect 
always involves balancing the rights of different private parties against each other.16 All 
                                               
15 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk, New York: Free Press, 1993.  
16 Similarly, one might consider the limitations clauses in some constitutions as potentially republican 
and perhaps even facilitating horizontal effect. Indeed, such clauses necessarily entail the balancing of 




this is to say that while republican theory is a useful lens through which to understand 
horizontal effect, this framework ought not to be pushed further than is useful. Indeed, 
insofar as jurists and constitutional framers have not, as a historical matter, had 
republican political theory in mind when introducing horizontal effect, this comparison is 
likely to have some limits.  
After arguing for a republican conception of horizontal effect, Chapter II and III 
take up in turn each of the two characteristics of solidarity and uniformity, showing how 
they occur in actual cases of horizontal effect. In particular, I examine solidarity in 
comparing the United States and India (Chapter II), and uniformity in comparing 
Germany and South Africa (Chapter III). This structure is not to suggest that only 
solidarity appears in the United States and India nor that only uniformity appears in 
Germany and South Africa. Both solidarity and uniformity will be present in each 
instance that rights are applied horizontally insofar as they are component, even 
overlapping, characteristics of horizontal effect in general. Nevertheless, the different 
circumstances of these countries prove useful to illustrate these respective characteristics. 
Although each pairing may highlight one over the other, therefore, both concepts are 
present in every case of horizontal effect.  
Additionally on the logic of case selection, each pair of countries are similar in 
certain crucial respects. The United States and India both committed to a new equality, 
contra their entrenched systems of caste and slavery. Germany and South Africa both 
committed to such principles as dignity that promised wide and deep transformation in 




constitute “most similar cases,”17 per se, they represent in each pair sufficiently similar 
constitutional goals, the development of which may be meaningfully compared while also 
accounting for the particulars of each place in a small-n analysis.  I thus observe the 
implementation and various understandings of these broad goals as articulated over time 
in various fora and primarily in the courts. In this way, we see differences in the 
interpretations of their seemingly similar constitutional projects and, moreover, how such 
differences are closely tied to the development of horizontal effect. Indeed, these 
comparisons reveal how horizontal effect (and, more generally, the relationship of public 
and private spaces) is a constitutional question in the highest sense.  
In speaking about interpretations of constitutional projects, I do not mean to 
downplay the very real possibility of motivated reasoning as, for example, in the 
influence of an enduring racism in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Civil Rights Cases, for example. For better or worse, such external factors are 
amalgamated with interpretation and are often key to understand the defining 
particularities of a place. Therefore, understanding constitutional interpretation in this 
broad way, we may observe how particular interpretive and implementing choices related 
to horizontal effect find a more or less comfortable fit in a constitution, and how these 
choices subsequently compound and shape politics more or less easily. 
Chapter II’s comparison of the United States and India illustrates the connection 
between horizontality and solidarity. Out of long histories of slavery and caste, both 
                                               
17 Ran Hirshl, “On the Blurred Methodological Matrix of Comparative Constitutional Law,” in The 




countries committed to equality in their constitutional projects. The Indian vision of 
equality was more expansive, however, to include from the outset the mutual cooperation 
of private actors or what I have called solidarity. That solidarity was a part of the 
constitutional project directly led to the decision to include strong foundation for 
horizontal effect in the Constitution itself. Subsequently, this existing foundation for 
horizontal effect facilitated the continued pursuit of solidarity in the long term. 
Something like solidarity might have also comprised the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the United States Constitution. However, the Court stymied this 
interpretation in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, a decision which the Court could never 
quite recant, even over a century later. Instead, the state action doctrine hardened in place 
of legislation that would have introduced horizontal effect aimed toward racial equality in 
private spaces. The legacy of this initial decision culminated in Congress’s decision to 
ground the 1964 Civil Rights Act in its power to regulate commerce since the equal 
protection clause could not serve as a source of obligation for private actors. In this way, 
the state action doctrine still entails a certain detachment of individuals from public 
projects.  
In a comparison of Germany and South Africa, Chapter III proceeds by 
illustrating the connection between horizontal effect and uniformity. Following such 
atrocities as the Holocaust and Apartheid, Germany and South Africa each sought to 
transform their societies, adopting new constitutions with the aim of preventing similar 
violence in the future. Indeed, both countries adopted horizontal effect early on with the 




particular vision that comprised each constitution differed in important ways, however, 
thus influencing the development of horizontal effect as well. Specifically, South Africa’s 
Constitution was rooted in a new egalitarianism, the implementation of which could not 
but affect private actors. And indeed, the reach of horizontal effect has continually 
expanded over the Constitution’s short history. On the other hand, Germany’s Basic Law 
was largely consistent with the country’s enduring civil law system and classical liberal 
tradition which, on balance, tend to privilege such principles as Privatautonomie rather 
than anything beyond formal equality. While the German Constitutional Court maintains 
a doctrine of horizontal effect, the very content of the Basic Law has restricted the ways 
in which horizontal effect expanded. Many in Germany resisted the European Union’s 
expansion of anti-discrimination measures, for example, because the polity remained 
committed to distinguishing the values that governed public from those that governed 
private spaces. In comparing South Africa and Germany, we thus see the fundamental 
connection between horizontal effect and uniformity. While both countries genuinely 
aimed to transform their respective societies, uniformity was integral to the South African 
constitutional order to a much greater degree and supported the continued, natural growth 
of its doctrine of horizontal effect.  
In both pairings of countries, practices of horizontal effect emerge from and 
expand according to the constitutional vision of a place. More to the point, the 
introduction and expansion of horizontal effect in each of these contexts tracks the 
constitutional vision’s relative congruity with republican principles. The solidarity that 




effect, and the more thoroughgoing uniformity that South Africa’s egalitarian vision 
requires laid groundwork for its ever-expanding practice of horizontality. Interestingly, 
we see a certain self-consciousness in the way these constitutional visions break from 
existing paradigms. Not only did the Indian framers adopt horizontality with the positive 
goal of achieving solidarity, but with explicit intention of rejecting the United States’ 
limited formulation of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, South African 
framers and jurists expanded horizontality not only because they intended constitutional 
commitments to serve as a uniform set of values for the polity as a whole, but because 
they saw that Germany’s more limited practice of horizontal effect had neither sought nor 
achieved the same transformation that constituted the South African vision.  
Such episodes have more than symbolic significance. Indeed, they reveal 
intentional breaks from practices and conventional wisdoms that previously defined 
constitutionalism. While we may also see horizontal effect in more traditional 
constitutions, disharmonies18 do seem to emerge in places with stronger liberal 
predilections. That such liberal predilections are obstacles to horizontal effect suggests 
that actors operate according to a different logic when they apply rights horizontally. 
Thus, the same characteristics that distinguished horizontal effect as republican in the 
abstract according Chapter I, also tend to the expansion of horizontal effect as a matter of 
fact as demonstrated in Chapters II and III. 
Chapter IV bookends these case studies by considering horizontal effect in the 
European Union. The degree to which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
                                               




European Union applies rights horizontally to create duties of citizens has been long-
contested in both law and scholarship. The issue raises fundamental questions about the 
theoretical and practical implications of attaching obligations to citizenship across 
national boundaries. To the extent that the EU challenges the bounds of political 
community and citizenship, it is a critical case for my larger project of understanding 
horizontal effect in the light of republican political theory. Indeed, the way the debate 
over horizontal effect in the EU has unfolded, both in scholarship and in cases, tracks 
larger questions about the character and aspirations of European unity. More specifically, 
it is because the status of the EU as a political community and European citizenship are 
contested that we see scholars and jurists arguing about horizontal effect in the particular 
ways that they do. The republican lens is informative in this context to the extent that it 
foregrounds the connection between horizontal effect and other foundational issues, 
namely the prospect of a European res publica and a European citizenry.  
What is clean in theory is often less precise in practice. By examining how 
horizontal effect has developed in actual places, we may appreciate the very different 
starting points and particular aspirations of each polity. In this way, we may also 
appreciate the politics involved with horizontal effect, a phenomenon that, up to this 
point, has primarily been studied in law journals. Though a fairly recent development, 
horizontal effect alters the terrain on which constitutional politics unfolds and the 
calculations of judicial decision-making across areas of law (including common law and 
private law). Moreover, to the extent that horizontal effect departs from the conventional 




relate to public commitments in the long-term, and whether this republican vein will 





I. A Republican Vein in Liberal Constitutionalism 
 
 
The classical liberal tradition has typically understood constitutions as protecting 
individuals from the encroachments of government. Of course, constitutions empower 
government, but they also seek to limit that power through checks and balances and, 
almost always, through enumerating a list of justiciable rights obligating the state.1 Since 
the post-World War II era of constitution-making, increasingly more countries have 
included socio-economic or positive rights in their constitutions in addition to the 
classical political and civil rights. In either case, however, a constitution establishes a 
vertical relationship according to which government must respect and secure rights on 
behalf of the people. Ultimately, this vertical relationship leaves space for a separate 
private sphere in which individuals may pursue their own interests and projects free of 
government involvement, though admittedly supported by government structures.  
Despite this conventional liberal account, constitutional framers and courts in 
some countries have given horizontal effect to certain constitutional rights, interpreting 
constitutional commitments to create duties not only of the state but of private entities or 
non-state actors as well. According to the Indian Supreme Court, for example, the 
constitutional right to equality creates rights obligations of corporations vis-à-vis 
workers.2 According to the South African Constitutional Court, landlords may have 
                                               
1 Speaking of the purpose of the U.S. Constitution in Federalist 51, for example, Madison explains, “In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” 
(Madison 319) 




positive obligations to ensure their tenants live in conditions consonant with human 
dignity.3 Some scholars understand this move to give rights horizontal effect as a natural 
development given the more ambitious rights objectives of modern constitutions,4 and 
given the larger trends toward making many political questions also constitutional 
questions.5 Some further argue that offering constitutional remedies for rights abuses in 
the private sphere has the potential to bolster democratic commitments.6 As mentioned in 
the Introduction, Erwin Chemerinsky indicts the classic vertical model embodied in 
United States constitutionalism as “anachronistic, harmful to the most important personal 
liberties, completely unnecessary...”7 Nevertheless, others still worry that the shift to 
horizontality excessively empowers courts, threatening democratic political processes 
and the individual liberty people enjoy in private spaces.8 They maintain that even while 
                                               
3 Daniels v. Scribante and Another, CCT50/16 [2017] ZACC 13. 
4 Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008. 
5 Mattias Kumm, “Who’s Afraid of the Total Constitution?” German Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4. 2006. For 
an account of this phenomenon more general than the horizontality debate see, Ran Hirschl, Toward 
Juristocracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004. 
6 The UK’s passing of the Human Rights Act, for example, has led scholars to ask what rights obligations 
Strasbourg jurisprudence entails for private entities. See Murray Hunt, “The ‘Horizontal Effect’ of the 
Human Rights Act,” Public Law, 1998; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. See also the three edited volumes on the subject of horizontality published in 
the years following the HRA: Human Rights in Private Law, Ed. Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez, 
Portland, OR: Hart, 2001; The Constitution in Private Relations, Ed. Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz. Utrecht, 
The Netherlands: Eleven, 2005; Human Rights in the Private Sphere. Ed. Dawn Oliver and Jorg Fedtke. 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007. 
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, “Rethinking State Action,” Nw. U. L. Rev. Vol. 80, 1985, 506. 
8 See Bruno DeWitte, “The Crumbling Public/Private Divide: Horizontality in European Anti-
Discrimination Law,” Citizenship Studies 13.5, 2009, 515-525; Stephen Ellmann, “A Constitutional 
Confluence: American ‘State Action’ Law and the Application of South Africa’s Socioeconomic Rights 
Guarantees to Private Actors,” 45 New York Law School Law Review, 2001; Cass Sunstein, “On Property 
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horizontal effect may produce positive outcomes, it depends on eroding the very 
separation between the public and private spheres that has traditionally founded liberal 
constitutionalism.  
The fact that this phenomenon has generated such debate with respect to the 
purpose and limits of constitutionalism points toward the need for explanation beyond 
what can be offered by the conventional liberal wisdom, that constitutions regulate and 
limit only state actors. That horizontal effect departs from these liberal foundations thus 
warrants a search for alternative sources of explanation and even justification. The 
scholar or jurist committed to horizontal effect can no longer describe constitutionalism 
simply as obligating government to certain ends in a way that creates a separate private 
sphere of individual liberty. How, then, can we understand constitutionalism when 
constitutional commitments that oblige the state also oblige non-state actors, when the 
private comes to be governed by the same principles that govern the public? In the 
republican tradition one finds such a source of justification.  
In this chapter, I identify two features of horizontal effect that garner support from 
republican principles. First, consider how horizontal effect obligates citizens to abide by 
public commitments and projects. Indeed, it incorporates private actors into the 
constitutional project directly in a manner that the vertical model does not. At most, the 
vertical model could bring private actors closer to public values through ordinary 
legislation, but this occurs wholly at the discretion of legislators and not as a result of the 
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constitution’s requirements. In this obligation to constitutional principles and projects, 
horizontal effect reflects an affinity with the republican emphasis on “the public thing,” 
best summed up in the commitment to the common good that recurs in republican 
thought. This is not to say that either horizontal effect or the republican tradition 
collapses the private into the public, but only that private entities are not cast as existing 
beyond or strictly separate from the public realm. I describe this orientation of private 
entities toward public projects in horizontal effect as a kind of uniformity in obligation to 
the constitution across spheres, one that resembles the republican ideal that the common 
good should move the polity understood as a whole.  
In addition to this orientation of private entities toward public projects, horizontal 
effect gives rise to duties between private individuals. This solidarity among people for 
which horizontality calls resembles the republican idea that people possess individual 
duties to others by virtue of being equal citizens of a common polity. Of course, other 
traditions also call for certain dispositions of citizens. William Galston and Stephen 
Macedo have argued, for example, that liberalism requires particular virtues to ensure a 
requisite respect and tolerance among citizens.9  However, these conceptions are more 
typically couched as individual virtues rather than public duties that citizens have toward 
the polity and toward one another, a formulation more naturally supported by 
republicanism. In these features of uniformity and solidarity, therefore, horizontal effect 
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departs from certain ideals of liberal constitutionalism but finds grounding in the logic 
and values commonly associated with republicanism.  
 I begin with an overview of the liberal and republican traditions in order to 
distinguish them and describe each’s justificatory core in their respective conceptions of 
liberty. I then elaborate how the particular principles of the common good and solidarity 
manifest in republican and neo-republican thought. This discussion sets up the core of the 
chapter, that particular features and the general practice of horizontal effect may find 
grounding in these republican principles. The final section raises potential republican 
concerns with the way horizontal effect results from judicial action, but also shows how 
some republicans have defended a role for courts on the very basis of republican liberty.   
 
Distinguishing the Liberal and Republican Traditions 
Insofar as this chapter argues horizontal effect reflects a republican logic in 
contrast with the conventional liberal understandings of constitutionalism, it depends on a 
comparison between liberalism and republicanism. Many scholars show how these 
different traditions have manifested in political histories in complex ways.10 Though I do 
not engage this debate over the relationship between liberal and republican thought, nor 
                                               
10 On the liberal tradition in American political-constitutional history, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal 
Tradition in America,1955; Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk, New York: Free Press, 1991. Thomas Pangle, 
The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, Chicago: Chicago UP, 1990; Herbert Storing, “Slavery and the Moral 
Foundations of the American Republic,” in Toward a More Perfect Union, Ed. Joseph Bessette, 1995. On 
the republican tradition, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, Chapel Hill: 
North Carolina UP, 1998; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003; 
Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals, New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. See also the concept of a “republican synthesis” in 





the role of these traditions in broader histories, as of the American founding,11 my 
argument does depends on the recognition that these traditions are different and 
distinguishable. This point is not predicated on any claim that these traditions are 
irreconcilable either in theory or in practice, but is fully compatible even with subtle 
accounts arguing that liberalism is nested within republicanism or vice versa. Joseph 
Postell offers such an account, demonstrating how republicanism and liberalism equipped 
Americans in the Early Republic with mutually reinforcing justifications to regulate 
various industries. Nevertheless, such accounts still depend on understanding liberalism 
and republicanism as different traditions defined by different concepts and commitments.  
How then do these traditions differ? In some ways this may seem a vain effort as 
the history of political thought has seen many instantiations of each. However, both 
liberal and republican scholars have largely converged on the proposition that the 
fundamental and encompassing difference lies in how each tradition understands 
liberty.12 It is the definition each offers of liberty that is most fundamental and that serves 
to distinguish one from the other most precisely. The tradition one finds most compelling, 
therefore, will largely depend on what conception of liberty one thinks is more accurate. 
Moreover, and more to the point of the present argument, the extent to which one 
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endorses horizontal effect may in part depend on the extent to which one grants 
something like a republican conception of liberty.  
The liberal tradition grew out of various wars that plagued Europe in the years 
leading up to the Enlightenment. Such political philosophers as Thomas Hobbes13 and 
John Locke14 sought a new basis on which to ground government authority, and so 
developed their theories of the state of nature. In each version, people exist in perfect 
freedom before the establishment of government, enjoying certain pre-political natural 
rights. However, the state of nature ultimately proves inconvenient at best and dangerous 
at worst, as no institutions exist to enforce these rights. Individuals, thus, contract with 
one another, ceding some of their natural rights to a governmental authority in exchange 
for order and protection. It is at this point that Hobbes and Locke crucially part ways. 
While Hobbes thinks it necessary to empower an absolute sovereign simply to get people 
to live in relative peace, Locke develops the liberal premise that government can and 
ought to be limited, acting within certain constitutional powers to protect people’s rights 
but no further. On Locke’s telling, government exists for the sole purpose of protecting 
rights and so may not act beyond this designated purpose. Out of all this comes the liberal 
understanding of freedom, variously called negative liberty,15 freedom as non-
interference,16 the right to be let alone.17 Government exists so that people may be let 
alone, and not face unwarranted interference in exercising their rights. Moreover, people 
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adopt constitutions to ensure that government operates within these designated limits, 
thus leaving space for a separate private sphere in which individuals may go about their 
lives without government interference.  
Liberty in republicanism comes from a very different place. Classical 
republicanism finds its start in the Greco-Roman world with such philosophers as 
Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero. In The Politics, Aristotle describes man as zoon politikon, 
a being that requires political community in order to flourish. Anyone that can flourish, 
let alone survive, without community must be either god or beast, he concludes.18 
Therefore politics is natural in a way that it is not for liberal social contract theorists and, 
indeed, is necessary for authentic freedom. For many republicans, freedom comes in the 
ability to engage in public life on an equal basis with one’s fellow citizens, to debate the 
requirements of the common good, the laws under which citizens live, and the way 
forward for the polity.19 From this common structure of republics, some conclude that 
republican freedom consists in “mastery over the self” and, by extension, an ability to 
shape and control the polity’s way of life.20 On the other hand, others insist that there is a 
more fundamental core to republican freedom in the concept of freedom as non-
domination.21 Laborde and Maynor sum it up: “In the old republican adage, the people 
want not to be a master, but to have no master.”22 The republican citizen is free, 
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therefore, insofar as he or she is equal among his or her fellow citizens and not subject to 
arbitrary or alien rule. Moreover, insofar as the goal is non-domination and domination is 
conceivable in both public and private life (imperium and dominium, respectively),23 
republican liberty requires that law be able to govern all spheres of life. Neo-republican 
scholarship, as represented by Philip Pettit, follows this more negative cadence of 
freedom as non-domination. Though this formulation tries to carve out more space for 
liberty in private spaces, it also recognizes the need for law to intervene in private life 
when to prevent domination.  
 
The Common Good and Solidarity in Republican Thought 
In order to show how horizontal effect may find support in republicanism and this 
understanding of freedom as non-domination, it is necessary to exposit the particular 
principles of republicanism that can do this heavy lifting. This section elaborates the 
republican concepts of the common good and duty among citizens, showing how they 
emerge from a foundation of freedom as nondomination. This discussion, thus, lays the 
groundwork to connect these principles with horizontal effect in the section that follows.   
The very purpose of the polity, as Aristotle understands it, is to facilitate people’s 
achievement of their human good of virtuous living.24 More precisely, the purpose of the 
polity is to pursue the common good, or the good of the community taken as a whole, 
above any one person’s individual good. He states, “For even if the good is the same for a 
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city as for an individual, still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more 
complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve 
the good even for an individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a 
people and for cities.”25 In this way we see an early articulation of the republican idea 
that there exists a discernible good of the community, as well as the republican ideal that 
the promotion of this good is the primary function of politics. The common good may be 
understood in contrast with private interests or even the aggregate of individual interests. 
Indeed, a republican conception of the common good refers to what is good for a 
community as such, the idea being that everyone ought to contribute to the good of the 
community and that the community will bear on each individual’s good in turn. This 
concept is so constitutive of Aristotle’s understanding of a well-ordered polity, that he 
employs it as the standard by which to distinguish good regimes from bad regimes, true 
forms of government from perversions.26  
In Aristotle we already see core concepts of what would develop into republican 
political theory. First, Aristotle gives us an initial account of human beings as having a 
particular good that consists in virtue and in living the political life; second, Aristotle 
understands the common interest or common good as, in some ways, prior to the 
individual good. Even as republicanism has evolved, these points have been represented 
consistently in the various iterations of the tradition. Some even argue that one can only 
be a republican philosopher or a republican statesman in a limited sense if one does not 
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accept these premises.27 For others, the republican understanding of the common good is 
less a matter of teleology and more a matter of what is necessary to achieve authentic 
freedom. Daly and Hickey associate the more teleological understanding with Aristotle, 
and the more liberty-centered interpretation with Roman thought, citing Philip Pettit’s 
conception of freedom as nondomination as an exemplar of this Roman republicanism.28  
Such differences in republican thought will reemerge below in considering how 
republicanism may ground horizontal effect and which versions of republicanism fulfill 
this role best. 
Unlike Aristotle, Machiavelli did not base his thought on any particular 
understanding of the human good. However, “the public thing” features prominently in 
his republicanism, as Machiavelli considers citizens’ ability to debate vigorously the 
common good of the polity an essential feature of republican freedom.29 S. M. Shumer 
explains: 
People have different values and different perspectives rooted in their 
individual lives, and, too, they compete for the same scarce values. To 
destroy that conflict, even to seek to destroy it, is to destroy politics. 
Machiavelli takes this a significant step further: it is active (even 
passionate) conflict that is the life force of public liberty, civic virtue, and 
even military courage. 30 
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Amid this inevitable (and desirable) disagreement in public discourse, however, 
Machiavelli’s ideal citizen will remain intent on pursuing the common good. Individual 
ambition and expression becomes “fused within the breast of each citizen” with the 
public good and liberty.31 What made the Romans truly free, on Machiavelli’s telling was 
that, even after tempestuous debate, they pursued with unequivocal and united 
commitment the common good as dictated by the results of those debates.32  
In one of republicanism’s later iterations, Jean-Jacques Rousseau represents the 
republican tradition in his concepts of the social contract and the general will. Individuals 
can only be truly free, Rousseau argues, if they are not subject to alien and arbitrary rule, 
if each individual is self-governing.  Given that we are bound, as a practical matter, to 
operate within the confines of civil society, however, the best chance we have of 
achieving the authentic freedom that comes with self-government is to enter into a social 
contract with others.33 In this social contract, we surrender our rights and agree to comply 
with the general will. Since each individual has consented and so vested his or her own 
will in the general will, individuals are obeying themselves in obeying the general will—
they are, in actual fact, self-governing and free. Moreover, a community may “force to be 
free” those who would not comply with the decisions of the general will.34 Thus, 
Rousseau’s requirements for freedom lead to some relegation of the individual, and a 
republican understanding of human freedom as consisting in the political life. Though 
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this goes further than most other versions of republican thought, Rousseau’s emphasis on 
the public is characteristic of republicanism in general.35  
From ancient republicanism to modern republicanism, therefore, we see the 
privileged status of the common good and prioritization of the “public thing.” As Cicero 
explains in On Duties, “But when you have surveyed everything with reason and spirit, of 
all fellowships none is more serious, and none dearer, than that of each of us with the 
republic. Parents are dear, and children, relatives and acquaintances are dear, but our 
county has on its own embraced all the affections of all of us.”36 The politeia or res 
publica and its governing principles are all-encompassing and therefore, require the 
citizen’s devotion, perhaps even at some cost to private interests, but always with the 
ultimate result of securing one’s freedom understood as non-domination. Like liberals, 
republicans from Cicero to Pettit have maintained space for private interests and rights, as 
to property. However, in contrast with the liberal position, a republican of most any stripe 
would ultimately understand their freedom as contingent on, rather than infringed by, 
pursuing the larger commitments of the polity understood as the common good. 
 In this idea of devotion to the common good, we begin to see the outlines of 
republican solidarity, as well. Many republican philosophers and statesmen have 
discussed the importance of inculcating shared beliefs through civic education, for 
example.37 Aristotle explains that the young must be “trained by habit and education in 
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the spirit of the constitution.”38 Inhering in a constitution is a kind of ethos, a particular 
shared life, in which people must be educated if the polis is to persist.39 In her own 
account of education as a vehicle toward republican solidarity, Iseault Honohan worries 
that “fostering solidarity has often been associated too closely with promoting cultural 
identity without taking sufficient account of the pluralist conditions of modern 
societies.”40  Honohan thus recognizes a common life to uphold in a republic, but insists 
that the solidarity that education should foster is better understood in “willingness to 
acknowledge and assume the responsibilities entailed by interdependence; self-restraint 
in pursuing individual or sectional interests rather than the common good; and the 
inclination to engage open-mindedly with viewpoints of others in the public realm.”41 
This in contrast with promoting a particular cultural identity. Aristotle, Cicero,42 
Rousseau,43 the American Founders,44 and contemporary theorists such as Honohan45 all 
emphasize, albeit in different ways, the role of education to cultivate in a people civic-
mindedness and devotion to republican values and virtues. As Richard Bellamy states, 
“No constitution will itself survive long unless citizens identify with it.”46  
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 On this understanding, devotion to one’s constitution entails devotion to one’s 
patria, and by extension, a certain solidarity with the people in one’s patria. Maurizio 
Viroli explains how people only come to love liberty and virtue through the cultivation of 
such local bonds. 47 Again, we see this idea as early in the republican tradition as 
Aristotle, who describes civic friendship as “the greatest good of states and what best 
preserves them against revolutions...”48 Later in The Politics, Aristotle further explains 
the value of such friendship or solidarity:  
Such a community can only be established among those who live in the 
same place and intermarry. Hence there arise in cities family connexions, 
brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. 
But these are created by friendship, for to choose to live together is 
friendship.49  
 
Thus, on Aristotle’s understanding, friendship is requisite to community. This includes 
the sort of affection for one’s neighbor which we might expect, but also a sort of 
proximity and sameness—shared blood to reinforce those affections. “To choose to live 
together,” he states, “is friendship.” Cicero further develops this idea of civic friendship 
in his account of duties. He states, “We are not born of ourselves alone,”50 and suggests 
in his account of justice that we actually owe something to our country and fellow 
citizens. Not to give to our patria what we are able is nothing less than an injustice.51  
 In addition to the existential requirements of a polity and necessities of justice that 
Aristotle and Cicero respectively offer in support of civic friendship, republican thought 
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values solidarity insofar as citizens must see one another as co-equals if they are to 
govern together in pursuit of the common good. This need for meaningful and 
acknowledged equality among citizens has been present even when republics were not so 
egalitarian, as in Greece, Rome, and the United States through Jim Crow.52 Jack Balkin 
explains how “The historical tradition of republicanism... insisted that economic self-
sufficiency was central to participation in republican government,” that one had to have 
the requisite leisure time and financial security in order to participate in politics, both as 
practical matter and as a matter of being acknowledged as an equal.  “This demand,” 
Balkin continues, “produced both conservative and egalitarian versions of 
republicanism.”53 It produced the conservatism of those republics that allowed only 
propertied or noble members of society to be voting citizens. However, this same demand 
of economic self-sufficiency would give rise to more contemporary versions of 
republicanism that have sought either to raise individuals up to a certain level of 
independence and self-sufficiency, or to make material wealth less important so that a 
broader population may participate as equal members in politics and society.  
In a way, both the conservative and egalitarian versions of republicanism operate 
on the same premise, that a certain equality is necessary for solidarity, which is, in turn, 
necessary for republican citizenship and collective self-government.  The difference is 
that the conservative version identifies citizens from pre-existing castes, whereas the 
latter more egalitarian version makes a positive effort to equalize people and so bring 
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them into the fold of citizenship.54 In either case, we see the necessity of shared 
responsibility and solidarity toward fellow citizens in a republican framework. 
 
The Neo-Republican Intervention 
From the conservative versions of republicanism Balkin discusses to the populist 
bent we find in Rousseau, some scholars have worried about the broader implications and 
tendencies of republicanism. For example, Isaiah Berlin’s well-known characterization of 
the ancients’ positive liberty is less than attractive in its potential to legitimate an 
oppressive communitarianism and even authoritarianism as a function of the rights and 
privileges that come with self-rule.55 Against such apprehension, Philip Pettit argues that 
a consistent understanding of republicanism—that is, “freedom as non-domination,” 
properly understood—is not susceptible to these authoritarian perils, but actually serves 
to critique certain instantiations of republicanism as classist and homogenizing.56 Daly 
and Hickey similarly explain how republicanism comes in different versions, some of 
which are more moderate than others: 
The term [republicanism] is associated with the unitary and indivisible 
State advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but also the federalism and 
checks and balances promoted by Madison....Some republicans have 
assumed that civic virtue can be realized only in a cohesive, austere and 
disciplined society, whereas more liberal-minded thinkers have argued 
that republican citizenship can occupy a more minimal domain and 
accommodate a range of co-existing private identities.57 
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Pettit does just this: argue for “a minimal domain” of republican citizenship that can 
“accommodate a range of co-existing private identities.” Pettit juxtaposes republican 
freedom as nondomination with both the liberal conception of freedom as non-
interference58 and perversions of republican freedom manifest in more communitarian 
theories.59 He follows Quentin Skinner in arguing that republican freedom is properly 
understood “not as the positive benefit of participation in sovereign self-rule, but as a 
negative good that such participation might instrumentally serve: the good of escaping 
the imposition of others.”60 In this way, Pettit’s theory may require the addition of 
another category in Berlin’s framework, namely, freedom as nondomination negatively 
conceived.61  
How, then, does Pettit’s take on freedom as non-domination comport with a 
republican commitment to the common good and solidarity among citizens? Though 
Pettit tends not to employ such language as “the common good” in the same way as 
classical republicans, the heart of his theory still reveals an essential kinship. First, he is 
very clear that nondomination is a common good, that is, a good that is good for all and 
can only be fully realized in common. He explains,  
...[T]here can be no hope of advancing the cause of freedom as non-
domination among individuals who do not readily embrace both the 
prospect of substantial equality and the condition of communal solidarity. 
To want republican liberty, you have to want republican equality; to 
realize republican liberty, you have to realize republican community.62  
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In short, even republican liberty in its negative form of freedom as non-domination, as 
opposed to the more positive freedom as self-mastery, depends on a “republican 
community” dedicated to this conception of freedom and to its fruition for all members of 
the community. For Pettit, therefore, freedom is necessarily tied up with some 
understanding of a common good.  
In the same way that freedom as non-domination requires republican community, 
so too might it be jeopardized by any sector of the community, by private and public 
entities alike. Pettit warns against the ways in which domination can occur in the private 
realm—one might think of the power of an employer over his or her employees, or of big 
money in politics. For this reason, true freedom requires the cooperation of all spheres 
with respect to this public principle of freedom as non-domination. Hence, Pettit follows 
his republican predecessors in maintaining that both public and private spheres remain 
obligated to this common good, even as a matter of law.  The fundamental requirement 
for preserving freedom is that interventions in private life occur “on the people’s 
terms.”63 In other words, the public principle of non-domination may warrant interference 
in the private sphere so long as the people maintain meaningful control over the 
governing institutions that make these decisions. 
Pettit also accounts for republican solidarity. In On the People’s Terms, he 
introduces the “eyeball test,” the idea that freedom requires that an individual “should be 
able to look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference.”64 This is because the 
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ability to evoke the kind of fear that leads one to avert his or her eyes in deference 
amounts to domination. This kind of domination, or arbitrary power, Pettit believes, can 
be avoided if everyone enjoys a comparable standard of living. He explains, “Social 
justice, so interpreted, would require each citizen to enjoy the same free status, objective 
and subjective, as others. It would mandate a substantive form of status equality."65 
According to Pettit, the securing of material factors, often controlled by the private realm, 
are necessary to achieving nondomination in a meaningful sense. Therefore, a polity must 
secure a requisite material wellbeing in order for citizens to be able to “look others in the 
eye,” and so view one another as co-equals governing together. This concern with 
requisite material equality, to which the “eyeball test” draws attention, echoes the 
emphasis of classical republicanism on material equality and self-sufficiency as pre-
requisites for participation in politics and society. And so, Pettit justifies intervention in 
the private both to secure such social and economic equality, as well as to prevent more 
direct forms of domination.  
While republican thought is united by an understanding of freedom as non-
domination, Pettit’s theory admittedly focuses on the more negative concern of not being 
subject to the arbitrary power of others, in contrast with other versions of republicanism 
that focus on the positive of self-rule. In some ways, this distinction is important to the 
task at hand, to the extent that one version may encompass more persuasive connections 
with horizontal effect than the other. Indeed, horizontal effect does seem to have an 
affinity to Pettit’s negative formulation of non-domination insofar as it emphasizes the 
                                               




threats to freedom that may come in private spaces. In contrast, consider certain accounts 
of freedom as self-mastery, such as we find in Rousseau’s concept of the general will 
discussed above that depends on a more complete subversion of one’s individual will. 
Contemporary proponents of horizontal effect, still operating within the framework of 
constitutionalism, likely would recoil from the implications of such Rousseauvian 
theories and incline to more moderate neo-republicanisms to ground horizontal effect. Put 
differently, one might argue that it is in the context of neo-republicanism’s negative 
conception of freedom that the practice of horizontal effect is likely to obtain as a 
republican vein within the tradition of liberal constitutionalism, as this chapter’s title 
states.  
At the same time, neo-republicanism arguably is an heir of classical republican 
theories and, to this extent, may still entail some of the same implications. As explained, 
one of the main points that we derive from Pettit’s theory of freedom as nondomination is 
that such domination often occurs in the private sphere. Thus, in a similar manner as the 
classical theories, Pettit’s account requires that the principle of republican freedom 
govern the polity taken as a whole, that is, in public and private spaces alike. This may 
not leave much room for difference in how individuals conceive of freedom, republican 
freedom, or the requirements for realizing that freedom. This is not to suggest that Pettit’s 




to highlight in his account certain limits to what “the people’s terms” may ultimately 
include.66  
Regardless of where one comes down on such questions concerning positive and 
negative formulations of liberty in republican thought, the principle of freedom as 
nondomination forms the fundamental core of this tradition. Consequently, it illuminates 
the role of such concepts as the common good and solidarity that, I argue, we find in the 
practice of horizontal effect. 
 
Republicanism and Horizontality 
What, then, is the connection between these principles of republican thought and 
horizontal effect? More specifically, how do the principles of the common good and 
solidarity serve to ground this emerging practice in constitutionalism? 
 
Uniformity in Horizontal Effect 
As republican thought holds up the common good as a standard for both public 
and private entities, so too does horizontal effect charge public and private actors with 
promoting constitutional values. This uniformity in the constitution’s applicability to 
public and private entities can be justified by republicanism and, more fundamentally, by 
the common good that serves a republican conception of freedom.  
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In contrast with the conventional vertical model of constitutionalism which 
requires some distance between the principles that bind each of the public and private 
spheres, horizontality brings private entities into conformity with public values as a 
function of what the constitution itself is understood to require. What is known as direct 
horizontal effect occurs when judges apply constitutional rights directly to private actors, 
creating duties somehow to respect, uphold, or promote the constitutional rights of other 
citizens. On the other hand, horizontality sometimes operates through ordinary legislation 
or through judges’ development of common law. This indirect horizontal effect occurs 
when judges require legislatures to hold private actors to account for rights obligations in 
the way they legislate and regulate private spaces. 67 Despite these doctrinal minutiae, the 
function of horizontal effect remains the same: private entities accrue duties as a direct 
result of a constitution’s commitments to certain rights. Legislatures may have some 
discretion in how they execute these constitutional requirements in law, but they do not 
have discretion in the core fact that the constitution’s commitments must bear on private 
entities.68  
Though these horizontal rights obligations may be mediated by private law, 
therefore, the fundamental point remains that public values or constitutional 
commitments become the source of duties of private individuals and entities. Hence, as in 
the republican tradition, individuals become responsible for and accountable to the larger 
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projects of the polity. In this way, we can say that horizontality constitutes something of 
an innovation of liberal constitutionalism in changing who is responsible for 
constitutional commitments, and in designating the constitution as the source by which 
individuals are made responsible. Moreover, this innovation may be justified to the extent 
that we find compelling a republican conception of freedom as non-domination. Whereas 
one subscribing to the liberal conception of freedom as non-interference may be troubled 
by the degree and nature of interference in private relations that horizontality entails, one 
who maintains a republican conception of freedom as non-domination will be more 
inclined to recognize this as leveraging the same constitutional principles that protect 
people from the domination of public entities (imperium) to protect them also from 
domination of private entities (dominium). 
For an example of how uniformity manifests in an actual instance of horizontal 
effect and may be justified by republican principles, we need look no further than 
Germany’s seminal Lüth case.69 In 1951, German filmmaker Veit Harlan filed suit 
against Erich Lüth, arguing that Lüth had harmed his economic prospects in publicly 
calling for a boycott of his pro-Nazi film. While the district court initially granted 
Harlan’s injunction, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) reversed the ruling seven 
years later, arguing that the German Basic Law committed the polity to an “order of 
objective moral and legal principles.” Such principles have a “radiating effect,” bearing 
on all areas of German law and life. For this reason, the Court argued that it would be 
remiss to pretend that Lüth’s right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Basic 
                                               




Law, was irrelevant to the case. Indeed, the Court ultimately sent the case back to the 
lower court with the instruction that it consider how such principles of the Basic Law 
inform German civil law. 
In Lüth, the FCC states explicitly the importance of uniformity on certain 
foundational questions and constitutional commitments in public and private venues 
alike. In the same way that the constitutional framers felt a sense of urgency to entrench 
in the Basic Law commitments to human dignity and the inviolability of human 
personality just a few years after the conclusion of World War II, one senses a similar 
urgency in the FCC’s Lüth decision to ensure that these defining constitutional 
commitments actually be constitutive of the polity as a whole.  In speaking of the German 
constitutional tradition, and the Lüth case in particular, Ulrich Preuss explains:  
[T]he right to free speech or to freedom of religion is not only a kind of 
concession of the society to individuals and their self-interest, but it 
equally serves the benefit of the society at large; a society in which each 
individual enjoys the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights is different 
and morally more advanced than one in which these rights are lacking. 
Hence, it is in the interest of society itself to establish and sustain these 
rights. If this is so, it cannot be tolerated that there are spheres of social 
life in which the spirit or the values of the fundamental rights are absent.70 
  
This interpretation of German constitutionalism suggests that the horizontal application 
of rights is motivated by more than the sheer convenience of enlisting the private sphere, 
or even by the goal of protecting individual rights. Rather, Preuss describes an ethos of 
the polity, a moral position which may permit some degree of difference, but ultimately 
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begs for a united front in the commitment to certain governing principles. Thus, the 
horizontal application of rights can serve to infuse the life of the polity with the “spirit or 
the values of the fundamental rights,” in the same way that citizens of a republican polity 
are equally held to pursue the common good of the polity as their own. In this way, 
constitutional rights commitments may be just as much “about” that private entity 
charged with promoting rights as they are about the rights-bearer. 
One might object that the uniform commitment of public and private spheres that 
horizontality requires is different in some important ways from the principle of the 
common good associated with republicanism. Indeed, horizontality operates within the 
larger framework of rights which, on certain formulations, may exist in tension with the 
sort of civic-mindedness that republicanism requires.71 The objection might continue that 
with horizontal effect we employ the language of rights and so frame the issue as a 
conflict of rights, an essentially liberal formulation that does not leave as much space for 
considerations of the common good.72 Nevertheless, horizontal effect still entails a 
privileging of the public thing above one’s immediate private interests, and not simply as 
a result of the sort of refereeing or policing that virtually all political philosophers have 
understood as being part of the role of government.73 Rather, horizontality requires the 
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suspension of private interests in the explicit service of public ends, a notion that one 
would be hard-pressed to find in the work of classical liberals. Indeed, horizontality will 
require that one yield his or her rights claims to other, perhaps more constitutive 
commitments of the polity, even if those simply be commitments to other rights. Hence, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the radiating effect of the right to 
freedom of expression in some cases necessitates the concession or sacrifice of he who 
suffers economic harm as a result.74  
Of course, courts do account for the burden that horizontal effect puts on private 
agents, concluding that the obligations of state and non-state actors may differ in 
intensity. Take for example, South African case Daniels v. Scribante and Another.75 
Living in conditions of utter disrepair, Yolanda Daniels began to improve at her own 
expense the dwelling she rented on Chardonne Farm. The property manager, Theo 
Scribante, argued that the relevant statutory law and constitutional provisions granted her 
no right to change the property without his or the owner’s consent. Moreover, they had 
no positive duty to pay for any modifications she made to improve her living conditions. 
Tending to the social and historical context surrounding the case, the South African 
Constitutional Court ultimately decided that Daniels did, in fact, have a right to live in 
conditions that were up to standard and, more specifically, that this was required by her 
right to human dignity. Moreover, Scribante and the property owners were not 
necessarily exempt from covering these costs. Still, the Court acknowledged certain 
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limits to the duties that Daniels’s right demanded of Scribante. In the majority opinion, 
the Court observes that private persons can only rely on “their own pockets” or private 
funds as opposed to public sources of revenue. Justice Madlanga explains, “It would be 
unreasonable, therefore, to require private persons to bear the exact same obligations 
under the Bill of Rights as does the State.”76 Because the capacities, resources, and status 
of private and public institutions are not identical, therefore, neither are their 
constitutional duties equal.  
Nevertheless, the capacities of or burden on private entities is neither the only nor 
the most important consideration in determining whether rights should be given 
horizontal effect. In Daniels, the Court develops criteria introduced in earlier cases,77 
explaining the considerations upon which the horizontal application of rights depends:  
Whether private persons will be bound depends on a number of factors. 
What is paramount includes: what is the nature of the right; what is the 
history behind the right; what does the right seek to achieve; how best can 
that be achieved; what is the “potential of invasion of that right by persons 
other than the State or organs of state”; and, would letting private persons 
off the net not negate the essential content of the right?78  
 
This explanation of the South African Court’s decision suggests that much more enters 
the calculation than the relative burden horizontal effect may create for private entities. 
Rather, the Court puts much weight on such factors as the importance or status of a given 
right, that is, how constitutive a right is in the context of the larger constitutional project, 
                                               
76 Daniels v. Scribante, pargraph 40. 
77 See Khumalo v. Holomisa, in which the South African Court decided that the horizontal application of 
Section 8(2) of the South African Constitution depends in part on the potential of private entities to 
impinge rights, but also, importantly, on the “intensity of the constitutional right in question” (paragraph 
33). 




as well as what the right’s realization will require. We see this in the Court’s 
consideration of “the nature of the right,” and “the history behind the right.” In such 
criteria, the Court considers not the burden on private individuals, but the status of 
particular rights against standards of justice and the meanings that arise out of particular 
historical and cultural contexts. Some rights are so important and important to a particular 
place,79 the argument goes, that they must govern the polity uniformly, regardless of 
those projects and commitments existing in what we might otherwise understand to be a 
private space.  
 
Solidarity in Horizontal Effect 
 In addition to uniformity, the horizontal application of rights also engenders a 
certain solidarity, akin to republican solidarity or civic duty. Specifically, in obligating 
private entities to promote the constitutional commitments of a polity, horizontal effect 
holds individuals accountable for the rights of fellow citizens, directing them toward 
some sense of solidarity and recognition of equal status. Of course, liberal political 
thought also depends on a belief in human equality. But again, one who subscribes to the 
liberal conception of freedom as non-interference will dispute the way horizontality seeks 
equality through enlisting private entities to public projects. On the other hand, the idea 
of solidarity or duty with respect to one’s fellow citizens is part and parcel of the 
republican community to which Pettit refers.80 That one would have obligations to one’s 
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fellow citizens as an extension of pursuing the good of the polity is beyond dispute in 
most any version of the republican tradition. Though not palatable to the typical liberal, 
therefore, this solidarity is a natural result of the republican conception of freedom as 
non-domination.   
This connection between horizontality and solidarity is apparent in various 
scenarios, as when courts apply rights horizontally to achieve an outcome that might have 
been attainable through the conventional vertical model as well. For example, in the case 
Society for Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, the Indian Supreme Court decided that 
private universities could not be allowed to charge certain application fees as a 
constitutional matter, insofar as such fees would obstruct Article 14’s guarantee of 
equality and Article 21’s right to education. 81 These rights to equality and to education 
plausibly could have been secured through alternative means, however—perhaps through 
government subsidies to offset the cost of applying to private universities, or through 
making public universities more accessible.82 When a court applies horizontally a right 
that government might have secured through state action, it seems to assume the distinct 
goal of bringing private entities to respect and guarantee the rights of others. Horizontal 
rights thus become just as much “about” those private entities charged with protecting 
rights and the disposition of those entities toward the rights-bearer.  
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A similar motivation might underlie those instances in which a court imposes a 
penalty on private actors, on top of whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the rights-
bearers’ rights are secured. Consider, for example, the case of M.C. Mehta v. State of 
Tamil Nadu in which the Indian Supreme Court held that employing children younger 
than fourteen in the matchmaking industry violated Article 24. The offending employers 
were required to pay a fine to the “Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund” in 
order to provide for children who might otherwise be compelled to seek employment.83 
While a penalty might promote the deterrence of future violations of rights, it might also 
be motivated by the desire to reform private actors and, specifically, to reform private 
actors to participate in the project of promoting particular rights.  
On the subject of solidarity, we might also revisit the case Daniels v. Scribante 
and Another.84 In deciding that landlords must permit tenants to live in accommodations 
up to requisite standards of dignity, the South African Constitutional Court did more than 
simply hold private entities to account for public values. Rather, the Court decided that 
economic and social rights could directly create obligations of private individuals and 
non-state actors.85 This entails the much broader conclusion that constitutional 
commitments may create positive obligations for private individuals and non-state actors.  
In other words, individuals against whom a right is applied horizontally may not simply 
                                               
83 M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 6 SCC 756. Gardbaum, “Horizontality in the Indian 
Constitution,” 605. 
84 CCT50/16 [2017] ZACC 13. 
85 See also Aoife Nolan, “Daniels v. Scribante: South Africa Pushes the Boundaries of Horizontality and 
Social Rights,” I-CONnect: Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law, 27 Jun. 2017, 
www.iconnectblog.com/2017/06/daniels-v-scribante-south-africa-pushes-the-boundaries-of-




have to refrain from acting in a particular way, but may have to take positive action in 
pursuit of the commitments of the polity.86 On this understanding, horizontal rights have 
the capacity to achieve an equality akin to Pettit’s status equality.87 Insofar as it holds 
private individuals to acknowledge and actively secure the rights of others, horizontality 
makes possible an equality that exceeds the typical negative and positive rights, but rather 
encompasses the mutual cooperation and recognition that might enable one to look others 
in the eye, according to Pettit’s republican “eyeball test.”  
One might object that while the mechanism of horizontal effect seeks solidarity 
among citizens, it does so by judicial decree in contrast with the more typically 
republican emphasis on contestation and a robust civic culture.88 The objection may 
continue that, in spite of the remedies that courts apparently provide, the very act of 
assigning rights obligations to private actors, such as landlords and private universities, 
only serves to underscore and even crystalize how rights-bearers continue to depend on 
such entities. In contrast, a remedy more faithful to republican principles would work 
ultimately to free people from dependence on such actors, insofar as freedom as 
nondomination is possible only in independence from external, likely arbitrary, forces.  
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To this overarching point, that horizontality achieves merely a pretense of 
republican objectives due to its continual reliance on external entities and top-down 
nature of implementation, one might argue that courts applying rights horizontally offer 
an education in republican virtues. In appreciating the institutional character and 
limitations of courts, one must concede that the ends that horizontality may achieve are 
also limited. Indeed, it would be misguided to expect too much too quickly from this 
legal-constitutional mechanism. Nevertheless, horizontal effect may serve as a stop-gap 
in particular instances,89 as well as a kind of preliminary step in realizing republican 
aspirations, as to solidarity, on a broader scale. For, in setting out certain values and 
aspirations for a polity, the horizontal effect of rights may serve an instructive role, 
legitimating certain behaviors and decrying others in private relations. Perhaps this 
initially takes the form of top-down pronouncements against external forces. However, in 
taking the long view, such steps may ultimately contribute to the broader culture and, 
ultimately, render future interventions of the court less necessary. In the words of Eugene 
Rostow, “The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body, and the 
Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar.”90 Rostow goes on to cite the 
situation of African Americans in 1950s America, and argue for the good that the Court 
accomplished in advancing equality in both public and private venues.91 In a similar vein, 
one could argue that doctrines and applications of horizontality offer people something of 
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a civics lesson, and even promise some remedy for what some see as the dearth of 
republican-esque virtue and solidarity, and other ill effects of a pervading liberalism in 
modern constitutionalism.92 It is to these concerns about the role of courts that I turn my 
focus in the final section.  
 
Horizontality and the Republican Credentials of Courts  
Despite the features of horizontal effect that can be justified in republican terms, 
the expansive role for courts that horizontality potentially entails may give some 
republican scholars pause.93 As one scholar explains, “courts lack the fundamental 
democratic quality of allowing an equal input from all affected citizens—their ‘right’ to 
author their rights.”94 Such a tension emerges in one strand of republican thought not yet 
discussed, namely the Republican Revival in the legal literature. Interestingly, some 
republican revivalists, such as Frank Michelman and Mark Tushnet, have also written on 
horizontality.95 However, these scholars never make the connection that horizontality has 
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a republican logic. A reason for this may lie in the nature of their endorsement of 
republicanism. Tushnet, for example, emphasizes such republican principles as self-
government, dialogue, and deliberation,96 principles that may not easily coexist in an 
increasingly court-centric world. Indeed, Tushnet has in other places argued that we must 
“take the Constitution away from the courts.”97  
Frank Michelman does find a role for courts in his republicanism, albeit his 
argument is premised on the very fact that there is a deep tension between, what he 
frames as, “rule of the people” and “rule of law.” In Law’s Republic Michelman states, 
“Republican thought thus demands some way of understanding how laws and rights can 
be both the recreations of citizens and, at the same time, the normative givens that 
constitute and underwrite a political process capable of creating constitutive law.”98  In 
other words, it is not immediately clear how citizens can be both self-governing and 
governed by law. As a solution, Michelman argues that courts are distinctly situated to 
assist the marginalized of society to join the governing body of citizens. For if a polity, 
taken as a whole, is to be truly self-governing, then its citizens must possess the requisite 
agency to govern. According to Michelman, courts can help widen the boundaries to 
encompass more people as citizens, and thus facilitate more perfect self-government. 
Nevertheless, a tension remains in Michelman’s thought as he elsewhere concedes that 
the role of the court ought to remain fairly modest.99 
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Richard Bellamy tries to strike a similar balance in his own work. 100 Drawing on 
a distinction first employed by Philip Pettit,101 Bellamy concedes the usefulness of courts 
for their “editorial” capacity, that is, their ability to force legislatures to reconsider laws 
that may not have accounted for the interests of every group in the polity.102 However, he 
worries that with judicial finality, courts instead begin to exercise an “authorial” role. 
This is the function of making law that, on a republican understanding of freedom as non-
domination, ought to be retained by institutions accountable to and, therefore, controlled 
by the people, rather than unelected judges. Bellamy explains that if a court is allowed 
“to strike down legislation or to read into it its own reading of its fit with constitutional 
norms, then it is in effect usurping the authorial function of electoral democracy.”103 And 
indeed, insofar as people disagree so vastly in their views of the “sources and substance,” 
the “subjects and scope” of rights, we have little reason to entrust judges with answering 
these inherently political questions about rights, much less their horizontal application. 
He states, “At the level of principle, these disputes have not proved any more resolvable 
in seminar rooms of philosophy departments than they have among policy makers and 
citizens.”104 In light of the inevitability of reasonable disagreement, therefore, the 
republican committed to freedom as non-domination may not view courts as proper 
venues to convene Eugene Rostow’s national seminar. Rather, on Bellamy’s telling, the 
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authorial implications of rights questions make their resolution a matter for “real 
democracy.”105  
In his own article “The republican core of the case of judicial review,” Tom 
Hickey addresses these same concerns.106 Like Bellamy, Hickey is a political 
constitutionalist in that he views the source, substance, and scope of rights as political 
questions, rather than questions with set legal answers to be revealed by judges and 
lawyers.107 In this spirit, Hickey joins Bellamy in arguing that judicial review cannot be 
justified in terms of judges’ “epistemic” capacities, their ability to reach right answers, if 
we are operating on a republican conception of freedom as non-domination. However, 
Hickey departs from Bellamy in the extent to which he thinks judicial review can be 
justified in terms of judges’ “legitimating” capacity without necessarily usurping the 
authorial function. This is because courts may actually support those processes by which 
the people retain control over governing institutions and so bolster their republican 
liberty. In particular, Hickey cites the ability of judicial review to “smoke out” dubious 
motives of legislators, draw attention to missed opportunities to accommodate minorities, 
and allow individuals whose rights may have been violated to raise their grievances.108 
Insofar as these features and capacities work toward legitimating law-making processes 
rather than seeking right answers, they become not only compatible with but instrumental 
toward a republican understanding of freedom as non-domination.  In this way, Hickey 
                                               
105 Bellamy 2013, 1030. 
106 Tom Hickey, “The republican core of the case for judicial review,” International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, forthcoming, https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=3137157. 
107 Hickey 5.  




argues, even strong judicial review may remain editorial without infringing on the 
authorial function more properly located in those electoral institutions over which people 
have more control.  
The question underlying Hickey’s and Bellamy’s arguments about judicial review 
is the same question one would need to answer to quell any worries about horizontal 
effect as implemented by courts. Specifically, one must ask whether horizontal effect 
manifests primarily as an editorial or an authorial function. One persuaded by Bellamy 
would almost necessarily conclude that while horizontal effect comports with such 
republican principles as the common good and solidarity, it does not do so through 
republican means. On the other hand, insofar as Hickey understands republican politics to 
accommodate and actually benefit from fairly robust judicial review, so too might he 
admit of horizontal effect. One only need show that horizontal effect serves the 
legitimating purposes Hickey describes to conclude that it does not usurp the authorial 
function. In other words, one must determine whether horizontal effect contributes to the 
court’s ability to legitimate those processes that engender republican freedom, or instead 
raises wholly new political questions that must be left to more democratic institutions. 
How one assesses these issues will directly bear on whether the republican principle of 
self-governance joins the principles of the common good and solidarity in supporting 
horizontal effect, or whether, in the words of Alec Stone Sweet, this aspect of horizontal 
effect instead constitutes a “juridical coup d’état.”109  
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 The claim here is that horizontal effect constitutes a republican vein within the 
tradition of liberal constitutionalism. As explained above, the introduction of horizontal 
effect depends on the continued use of the liberal language of rights.110 In understanding 
this innovation in constitutionalism through the lens of republican theory, therefore, this 
chapter does not intend to cast republicanism and liberalism as dichotomous, nor 
horizontal effect as wholly incompatible with liberal constitutionalism. Rather, it aims to 
draw attention to how particular features of horizontality reflect and finding grounding in 
republican principles, even as this intervention occurs within a larger liberal framework.  
To the extent that these traditions are different, however, we can ask where we find the 
best grounding for horizontal effect. Though previous scholarship understands 
horizontality in liberal contexts,111 the republican tradition comfortably justifies such 
crucial features as the uniformity of private and public spheres’ obligations and the 
solidarity that horizontal effect prompts.  
At the same time, republican principles may also serve to caution courts that 
would give rights horizontal effect. For example, though horizontal effect finds 
justification in the republican principles of the common good and solidarity, the crucial 
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role of the courts in applying rights horizontally may exist in some tension with 
republicanism’s emphasis on self-government. As horizontal effect is still an emerging 
phenomenon, it remains to be seen how it will continue to be employed. Perhaps attention 
to these republican principles and distinctions will better equip scholars and jurists to 
consider horizontal effect as it does support republican freedom.  
 












II. Solidarity in the United States and India  
 
 The previous chapter argued that horizontal effect can be understood as a 
republican vein in liberal constitutionalism, demonstrating how the doctrine itself entails 
uniformity between the standards governing public and private spaces, as well as 
solidarity in the duties resulting between citizens. The next three chapters build on this 
initial discussion by considering these doctrinal characteristics in the context of actual 
places. Whereas the previous chapter considered legal-constitutional doctrines of state 
action and, especially, horizontal effect as something like ideal types, the remaining 
chapters study them as (less precise) practices grounded in particular histories and 
contexts.  
In the present chapter, I examine the United States and India to demonstrate the 
relationship between horizontal effect and solidarity. Both the United States and India 
have histories tainted by social stratification and caste, and eventually adopted 
constitutional commitments to equality. The fact that these countries maintain remedial 
constitutional provisions raises the question of the scope or horizontal effect of these 
commitments—whether the equality rights in their constitutions entail only formal 
equality or a more ambitious vision of solidarity, whether equality obligates state actors 
only or non-state actors as well.1 Indeed, as systems of inequality are frequently rooted in 
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individual practices and beliefs, both countries naturally confronted the issues of whether 
and how this new commitment to equality would bear on the private sphere. Ultimately, 
the different doctrinal resources that resulted from these early constitutional decisions 
would engender strikingly different political-constitutional discourses over the long term.  
The United States’ state action doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
the identification of and adherence to a line between state action and non-state action, so 
that constitutional rights are a source of obligation only for public actors.2 Early on, this 
state action requirement was interpreted strictly to deny the possibility that any private 
institutions might also carry public significance and, by extension, some obligation to 
constitutional rights. On the other hand, in an effort to stem anything like the 
discrimination America continued to experience in the mid-twentieth century, the Indian 
Constituent Assembly provided for horizontal effect in guaranteeing access to public 
accommodations (Article 15), prohibiting untouchability in all spheres (Article 17), and 
in several other provisions. While the task of American jurists became one of parsing the 
line between state and non-state action, Indian jurists instead engaged in the task of 
discerning what constitutional obligations private actors had to each other. The different 
discourses that emerge in the opinions of the respective high courts evince how these 
doctrinal structures shape constitutional politics. 
In short, this chapter recounts two different stages in each country’s constitutional 
history to demonstrate the connection between horizontal effect and solidarity. First, the 
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extent to which each polity assumed a constitutional vision of solidarity at the outset 
influenced its decision to adopt horizontal effect versus a state action requirement. This is 
not to suggest that either country saw a consensus on these issues. Indeed, political actors 
in both contexts expressed a range of views on the reach of their respective constitutional 
commitments to equality. In the words of Indian constitutional framer Jawaharlal Nehru, 
we might describe both situations as “semi-revolutionary”3 insofar as only some people 
had ambitions to affect real solidarity in each polity. Nevertheless, in both contexts, a 
particular viewpoint amid these debates gained a foothold early on, whether through the 
Court’s constitutional interpretation as in the United States or through explicit inclusion 
in the constitutional text as in India. Secondly, this chapter argues the separate but related 
point that the initial legal-constitutional decisions have had practical implications for later 
efforts to argue for the solidarity of citizens as a matter of constitutional politics. 
Although, at this secondary stage, forces seemed to push both the United States and India 
toward greater solidarity, India’s foundation for horizontal effect better supported this 
effort as a constitutional matter.  
The comparison of the United States and India is not to suggest a false 
equivalence either in their histories or in their constitutional projects. Indeed, inequality 
has taken different forms in each country, and their constitutional states of affairs are the 
result of many historical accidents. From the Reconstruction Era through the years of Jim 
Crow, racism pervaded much of America including many of its governing institutions. 
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Moreover, the laissez-faire understandings that prevailed at the time that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted supported early formulations of the state action doctrine. On 
the other hand, not even 80 years after American Reconstruction, India’s constitutional 
moment emerged into a different time and world. While both the caste system and 
religious conflict continually plagued the country, the fact that the Indian Constituent 
Assembly coincided with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
attests to the fact that this was a new era for understandings of equality. Given such 
historical contingencies, it is unsurprising that the pursuit of equality in these countries 
would take different forms. On this basis, their comparison may not seem worthwhile at 
first blush. However, insofar as one of the very purposes of this chapter is to examine the 
kinds of constitutional projects that do (and do not) give rise to horizontal effect, it does 
make sense to consider such different constitutional orders—one a product of the 
eighteenth century and primarily committed to classical political rights, and the other one 
of the most ambitious constitutions of the Global South and assuming a wider array of 
rights obligations. Even while comparing these two countries, therefore, we can also 
account for the constitutional development of each on its own terms. 
Underlying this chapter is an appreciation for the necessarily political nature of 
questions concerning the relationship between public and private. The legal realists 
argued similarly in the early twentieth century, when they challenged many jurists in their 
belief that the American state action doctrine was neutral. Speaking specifically about the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in the United States 




The public-private distinction on which the state action doctrine relies is 
incomprehensible without a recognition of the socially constructed nature 
of the distinction. This, in turn, depends upon assumptions regarding the 
relative importance of nondiscrimination in certain activities and societal 
expectations of the appropriate scope of government responsibility to 
confront discriminatory action.4 
 
In other words, regardless of jurisprudential particulars, the actual location of the line 
between public and private that the state action doctrine requires depends on normative 
judgments that cannot be determined on the basis of the doctrine alone.5 More 
specifically, despite ostensive doctrinal constraints, an American judge may effectively 
bring to bear rights on the private sphere simply by defining “state action” broadly, as 
including, for example, judicial enforcement of private agreements.6   
In a way, therefore, this project picks up on the legal realists’ insight in examining 
doctrine in the context of the larger constitutional projects. This chapter also pushes 
further, however, in that it argues that doctrine does include some substantive content in 
framing the very questions that constitutional actors ask. While the liberal logic of state 
action invites jurists to frame their questions in terms of a divide between public and 
private, the republican logic of horizontal effect lends itself to an understanding of shared 
duties across spheres. Even if the particular location of the line between public and 
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private is not determined by the state action doctrine, the negotiating of the line between 
public and private in particular cases is influenced by the fact of a state action doctrine. In 
a similar way, while a doctrine of horizontal effect may not provide a determinative 
answer to which right should take precedence over the other as, for example, in a 
proportionality calculation between the right to freedom of expression and the right 
against the economic harm of boycotts,7 the fact of a doctrine of horizontality influences 
understandings of the relationship between public and private.  
I will proceed by recounting key moments in the development of the right to 
equality in the United States and India. While each country attached a legal-constitutional 
doctrine to equality fairly soon after this right was adopted, doctrine alone did not furnish 
all answers regarding the content of the right. Much negotiating of what the right to 
equality required would ensue in both countries. While understandings of the content and 
requirements of equality have changed, however, constitutional doctrine, though not 
determinative, is omnipresent and influential in bringing these larger logics of liberalism 
and republicanism to bear on conceptions of equality. These logics are present in 
constitutional doctrine themselves and have demonstrably impacted the constitutional 
history. 
 
The American State Action Doctrine: Negotiating Equality Along the Public-
Private Divide 
                                               




This section argues in the context of United States constitutional history that the 
concept of state action itself entails a kind of liberal logic insofar as it seeks a definite 
line between public and private. While the outcome of a case may not be determined by 
doctrine alone, as the legal realists argue, the liberal logic of state action does influence 
judicial reasoning. Even while understandings of the requirements of equality began to 
change during the Civil Rights Movement, the liberal logic of state action had so 
accommodated prior notions of what ought to be considered private versus public, that 
justifying the regulation of public accommodations in terms of equal protection was 
largely understood as challenging the state action requirement itself. Even though Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 managed to prohibit racial discrimination in public 
accommodations, the liberal logic of the state action doctrine persists in shaping our 
understanding of what equality requires as a constitutional matter. 
In the first session of the 39th Congress, Senator Jacob Howard explained that the 
purpose of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was “to abolish[] all 
class legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of 
persons to a code not applicable to another.”8 In this way the Republicans of the post-
Civil War era hoped the forthcoming changes to the Constitution would set the stage for 
effecting the equality of all in the states. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments were thus ratified between the years 1865 and 1870. The text of each of 
these was clear enough. The Thirteenth abolished slavery. The Fourteenth extended 
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citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,” and guaranteed the 
equal protection of the laws and due process of law to people in every state. The Fifteenth 
guaranteed that the right to vote would not be contingent on one’s race. Congress quickly 
moved to exercise the power the amendments granted to enforce the new constitutional 
commitment to equality. To this extent, Congress had some preliminary say in 
determining what the new commitment to equality would require in practice. In the 
ensuing years, Congress enacted several laws in pursuance of these amendments, 
including the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which guaranteed, among other things, “‘full and 
equal’ enjoyment of inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, 
regardless of race.”9 As justification for this legislation, Congress cited its power to 
enforce both the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.  
Even at the time that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 passed, Congress was fairly 
divided on whether legislating on public accommodations exceeded its constitutional 
powers to say nothing of prudence in a turbulent time.10 Indeed, the end of the Civil War 
did not mark the end of political contestation. A strong contingent from the southern 
states sought to limit the progress of Reconstruction as much as possible, and the 
Republican Party was itself divided on how to understand and interpret the new 
commitment to equality. While the Radical Republicans were eager to read the new 
amendments as much more comprehensive in their reach, the Centrist Republicans were 
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content to extend freed persons a more formal, limited equality.11 This range of positions 
with respect to the new amendments were on full display when the Civil Rights and 
Enforcement Acts were eventually challenged in court. In a series of cases, known 
collectively as the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court was tasked with 
offering its own interpretation of the Civil War Amendments and the extent to which 
Congress did or did not act within its proper limits in its subsequent legislation. In these 
cases, black plaintiffs sued for being excluded from theaters and transportation facilities, 
in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The owners of those businesses argued that 
Congress had no authority to regulate their establishments under the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.12 In an eight to one decision, the Court ruled in favor of the 
business owners.  
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Joseph Bradley addressed the extent of 
congressional authority on the basis of each amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment, he 
conceded, had no state action requirement. That is, the amendment prohibited slavery 
both with respect to the actions of the state as well as the actions of private (i.e. non-state) 
actors. However, the Court did not accept the plaintiffs’ argument that their exclusion 
from such public places as theaters and transit facilities amounted to “badges of 
slavery.”13 To accept this interpretation, Justice Bradley maintained, would be to “[run] 
the slavery argument into the ground.”14 On Bradley’s telling, black people had already 
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been granted their “essential freedoms” in their civil and political rights, and calling any 
act of private discrimination a badge or incident of slavery would render the actual 
protection meaningless. In private correspondences, Bradley further worried that 
capacious interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment would impose “another kind of 
slavery” on white proprietors.15  Treating public accommodations and private gatherings 
as belonging to the same category, Bradley insisted, “Surely a white lady cannot be 
enforced by Congressional enactment to admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or 
dinner party.”16  
In this way, Bradley began to draw the lines of what equality would mean and 
require for American constitutional law. Freedom extended only so far as to grant civil 
and political rights. So long as black persons had such freedoms, the Thirteenth 
Amendment could not (and, Bradley’s argument implies, should not) do more for them. 
Moreover, though Bradley conceded that the Thirteenth Amendment did not include a 
requirement for state action, underlying his reasoning on this constitutional provision was 
a palpable urgency that the Court maintain a strict line between public and private, and 
maintain that line in a particular place. Specifically, the Thirteenth Amendment only 
required individuals in private spheres not to have slaves. But it did not require anything 
more of individuals, and especially not in private arenas. Anything more would unduly 
make black people the “special favorite of the laws.”17 
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Bradley’s reasoning with respect to the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 
arguments would reflect a similar urgency to maintain a line between public and private. 
The difference here, of course, is that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does include 
language that raises this question of state action. The text of the amendment reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.18 
 
To the extent that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment has a state action requirement, 
its application depends on some prior understanding of what constitutes state action (or 
state neglect, as it were19) as opposed to purely private action. Looking to draw such a 
line between public and private, Justice Bradley considered the requirements and content 
of the right to equality. In making this determination, he relied on the distinction between 
civil rights and social rights that he had begun to develop in his 1874 Circuit opinion for 
United States v. Cruikshank.20 Brandwein explains that during the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “Centrist and Radical Republicans agreed on a core body of civil 
rights: contract, property, suing, testifying, and equal redress for injuries. For centrists, 
access to public accommodations, schools, intermarriage were typically social rights.”21 
Brandwein continues to explain that while the Radical Republicans would have both the 
civil and social protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Centrist Republicans drew this 
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distinction for the very purpose of omitting social rights from the guarantee of equal 
protection.22 Bradley thus pursued this line of argument in the Civil Rights Cases, setting 
the initial limits for the reach of equality in the polity.  
Justice Harlan’s lone dissent sheds light on the fact that the Court had a choice in 
Civil Rights Cases respecting the meaning of the new amendments. In his dissent, Harlan 
argues against Bradley’s narrow interpretation, explaining that the Thirteenth 
Amendment protects against more than slavery per se. Indeed, the Thirteenth 
Amendment calls for a more capacious interpretation that includes the abolition of certain 
corollary “badges and incidents” of slavery. Contrary to Bradley’s reading, therefore, the 
Thirteenth Amendment equipped Congress to contend with the many “burdens and 
disabilities” that freed persons confronted as a direct result of centuries of enslavement.23 
Full abolition of slavery, full freedom in any meaningful sense, required protection of 
“those fundamental rights which were the essence of civil freedom” and protection from 
“all discrimination against [freed persons], because of their race.”24 On Harlan’s telling, 
“the essence of civil freedom” thus extended further than Bradley conceded to include the 
very venues that the Civil Rights Act proposed to regulate, namely, “inns, public 
conveyances, and places of public amusement.”  
Harlan understands the ability to use inns and public conveyances as part and 
parcel of a rudimentary conception of freedom and, thus, comprising the freedom that the 
Thirteenth Amendment intended to guarantee. Indeed, such services as these institutions 
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offer are “so far fundamental as to be deemed the essence of civil freedom,” no less than 
those rights that the majority of the Court did concede.25 That the agents of these 
institutions are technically non-state actors does not detract from the fact that they 
maintain public significance and power over the enjoyment of the rights in question. 
Harlan explains, “no matter who is the agent, or what is the agency, the function 
performed is that of the State.”26 On this account, these agents are executing public 
functions in offering these services and, thus, may be subject to Congress’s efforts to give 
effect to the guarantees of the Thirteenth Amendment. In the Court’s decision to rule 
otherwise, he explains, freed persons are “robbed of some of the most essential means of 
existence, and all this solely because they belonged to a particular race which the nation 
has liberated.”27 
Apart from this argument that the regulations of the Civil Rights Act follow from 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom, Harlan also explains that access of 
all-comers to inns and public conveyances is a principle rooted in common law. In this 
light, the Court’s rejection of the Civil Rights Act becomes even more significant as not 
simply a rejection of one possible interpretation of a constitutional amendment, but a 
rejection of long-standing common law intended to regulate such private interchange. On 
this point, Harlan quotes none other than Justice Story: 
An innkeeper is bound to take in all travelers and wayfaring persons, and 
to entertain them, if he can accommodate them, for a reasonable 
compensation, and he must guard their goods with proper diligence. . . . If 
an innkeeper improperly refuses to receive or provide for a guest, he is 
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liable to be indicted therefor. . . . They (carriers of passengers) are no more 
at liberty to refuse a passenger, if they have sufficient room and 
accommodations, than an innkeeper is to refuse suitable room and 
accommodations to a guest.28 
 
On this basis, Harlan highlights the public nature of such institutions as inns and public 
conveyances. With this “quasi-public employment,” he explains, comes “certain duties 
and responsibilities to the public,” to serve all guests without distinction as to race or 
color.29 
 Harlan proceeds next to consider the Civil Rights Act’s attempt to regulate 
“places of public amusement.” While such places as theatres do not necessarily qualify as 
“the most essential means of existence,” they are still public in the sense that proprietors 
devote their property “to a use in which the public has an interest.” To this extent, Harlan 
explains, these institutions operate only under the license of law, and so, the authority to 
establish and maintain them is public in nature. Harlan concludes on this basis that such 
institutions must “submit to be controlled by the public for the common good….”30 This 
line of thinking, that such privately owned institutions operating under the law must 
comply with the common good, makes more explicit the republican significance that 
inheres throughout Harlan’s opinion. In the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil War 
Amendments more generally, Congress rearticulated the polity’s “public thing” to 
include a conception of freedom now comprising racial equality. This was a project that 
involved much more than the abolition of slavery, but the abolition of those badges and 
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incidents that also contradicted this new articulation of the common good. In the Civil 
Rights Act, Congress therefore affirms that “since the nation has established universal 
freedom in this country for all time, there shall be no discrimination, based merely upon 
race or color, in respect of the accommodations and advantages of public conveyances, 
inns, and places of public amusement.” In other words, it established universal freedom 
as the object of the nation understood as a whole and sought to realize this object in both 
law and fact. 
As Harlan understood the Thirteenth Amendment to be as much about 
discrimination writ large as about the institution of chattel slavery in particular, so too did 
he understand the Fourteenth Amendment as transcending formal equality to include all 
the “privileges or immunities fundamental in republican citizenship.”31 His more 
expansive interpretation of equality and citizenship comes through when he explains that 
the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically, that the citizenship clause of Section 1 
guarantee “[e]xemption from race discrimination in respect of the civil rights which are 
fundamental in citizenship in a republican government.”32 He goes on to read Congress’s 
Section 5 enforcement power in light of this comprehensive understanding of citizenship. 
Given his broad reading, the new amendments are far from self-executing and necessarily 
require Congress to take positive action to give these new constitutional commitments 
their full effect, as it so attempted in the Civil Rights Act. Harlan explains the rationale 
undergirding the Fourteenth Amendment accordingly: “To meet this new peril to the 
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black race, that the purposes of the nation might not be doubted or defeated, and by way 
of further enlargement of the power of Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment was 
proposed for adoption.”33  
In this way, Harlan relies on the citizenship clause to justify Congress’s authority 
to legislate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that the Amendment’s 
language is “distinctly affirmative in character,”34 not simply prohibiting the states from 
violating the new commitment to equality, but empowering Congress to give effect to the 
Civil War Amendments. Ought not Congress to have the constitutional authority, he 
questions, to “do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship 
what it did…for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive 
slaves”?35 Harlan would thus have Congress pursue a notion of citizenship encompassing 
much more than a simple check list of traditional legal criteria.36 Rather, the Civil War 
Amendments aimed at more than formal equality in citizenship, on Harlan’s telling, to 
bring equality in all spheres of life with a vital solidarity among citizens as the ultimate 
goal. He states, 
It was perfectly well known that the great danger to the equal enjoyment by 
citizens of their rights as citizens was to be apprehended not altogether 
from unfriendly State legislation, but from the hostile action of corporation 
and individuals in the States. And it is to be presumed that it was intended 
by that section to clothe Congress with power and authority to meet that 
danger.37 
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In this way, Harlan’s account of the amended Constitution might be described as 
entailing more of a vision or project than did Bradley’s. Indeed, his opinion reveals how 
the Civil War Amendments might have marked, in the words of Jacobsohn and Roznai, 
the beginning of a kind of step-by-step revolution toward full racial equality.38  
That this was even a question that the Radical Republicans and Centrist 
Republicans debated in framing the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Justice Bradley and 
Justice Harlan debated as a matter of constitutional law in the context of the Civil Rights 
Cases, illustrates that there was a range of possible interpretations of equality. More 
importantly, this illustrates that the state action requirement did not, by itself, determine 
that regulation of public accommodations was beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection. Brandwein does explain that the Radical Republican 
interpretation that public accommodation rights were included in civil rights had always 
been “a marginal position.” Quoting Charles Calhoun, she explains “‘For most 
Republicans...the good society entailed [civil and] political equality but not social 
equality.’”39 Though this may have been the more common position, it was neither the 
only interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment nor of the state action requirement. 
Ultimately, the Centrist Republican conception of what equality required 
triumphed in the Civil Rights Cases. This particular line between public and private, with 
public accommodations falling decidedly on the side of private, came to be understood as 
required by the state action doctrine itself. Moreover, this division between public and 
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private entailed by the state action doctrine was pushed to limit the rights of African 
Americans even further. Indeed, Brandwein’s primary project in Rethinking the Judicial 
Settlement of Reconstruction is to show that the decision in the Civil Rights Cases did not 
necessarily entail “the rejection of black property, contract, safety, and voting rights,” 
actions which would all be justified in the name of the Civil Rights Cases in the years of 
Jim Crow.40 Put differently, these were not necessary outcomes of state action, what I 
have characterized as the liberal logic of drawing a line between public and private. 
Rather, these outcomes were also influenced by the widespread goal of reinforcing 
certain ascriptive categories and hierarchies, to use Rogers Smith’s language,41 rather 
than pure, good faith efforts to interpret the requirements of equal protection.  
Nevertheless the state action requirement invites the drawing of the line between 
public and private, between state action and non-state action. Therefore, in deliberating 
the requirements of equality, a polity could decide that “social rights” do belong on the 
side of the private, as the Court did in the Civil Rights Cases. This is not to condemn 
American constitutional law to relativism and positivism, but only to highlight that this 
determination concerns prior conceptions of the content and requirements of equality, and 
so is not determined by the state action doctrine by itself.42 While this history does 
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suggest that this initial determination, that “the social rights of men and races in the 
community”43 were a strictly private matter, found a comfortable home in the liberal 
logic of the state action doctrine, the Court and larger polity had opportunities to 
renegotiate the initial line drawn in the Civil Rights Cases. Indeed, in the same way that 
Harlan’s dissent revealed a plausible alternative interpretation of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments that might have brought equality to civil society, many forks in 
the constitutional road arose after the start of the twentieth century. A kind of path 
dependence ensued, however, that proved the force of precedent both real and imagined 
on these questions. While as the Court and the polity grew largely sympathetic to a 
broader conception of equality and the rights of citizens, therefore, any move toward 
greater equality would not be justified as a constitutional matter, even when a plausible 
constitutional argument was available. 
After decades of an equality defined by “civil not social” and “separate but 
equal,” the Court and general populace became receptive to a more capacious 
understanding of the content and requirements of equality. That the Court might in fact 
pursue a line of constitutional argument that allowed equality rights to reach private 
spaces seemed plausible when the Court briefly embraced a broader understanding of 
state action. In the 1948 case Shelley v. Kraemer, homeowners in St. Louis adopted a 
restrictive racial covenant that prevented African Americans and other minorities from 
purchasing properties in their neighborhood. The covenant stated, no property shall be 
“occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the 
                                               




use of said property . . . against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said 
property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”44 
When one of the homeowners party to this covenant sold his house to an African 
American family by the name of Shelley, others in the neighborhood asked the courts to 
uphold the restrictive racial covenant as a private contract to which they had all 
voluntarily agreed. The Supreme Court of Missouri decided to enforce the covenant on 
the basis that it was a purely private contract and did not bear on the state’s obligation to 
uphold the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equal protection. This was a matter 
of private action therefore, rather than state action. However, on appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court found that the very act of enforcing the covenant did constitute state 
action. In the Opinion of the Court, Justice Vinson explained that “the full panoply of 
state power”45 was ultimately responsible for preventing the Shelley family from 
occupying the home they had purchased. To this extent, one could not honestly say that 
the state had “merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose 
such discriminations as they see fit.”46 While the Court could not prevent the drafting of 
such covenants, therefore, neither could it enforce them without directly participating in 
discriminatory actions and, thus, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In this way, the Court seemed to find a path forward from the strictures of 
Bradley’s initial reasoning and subsequent developments that continually left Congress’s 
bereft of any power to implement widespread equality. Indeed, in the years leading up to 
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the sit-in protests, some spectators were hopeful that Shelley’s move to recognize the 
Court’s enforcement of private contracts as constituting state action might next lead to 
the Court’s reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to require equal access to 
public accommodations.47 However, others were less optimistic about the impact of this 
case, whether for reasons of strategy or reasons of principle. In a 2010 article, 
Christopher Schmidt describes Shelley as “a singular case,” explaining that “it is best 
understood as a court putting aside doctrinal complexities in order to attack an immoral 
and socially destructive practice.”48 And indeed, the case does constitute a kind of high 
water mark in the Court’s willingness to stretch the bounds of the state action doctrine so 
as to hold private actors accountable for constitutional principles. No case after Shelley 
follows similar reasoning. While the Court would in some ways find workarounds to the 
state action doctrine, it “quickly reasserted a traditional, limited conception of state 
action,” and in non-race cases in particular.49   
That such retrospective analyses find Shelley to be anomalous in United States 
constitutionalism is not altogether surprising when viewed in the light of early accounts 
of the case. Many legal scholars, including many who were sympathetic to the cause of 
equality, faulted the Court for its reasoning and even the outcome it reached in Shelley. 
Herbert Wechsler criticized the Court for departing from “neutral principles” of the law. 
He explains:  
That the action for the state court is action of the state...is, of course, 
entirely obvious....What is not obvious, and is the crucial step, is that the 
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state may properly be charged with discrimination when it does no more 
than give effect to an agreement that the individual involved is, by 
hypothesis, entirely free to make.50 
 
In other words, according to Wechsler, while state action was present in the general 
sequence of events surrounding the Shelley case, one could not honestly say that state 
action was responsible for the particular discrimination at issue, namely the restrictive 
covenant. The state may have had a hand in the covenant’s enforcement, but it was not 
the source of the discriminatory act. Any decision to the contrary, Wechsler argued, was 
merely a result of the Court’s wanting to reach a more favorable outcome rather than to 
adhere to neutral principles of the law. The fact that such dissents came from parties that 
were likely to welcome the outcome in Shelley as a practical matter speaks volumes of 
the general understanding of the state action doctrine at the time. While the Court in 
Shelley had technically granted the premise that only state action was accountable to 
constitutional obligations, it departed from the thrust of the Civil Rights Cases in that 
constitutional standards ultimately governed the behavior of private actors.  
That scholars and jurists objected to the Court’s decision at the time is not to say 
that the issue of state action was settled, however. Indeed, Shelley and other cases such as 
Marsh v. Alabama (1946) did lead some to question the state action doctrine as 
traditionally understood.51 Louis Henkin, for example, suggested in a 1962 article that the 
Court should have decided Shelley v. Kraemer by weighing the Shelley family’s right to 
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equality against the other homeowners’ liberty to enter a contract.52 He explains, “Under 
today's concepts of due process, we have suggested, the state may not forbid a person to 
be whimsical or capricious in his social relations or as to whom he will admit to his 
home.”53 Regardless of how the Court decided in Shelley, its enforcement would have 
constituted state action aimed at depriving one of the parties’ rights.  
In this way, Henkin argues for a mode of decision-making that begins to resemble 
horizontal effect, explaining how the Court should have engaged in a process of 
balancing to determine which right ought to triumph in this particular instance. More 
often than not, he thinks, equal protection will triumph given the commitments of the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution does permit, and even protects, a certain 
ability of individuals to act arbitrarily with respect to the company they choose to keep. 
And so, the Court cannot but account for such freedoms of association as well. On this 
understanding, Henkin explains, Shelley essentially asked the “the state not prefer the old 
contract over his new one, that it not lend support to organized zoning for an improper 
purpose, to a discrimination which has no basis but race and serves no purpose but 
prejudice.”54 Hence, while different rights may have been at stake here, the facts of the 
case and the commitments of the Constitution pretty clearly favored the Shelleys. 
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Henkin’s heterodox take on state action never gained traction, however.55 Indeed, 
something closer to Wechsler’s understanding stuck in the American legal world and in 
the Court’s own understanding. Just a couple of years after Shelley, the Supreme Court 
actually denied certiorari of a case in which the New York Court of Appeals had “found 
no state action in a racial discrimination claim against a private housing developer.”56 
The Supreme Court opted to deny cert even in spite of the fact that “the developer had 
received extensive state support in the form of land condemnation, street closings, and a 
twenty-five year tax exemption for a New York case just a couple of years later.”57  In the 
end, Shelley was the exception that proved the rule, a fact that became even clearer as the 
Court began to confront the cases resulting from the sit-in protests. Even as the Court 
largely ruled in favor of protestors, finding ways to help them evade trespass laws during 
the sit-ins of the early 1960s, it deliberately avoided upsetting the status quo of state 
action.58 
Around the time that Congress was debating the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Supreme Court was deciding the case Bell v. Maryland.59 In this case, twelve African 
American students were refused service in a Baltimore restaurant and convicted of 
criminal trespassing. As Schmidt explains it, “the question came down to which party 
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was the primary lawbreaker, the discriminating proprietor or the sit-in demonstrator.”60 
Given its favorable rulings in the sit-in cases of the previous terms, it seemed possible 
that the Court would take this opportunity finally to overturn the Civil Rights Cases. And 
indeed, Justices Douglas and Goldberg were in favor of doing just this throughout the 
deliberations. Even in the earlier case of Garner v. Louisiana (1961), Douglas wrote in 
his dissent: “Restaurants, whether in a drugstore, department store, or bus terminal, are a 
part of the public life of most of our communities. Though they are private enterprises, 
they are public facilities in which the State may not enforce a policy of racial 
segregation.” Three years later and with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the cusp of 
passing in the legislature, the time seemed ripe to reconsider the constitutional question.  
Even while a majority of the Court was sympathetic to the protesters, however, 
other considerations were in play that ultimately led the Court to vacate and remand the 
decision back to the Maryland Court of Appeals. Schmidt makes much of the fact that 
Justice Black was disquieted by the methods of the protestors, for example. Eager to 
maintain law and order and not to stamp civil disobedience with the endorsement of the 
Court,61 Justice Black, along with Justices Harlan (II) and White, thus decided in favor of 
the restaurant owner. The remaining six justices wavered between considering the 
constitutional question and taking the intermediate step of vacating and remanding since 
Maryland had recently passed laws against discrimination in public accommodations. 
Led by Justice Brennan, the justices seeking the more moderate line put much weight on 
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the fact that the Civil Rights Act was about to pass Congress. If they could prevent any 
disruption of this progress by avoiding a (doctrinally) controversial decision, then so 
much the better.  
Members of the public sympathetic to the Civil Rights Movement were largely 
unconcerned and even unaware of such jurisprudential hurdles, however. In fact, the 
primary impetus behind the sit-in protests was the widespread conviction that the 
principle of equality advanced in Brown v. Board of Education ought to apply to public 
accommodations as well. Moral and constitutional consistency, they held, required 
nothing less. At various moments, this view, that the constitutional commitment to 
equality directly bore on private spaces, received the imprimatur of such public figures as 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Dwight Eisenhower.62 Moreover, almost as if to draw from 
Harlan I’s conception of citizenship in the Civil Rights Cases, John F. Kennedy stated 
that the “right to be served in facilities which are open to the public” was an “elementary” 
right and one of “the privileges of being American.” 63 Chris Schmidt quotes him at 
length: 
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant 
open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best public school 
available, if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him, if, 
in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then 
who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and 
stand in his place?64 
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In light of this, it seems that any hesitance the justices felt about reinterpreting the state 
action doctrine was not a result of the desire to appease the public. On the contrary, those 
sectors of the public that were sympathetic viewed equality at lunch counters, restaurants, 
and the like as no less constitutive of the equality to which the polity had committed in 
the Fourteenth Amendment and clarified in Brown. In thinking about these venues, the 
protestors and even the aforementioned public figures were not so concerned about 
drawing a line between public and private, therefore, as much as they aimed to transform 
the polity understood as a whole and so support the requisite conditions for solidarity 
among all citizens.  
 Even those who were more aware of the doctrinal complexities of state action and 
equal protection did not necessarily view these precedents as insurmountable. In a 1960 
article, for example, The Washington Post described the state action doctrine as “an 
evolving thing.”65 It stated,  
An assertion that would have been laughed out of court 20 years ago may 
be an established right today after a long step-by-step process of 
fashioning a new rule. The courts may not rule today that Negroes have a 
right to eat beside white persons in private stores. They might so rule three 
or five or 10 years from now after taking it a piece at a time.66 
 
Such an account that “a long step-by step process” was unfolding does offer good reason 
to think that Bradley’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was never going to be 
the final word. On this understanding, the Court could ultimately decide that African 
Americans had “a right to eat beside white persons,” so reinterpreting the state action 
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doctrine to conform to the emerging conventional wisdom and, as it happens, closer to 
Justice Harlan’s conception of citizenship in the Civil Rights Cases. Even the Chief 
Justice himself thought it possible that the jurisprudence might unfold in this way. 
Indeed, in speaking of the Court’s practice of avoiding the merits and instead deciding 
the sit-in cases on more procedural issues, Earl Warren explained that he had hoped that 
the Court “could take these cases step by step, not reaching the final question until much 
experience had been had.”67 As Warren thus admitted the possibility and even some 
desire to develop the state action doctrine, in retrospect it was telling that these 
reflections came in a more general explanation of why the Court had not yet taken such 
steps. 
Private correspondences suggest that many of the justices initially considered 
decoupling section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, establishing the legal principle of 
equal protection, from section 5, establishing Congress’s enforcement power. This would 
allow the Court to “follow Congress in redefining the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause—that is, the congressional interpretation of equal protection would then be 
adopted by the Court as a self-enforcing constitutional right.”68 Even Justice Harlan (II) 
who ultimately dissented from Brennan’s majority opinion in Bell v. Maryland was 
willing to consider this rationale, since it would have allowed them to tread lightly with 
respect to the jurisprudential precedent.69 This approach was plausible enough to be 
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floated in Congress, too, during deliberations for the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Nevertheless, this decoupling strategy would not control the decision in Bell v. Maryland, 
and, as we will see below, would not serve as the primary authorization for Congress’s 
Act.  
Despite the potential doctrinal workaround of decoupling Sections 1 and 5, to say 
nothing of the favorable state of public opinion, the Court ultimately avoided the 
constitutional question altogether. Scholarship identifies a variety of contributing factors 
leading to this outcome, from Justice Black’s fears of endorsing civil disobedience to the 
strategic calculation of how their decision might affect the contemporaneous efforts of 
Congress.70 Among these factors, too, the justices simply were wary of taking on the 
significant endeavor of revisiting and revising the state action doctrine and even the equal 
protection clause itself. During one of the conferences, Justice Black seemed to echo 
Justice Bradley’s argument in the Civil Rights Cases: “[The Fourteenth Amendment] 
does not destroy what has until very recently been universally recognized in this country 
as the unchallenged right of man who owns a business to run the business in his own way 
so long as some valid regulatory statute does not tell him to do otherwise.”71 The clear 
belief and fear here was that the Fourteenth Amendment maintained a particular 
distinction between public and private, and the regulation of public accommodations fell 
decidedly on the side of private, non-state action. So while the states were free to root any 
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anti-discrimination law in their own commitments to equality, the United States Supreme 
Court at least had to abide by the line-drawing project defined decades earlier in the Civil 
Rights Cases, as well as the particular place at which the Bradley had located this line 
that prevented the application of equality in public accommodations. 
Even those Justices who joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinion were 
concerned not to depart too quickly or drastically from what they considered to be the 
requirements of doctrine. Perhaps their concerns were primarily strategic or prudential—
even this, though, suggests that these distinctions between public and private and state 
action and non-state action remained deeply rooted in constitutional understanding to 
such a degree that such caution was warranted. That the general public’s understanding of 
equality’s requirements had largely albeit not completely changed by this period only 
throws the point into sharper relief. In the end, even the activist Warren Court was not up 
to the task of redefining equality as a constitutional matter, and so uprooting the 
conceptions of public and private that had developed around equality in the form of the 
state action doctrine. 
 Contemporaneous with the Court’s tortured deliberations in the sit-in case Bell v. 
Maryland, Congress held debates similar in both subject and intensity. In working to pass 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, members of Congress considered whether they might rely 
on their enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This basis 
was clearly more germane to the questions at issue than the alternative basis of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce. Moreover, a few of the Court’s recent decisions 




justices might welcome the shift in constitutional discourse this would inevitably entail. 
On the other hand, relying instead on the power to regulate commerce was safer if this 
new Civil Rights Act was to withstand lawsuits. Indeed, even if its basis was less clearly 
connected to issues of discrimination and equality, the Commerce Clause would not pose 
the same challenge to the Civil Rights Cases’ precedent.72  
Apart from the high stakes of the particular issue of civil rights, Chris Schmidt 
explains that Congress simply did not accept its position “as a coequal branch on matters 
of constitutional interpretation”73 and, for this reason, was ready to defer to the Court’s 
1883 precedent. Schmidt’s account reveals a painful irony in Congress’s deferential 
attitude. Indeed, the Court was actually looking to Congress to act on the constitutional 
issue. As mentioned above, the Court had in its own deliberations considered decoupling 
the first and fifth sections of the Fourteenth Amendment that would have allowed 
Congress to advance its own understanding of equality rights in law under its 
enforcement power.74 Nevertheless, the Court’s “evolving position on this question was 
largely hidden from view.” 75 As Congress was not privy to these developments among 
the judges, it ultimately cited its power to regulate commerce as the primary 
constitutional basis by which it passed the statute. While it also cited its enforcement 
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power under the Fourteenth Amendment, this provision was “relegated to a 
supplementary role.”76 
Not long after the Civil Rights Act became law in 1964, proprietors began to 
challenge Title II’s requirement that people not be denied access to public 
accommodations on the basis of race. In such cases as Katzenbach v. McClung and Heart 
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court confronted the question of whether Congress 
acted within its constitutional powers in its recent legislation. Moreover, the Court 
considered what part of the Constitution gave Congress this authority. Although Congress 
had relied primarily on the Commerce Clause, that the law mentioned the Fourteenth 
Amendment at all kept section 5 in play as a possibility. Even at this stage, however, 
when the Court was in a position that it could defer to Congress, it upheld Title II on the 
basis of the Commerce Clause alone, “refusing to evaluate the alternative Fourteenth 
Amendment rationale to which most of the Justices felt Congress had not committed 
itself.”77 The justices considered the possibility in conference, but in the end only 
Douglas and Goldberg wanted to address Congress’s Section 5 enforcement powers.78 
And so, what much of the country had come to understand as a question of constitutional 
morality remained a private space in constitutional law, to be regulated simply as a matter 
of commerce and not implicating rights in any way.  
 One might argue that this outcome of the Civil Rights Movement has not 
prevented progress in racial equality. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act has become quasi-
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constitutional in nature79 and, beginning even before 1964, many states have done much 
to combat discrimination in their own anti-discrimination laws. Nevertheless, recent cases 
show the fragility of statutes for the very reason that they do not enjoy the same 
entrenched status as constitutional law. One need look no further than NFIB v. Sebelius 
(2012) to see that the Court has periodically reined in Congress’s commerce power, or 
Shelby County v. Holder (2013) to see that even such a milestone as the Voting Rights 
Act is not beyond incursion. Moreover, from an expressive or symbolic point of view, 
that the Civil Rights Act continues to be grounded in Congress’s commerce power rather 
than the principle of equality seems to degrade its status in the constitutional order from 
the start.   
As members of the Court fully admit that this area of law is a “conceptual disaster 
area,”80 they continue to work within and around this framework. Particularly in the 
realm of civil rights, the Court has decided that privately owned institutions that are 
somehow “entangled” with the state or that serve what are traditionally thought of as 
“public functions” can, in fact, be regulated as state actors. Though these workarounds 
may bring the Court to the outcomes it desires, they reach such conclusions only by 
expanding the definition of the state, so preserving the core of Justice Bradley’s legacy 
rather than obligating private actors to the constitutional commitment to equality. Perhaps 
it is not surprising that the Court has employed these doctrines of “entanglement” and 
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“public function” in the area of civil rights more than any other.81 Indeed, this is a realm 
in which the country has patently shifted its thinking as evinced in the sit-ins and the 
public’s constitutional understanding of these protests. In other words, we see these 
workarounds to the state action doctrine occurring precisely where the polity has changed 
its position and when it did want to effect solidarity among citizens. This is not to say that 
this shift jeopardizes the state action doctrine in general. Indeed, that some private space 
ought to exist beyond the reach of public values remains the prevailing constitutional 
understanding. Nevertheless, in the sit-ins, the polity confronted the valid political 
question of whether to rethink concepts of public and private with respect to the 
particular issue of racial equality. This question, which many found so reasonable 
following Brown, would prove inviable as a matter of constitutional law.  
In much the same way that the Civil Rights Cases generated a kind of path 
dependence in future cases, so too did the Court’s continued abidance by (and its 
particular formulation of) the state action doctrine in Bell v. Maryland preserve this 
constitutional interpretation to see another day. The sit-in protests offered the Court a 
chance to draw the line between public and private anew, and so reconceive the 
Fourteenth Amendment to approximate Harlan’s account of equality in his memorable 
dissent. Though many circumstances at the time seemed to favor such a decision, the 
precedent and certain institutional factors were powerful enough to lead the court to 
foreclose such alternative understandings of the state action doctrine, perhaps for good. 
While the state action doctrine was historically employed to nefarious ends, many 
                                               




acknowledge the value in preserving some private sphere and in distinguishing between 
state and nonstate action.82 Still, the fact that the Court has been willing to preserve this 
doctrine even when reaching outcomes it finds unpalatable illustrates the Court’s 
continued commitment to the state action doctrine in general. To this end, I conclude this 
section with DeShaney v. Winnebago County. 
A small child by the name of Joshua DeShaney suffered serious abuse at the 
hands of his father. Wisconsin Social Services reported to the residence several times on 
suspicions of abuse but did nothing to remove him permanently from his father’s custody. 
The abuse continued until the boy suffered irreversible brain damage with which he 
would live for the rest of his life. Learning what had happened only after it was too late, 
the boy’s mother argued that the state was culpable insofar as it knew about the situation 
but did nothing to protect her son’s positive right to liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not establish an affirmative duty of the state to 
protect against private abuse. Because Joshua’s injuries were inflicted by a private party, 
the harm at issue could not properly be described as state action. Moreover, neither did 
any negligence on the part of the social worker constitute a harm insofar as this was an 
instance of state inaction as opposed to state action. Thus, the Constitution did not offer 
any rights protections to Joshua. His only remedy was found in the fact that the father had 
been convicted of child abuse.  
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The state action doctrine thus persists and persists in rigid form, even in the face 
of tragic circumstances. Perhaps the idea that “state neglect” be counted as state action 
might have led to a different outcome in DeShaney.83 While this understanding of state 
neglect was widely accepted in equality-based claims in the nineteenth century, 
Brandwein explains how it fell away from the jurisprudence after a few decades.84 Even 
without the concept of state neglect, however, the Court might have reached a different 
outcome according to Brennan’s dissent. He argues that the state had acted from the very 
moment that it established the Department of Social Services, taking upon itself a duty to 
protect. In assuming this role for itself, the state effectively obstructed any others who 
might have come to the young boy’s aid. On this understanding, it seems the Court did 
have a choice in DeShaney, in much the same way that it had a choice in earlier state 
action cases.  
Gary Jacobsohn offers a framework by which to understand this alternative 
outcome that might have been in DeShaney against the decision that the Court actually 
reached. Jacobsohn analogizes constitutional interpretation with the classic dramatic 
genres of comedy and tragedy. In much the same way that comedies conclude with happy 
endings, typically only after some manipulation and absurd turns of events, so too can we 
imagine “judges exercising creativity in the pursuit of acceptable outcomes.”85 On the 
other hand, in contrast to comedic figures, the tragic hero inevitably is “unable to escape 
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the necessary consequences of his actions,” try as he may.86 Likewise, constitutional 
interpretation can have a tragic character, as when judges insist on “rigorous judicial 
adherence to norms of objectivity derived from neutral principles,”87 even when 
alternative plausible interpretations might have been available. In the DeShaney case, we 
might say that Brennan’s and Blackmun’s opinions err on the side of the comedic while 
Rehnquist’s tends to the tragic.88  
Both approaches have their problems, however. Of the comedic approach, 
Jacobsohn explains that some “will find in these efforts an unfortunate subversion of the 
liberal constitutionalism of the Founding Fathers. ”89 Even if a person were convinced 
that a particular outcome was morally superior, it may not follow that the Constitution 
could support that outcome. Meanwhile, practitioners of the tragic approach are 
vulnerable to the different tendency of subscribing to an “exaggerated sense of law’s 
determinacy.”90 Jacobsohn ultimately comes to the sober conclusion that constitutional 
interpretation is best understood in tragicomic terms, in which judges “strive for an 
accommodation between necessity and manipulation, between the obligation to find the 
law and the temptation to make it.”91 While this conclusion resists easy categorization 
and certainly calls upon judges to exercise their discerning capacities, it seems that 
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neither tragedy nor comedy could by itself encompass a full account of the constitutional 
project. 
Jacobsohn concludes that DeShaney seems to “represent a failure of judicial 
imagination,”92 suggesting that the Court might have reached a more favorable outcome, 
perhaps along the lines of Brennan’s opinion, without doing damage to constitutional 
structures. In support of this diagnosis, that the judges did have more room to reach a 
different conclusion than Rehnquist maintained, Jacobsohn points to the “degree of 
interpretive freedom manifest in the ambiguities surrounding the state action doctrine.”93 
Notwithstanding this possible interpretive freedom, much of the history of state action 
jurisprudence seems to be characterized by similarly tragic interpretations when the Court 
very well might have decided otherwise.94 In many of the landmark cases, including the 
initial Civil Rights Cases, the Court encountered plausible alternative interpretations that 
might have initiated the kind of step-by-step transformation of which Earl Warren later 
spoke. But the desire for full solidarity among citizens was not so widely held in 1883 as 
to lay foundations for this vision. And when during the sit-in protests the country was 
ready to embrace a vision of solidarity and embrace it as a constitutional matter, 
Bradley’s strict line between public and private had already been cemented.95  
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That America would have had some version of a state action doctrine seems 
inevitable given the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the conventional liberal 
understandings of constitutionalism. Indeed, even Harlan I’s dissent depends on some 
distinction of these concepts. Nevertheless, Harlan and successors such as Douglas were 
ready to acknowledge the significance that certain private spaces carried for citizenship 
and racial equality as the Radical Republicans had envisioned it. The way these 
conceptions of public and private relate to the project of solidarity comes into sharp relief 
when we consider this American constitutional history alongside that of India. Whereas 
jurists, members of Congress, and even many scholars in the United States have basically 
assumed tragically static interpretations of equality that defined solidarity out of the 
Amendment’s project, the Indian Constitution has from the beginning included 
foundations for a dynamic move toward an equality defined by solidarity. In Jacobsohn’s 
terms, we might say that transformational interpretations that might be called “comic” in 
the United States actually served to advance the Indian constitutional vision. 
 
Horizontal Effect in India: Citizens’ Duties and the Commitment to Equality 
 While maintaining a line between public and private has been so important in the 
development of United States constitutional law and rights, the Indian Constitution was 
founded on a slightly different understanding, one that included explicit discussion of the 
duties of individuals and non-state actors in the context of the larger plan and aspirations 
of the Constitution. Even while some constitutional provisions stipulated that certain 




of the Constitution, one that assumed the private sphere would be directly affected by 
constitutional commitments, and so did not show the same urgency to preserve a divide 
between private and public according to the traditional model of constitutionalism. In this 
way, we might say there was a kind of republican logic at work that assigned a role to 
private individuals in the constitutional project and would manifest in the ongoing 
development of a doctrine of horizontal effect.  
This is not to say that all of the Indian framers subscribed to the same vision of 
equality and social justice for India. In the years leading up to the Constitution’s framing 
Nehru acknowledged that the Indian constitutional moment might be born of merely a 
“semi-revolutionary situation.”96 In this way, Nehru showed some confidence that India 
was approaching the moment in which it would reconstitute itself, as well as a kind of 
realism that the impetus for such a revolution likely would not pervade the country as a 
whole. Indeed, many remained tied to structures of oppression that ran contrary to the 
constitutional vision such figures as Nehru maintained.97 Picking up on this idea of a 
“semi-revolutionary situation,” Jacobsohn and Roznai further suggest that the polity at 
the time of Independence might have been comprised of only “a semi-revolutionary 
people.”98  Even by the time the framers adopted and drafted the Constitution, they point 
out, divergent strands of thought and conflicting positions contributed to the final 
document—some supported the Nehruvian project of secularism and equality, while 
others were inclined instead to constitute the country on the basis of Hindu nationalism.  
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Granville Austin describes a related disjunction in the framing of the Constitution 
in his discussion of three “strands” underlying the Indian Constitution’s philosophy: 
“protecting and enhancing national unity and integrity; establishing the institutions and 
spirit of democracy; and fostering a social revolution to better the lot of the mass of 
Indians.”99 While these three strands were understood to be “mutually dependent and 
inextricably intertwined,”100 they also came to exist in some tension.101 Most relevant to 
the present project, the traditional rights that one might associate with the second strand’s 
“institutions and spirit of democracy” did not always sit comfortably with the third 
strand’s more ambitious goals of “social revolution.” While the former was manifested in 
the Constitution primarily in Part III’s guarantees as to formal equality, the latter 
appeared in Part IV’s directives as to institute affirmative action programs (known as 
reservations) to benefit such historically disadvantaged populations as the Dalits. Though 
the directive principles of Part IV were technically nonjusticiable, they were essential to 
the constitutional vision, effectively charging the state to transcend formal equality in 
favor of a more substantive equality across Indian society. As Jacobsohn and Roznai 
point out, Nehru recognized both a static element and a dynamic element in the new 
Constitution. Whereas the static provision for formal equality would by itself support a 
more conservative tendency, a more aspirational substantive equality, what Marc 
Galanter calls the Constitution’s “compensatory theme,”102 comprised the more complete 
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albeit dynamic vision. Nehru urged that this project could only be realized fully in duly 
recognizing the dynamic element, thus contending “step by step” with a political culture 
still hostile to much of this constitutional vision.103  
In the interest of taking stock and thinking comparatively, then, in the United 
States’ constitutional history we saw a kind of disharmony emerge later, as the formal 
equality of the Civil Rights Cases did not rest easily with the emergent commitment to 
solidarity in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. In contrast, we see disharmony at 
the very start in India, from its constitutional moment. Given the juxtaposition of Nehru 
and others’ aspirations with the broader political situation that promised to hamper their 
vision, disharmony existed from the outset. Nevertheless, in what Jacobsohn and Roznai 
understand as India’s “step by step revolution” was a trajectory running its course, 
incrementally working out the constitutional vision. Inevitably, the process included both 
the “taking of steps backwards and forwards,”104 but the end of such efforts was to lessen 
any disharmony by bringing the polity into accord with the constitutional vision. 
Therefore, whereas disharmony has proved to be a kind of terminus in America when the 
United States Court would not revisit the reach of equality during the sit-in protests, it is 
better characterized as the starting point of the Indian story as the meaning of equality 
initially reached further than civil society would permit. Indeed, the constitutional vision 
the Indian framers maintained extended beyond mere formal equality to encompass also 
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substantive equality, and beyond the involvement of state actors to encompass the 
cooperation of private actors as well.  
According to Manjeet Ramgotra, the Indian independence movement and the 
constitutional framers sought unity and equality in the country’s new founding.105 A 
decade after independence, Jawaharlal Nehru used similar terms to articulate the 
constitutional project “to promote fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the 
unity of the nation.”106 In this way, the architect of modern India identified “fraternity” as 
a factor in securing individual dignity and rights, to say nothing of the very unity of the 
newly-constituted polity.  
This same idea, that the relationship between citizens was crucial to the success of 
a democratic India runs through the deliberations preceding ratification.107 The 
Subcommittee on Fundamental Rights discussed at length the importance that citizens’ 
duties should not be neglected amid so much discussion of rights. One member, K. T. 
Shah, cautioned that “the constitution would be incomplete, and even futile, if equal 
stress were not laid on obligations corresponding to rights,”108 and that “every one of 
these rights [in the draft Statement of Fundamental Rights] would be impossible to 
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realise, unless, side by side, toleration is cultivated and enforced.”109 Shah goes on to 
develop this idea in a way that makes it immediately relevant to the present subject to 
horizontal rights, speaking of “the seeming conflict in certain rights due, so to say, to the 
right of one person or of one group becoming the obligation of another.”110 This 
explanation of a “conflict between rights” and of rights becoming “the obligation of 
another” speaks to the heart of what horizontality entails.  
Throughout these deliberations, the framers seemed to be more concerned with 
cultivating a culture of mutual obligation among fellow citizens than the possibility of 
horizontality as a doctrine of constitutional law. Nevertheless, the very fact that some of 
the framers understood private individuals and non-state entities as having obligations 
vis-à-vis their fellow citizens is a far cry from the state action requirement that came to 
define equality in the American context. And indeed, the United States experience with 
equality (and inequality) had a direct influence on this stage of the drafting of 
constitutional rights to equality.111 In his draft articles and notes, we see how the Father 
of the Indian Constitution himself was concerned to avoid the sort of discrimination 
America had tolerated in part by erecting such a stalwart wall between private and public. 
B. R. Ambedkar’s draft articles explicitly dealt with access to public accommodations, 
eligibility for various offices, and the like.112 In his notes on these particular draft articles, 
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Ambedkar states that he borrowed language for some of the provisions from the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875, “passed by the Congress of the United States of America 
to protect the Negroes against unequal treatment.”113  
Whereas in the American context Justice Bradley worried that these laws would 
force whites to endure “another kind of slavery”114 and Justice Black later worried that 
reading the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee equal access to public accommodations 
would go too far to limit liberty, Ambedkar and others in the Drafting Committee for 
fundamental rights were intent not to define equality in such stark terms of private and 
public. In Ambedkar’s own words, “Discrimination is another menace which must be 
guarded against if the fundamental rights are to be real rights. In a country like India 
where it is possible for discrimination to be practiced on a vast scale and in a relentless 
manner fundamental rights can have no meaning.”115 In this way, deliberations during the 
constitutional drafting and debates generally understood equality as necessitating at least 
some cooperation from the private. 
 Though the Subcommittee on Fundamental Rights did not ultimately adopt 
Ambedkar’s draft articles, the articles that the Subcommittee did bring before the 
Constituent Assembly included four separate provisions aimed at securing the right to 
equality, including prohibition against discrimination in public accommodations (Article 
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15) and the abolition of untouchability (Article 17).116 These provisions made no 
distinction between public and private, and included no state action requirement.117 The 
framers’ preoccupation with encompassing private entities in the constitutional plan, and 
particularly the commitment to equality, is particularly evident in Article 15. This Article 
prohibits discrimination in two separate clauses: one aimed at the state, and the other 
aimed at private individuals or non-state actors. Both clauses employ the same language 
and specify the same protected categories: “religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any 
of them.”118 Though these clauses possess almost identical content, the framers 
nevertheless thought it necessary to include both in the final Constitution, Sadar 
Vallabhibhai Patel going so far as to say both were “absolutely essential.”119 
In some ways, however, the inclusion of two separate clauses, one obligating state 
entities and another private non-state entities complicates the story. On the one hand, the 
fact that the framers thought that it was necessary to specify that a right obligated the 
state suggests a departure from the traditional model in which one could assume that 
rights only ever obligated the state.120 On the other hand, implicit in the fact of these 
separate clauses is the idea that private and public entities are distinct, and perhaps the 
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idea that their obligations are different. In the same remarks quoted above, Patel also 
describes prohibitions of private discrimination in such arenas as restaurants and hotels as 
“a completely different idea” from the state’s obligation not to discriminate.121 Moreover, 
in detailing additional private establishments, such as “wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads 
and places of public resort,” Article 15(2b) prohibits discrimination only in cases that 
these establishments are “maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to 
the use of the general public.” Similarly, Article 14 guaranteeing equality before law also 
seems to have a state action requirement attached. The text reads: “The State shall not 
deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the 
territory of India.”   
Though the framers maintained ambitious ideas of the duties of citizens, 
therefore, they still distinguished between state and non-state actors in matters of law and 
politics. Insofar as there are meaningful differences between the capabilities of state 
actors and non-state actors, it is not surprising that the framers would find the need to 
distinguish between their obligations as well. Indeed, the importance of the distinction 
seems to lessen in Indian constitutional thought as the capabilities of private entities 
increase.122 Moreover, as explained above, this distinction in many ways defines 
liberalism—so to the extent that India is a liberal democracy, it is unlikely that 
constitutional framers and jurists would run together the public and private completely. In 
the years immediately following the Constitution’s adoption, this distinction actually 
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created some ground on which a conservative Supreme Court would argue against 
horizontal effect, at least in particular instances if not writ large. However, the 
constitutional debates and text do not seem to contain anything like the Centrist 
Republicans’ understanding in post-bellum America that drove an impermeable wedge 
between social and civil rights. Indeed, there was broad consensus during the framing of 
the Indian Constitution that the right to equality required both.123 Discrimination from 
any sector had to be fought if fundamental rights were to be “real rights” and “have 
meaning.”124 In this way, the Indian framers laid bare a path for dynamic constitutional 
development, even while some continued to insist on formal equality and verticality.  
The Constitution’s distinction between private and public in some of its 
provisions manifested in a few of the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions that followed 
the precedent of other countries to confine the application of rights to the state.125 Sudhir 
Krishnaswamy recounts how the Court was not always keen to understand constitutional 
rights as creating private obligations. In particular, AK Gopalan v. State of Madras 
(1950),126 PD Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India (1952),127 and Vidya Verma v. Dr 
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Shiv Narain Verma (1956)128 were all decided according to the conventional 
understanding that rights only obligate the state. Krishnaswamy describes these as 
ambiguous cases. He explains that, based on the constitutional language alone, the Court 
could have decided either to apply the rights in question to the state only or also to 
private entities. Indeed, as suggested above, much seems to depend on what strands or 
themes of the Constitution one chooses to invoke, whether the static or the dynamic.129 
Moreover, these latter two Indian cases, and particularly Shamdasani, leave open the 
possibility for a doctrine of horizontality, as they “analyze fundamental rights provisions 
individually instead of deciding the issue wholesale by making some assumption about 
the nature of rights itself.”130 
In addition to resisting any move toward horizontal effect, the Court also resisted 
Parliament’s efforts to make good on the new Constitution’s “compensatory themes,” 
manifested in Directive Principles that charged government with working toward a more 
substantive equality. In the case State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, the Supreme 
Court struck down a state initiative that reserved specific spaces in government jobs and 
universities for members of lower castes.131 Whereas the state of Madras had relied on 
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Article 46 of the Directive Principles132 in pursuing this policy, the Supreme Court 
operated on an understanding of formal equality grounded in a prioritization of Articles 
16 (2)133 prohibiting discrimination above other provisions in that same Article 16 that 
permitted greater complexity.134 In much the same way as in the early cases concerning 
horizontal effect, the Court here proceeded on the choice to emphasize some aspects of 
the Constitution over others, maintaining that quotas in government jobs violated equality 
under the law.  Further, whatever preference the Court already had toward a more 
conservative interpretation was reinforced all the more by the fact that the Directive 
Principles were nonjusticiable, in contrast with the equal protection of the laws and other 
such rights in Part III of the Constitution, the protection of which was clearly within the 
courts’ purview.135  
In response to such judgments “impeding the fulfillment of government’s 
perceived responsibilities” under the Directive Principles,136 Parliament passed the 
Constitution Act of 1951. In this First Amendment to the Constitution, a Parliament 
largely composed of the same members that had drafted the Constitution137 pushed back 
against the Supreme Court’s restrictive decision in State of Madras v. Champakam 
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Dorairajan. The Amendment aimed to clarify a series of rights under Part III of the 
Constitution, including the rights to property and to equality, in order to preempt further 
claims that they somehow stood in the way of state-initiated reservation programs. In this 
way, such affirmative actions to assist historically deprived populations could not be 
challenged on the basis of discrimination. Jacobsohn and Roznai explain this as “a step 
forward in the dialogical advancement of a dominant, if not indisputable, view about 
achieving distributive justice in the polity.”138 However, the Court was not to take even a 
constitutional amendment as the final word on the question, waging an ongoing battle for 
power with Parliament in the ensuing years.139  
A couple of decades, as well as several decisions and constitutional amendments, 
later the Court had a considerable opportunity to push back against Parliament in the case 
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.140 In this decision, the Court established what 
has become a crucial concept of Indian constitutionalism known as the Basic Structure 
doctrine, the idea that “specific features of the Constitution are deemed sufficiently 
fundamental to the integrity of the constitutional project to warrant immunity from drastic 
alteration.”141 The initial cause (and effect) of this decision was to declare that in fact the 
Court had power to determine if an amendment passed by Parliament (specifically, the 
24th and 25th Amendments) went so far as to destroy rather than simply modify its basic 
structure. In particular, a narrow majority of the Court argued that while amendments 
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could enact some limitations to individual rights, the Constitution permitted such 
limitations only to a point. The initial impetus for this judgment was, admittedly, to stem 
Parliament’s power against the judiciary. However, this same basic structure doctrine 
would soon gain additional legitimacy when Parliament did pass a dubious constitutional 
amendment to enable Indira Gandhi’s overstepping during the Emergency Era.142 
Thereafter the doctrine would be enlisted to the cause of a more complete understanding 
of the Indian constitutional project, including the support of the Directive Principles and 
even the expansion of horizontal effect.143  
The Supreme Court thus assumed a fairly conservative posture in the years 
immediately following the adoption of the Constitution—it conceived of individual rights 
in such a way as to deter Parliament’s efforts to enact transformative legislation and, 
moreover, insisted on a vertical model of rights that stemmed the influence of 
constitutional values in private spaces. Of course, the language and concept of a state 
action requirement appears in the constitutional debates and the Constitution itself, 
thereby allowing for the early decisions that prevented anything like horizontal effect.144 
Nevertheless, such requirements of state action did not accrue the same rigidity as did the 
counterpart doctrine of the United States’ Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, even if the 
state was the primary guarantor of rights, it was difficult to deny that the larger 
constitutional project of India set its sights on broader influence, even transformation. 
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That the Constitution aimed at widespread solidarity among all citizens was evident from 
the debates and the Constitution itself. Ultimately, the Indian Supreme Court would give 
indirect horizontal effect to Article Fourteen’s guarantee of “equality before the law” and 
“equal protection of the laws” in spite of its state action requirement, and would not only 
support reservations but support them in private spaces. Nevertheless, it took years of 
political conflict and, ultimately, institutional consolidation before the Court arrive at this 
point. Indeed, this was a step-by-step revolution.145  
 Before long, the Supreme Court took initial steps toward acknowledging a 
constitutional project broader than its earlier decisions suggested, specifically in 
reassessing the reach of the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. As 
Krishnaswamy explains, the fact that early cases assessed the reach of specific rights 
rather than decide the issue of horizontal effect wholesale gave the Court flexibility to 
decide differently in later cases.146 In State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)147 the 
Court thus took its first steps to develop a doctrine of horizontal effect, explaining that, 
“Prima facie, these declarations [of fundamental rights] involve an obligation imposed 
not merely upon the ‘State’, but upon all persons to respect the rights so declared, and the 
rights are enforceable unless the context indicates otherwise against every person or 
agency seeking to infringe them.”148 Mahendra Singh suggests this shift can be explained 
simply as the Court paying greater attention to the requirements of various articles of the 
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Constitution, as well as expanding the definition of “the State,” per Article 12, in such a 
way as to admit greater horizontal application of rights.  
In the wake of the Emergency Era of 1975-1977, a chastened Court was eager to 
reassert itself as a defender of all rights and not a mere instrument of the privileged.149 
Emboldened in this way, the Court acted to widen the application of fundamental rights, 
including through the horizontal application of certain constitutional rights. In People’s 
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)150 petitioners sought to enforce 
existing labor laws against contractors who were paying less than minimum wage in a 
construction project. The petitioners argued that the state had failed to enforce these labor 
laws, but also that the private contractors had violated their right to equality (Article 14), 
right to life (Article 21) and rights against exploitation (Article 23 and 24). With respect 
to the right against forced labor (Article 23), Justice Bhagwati explained that certain 
constitutional rights were “enforceable against the whole world.”151 Moreover, he 
described the right against child labor (Article 24) as “plainly and indubitably enforceable 
against everyone.”152 Insofar as Article 14 includes a state action requirement, Bhagwati 
dealt with it somewhat differently. Rather than giving Article 14’s right to equality direct 
horizontal effect as with Articles 23 and 24, he gave this provision indirect horizontal 
effect, expanding the states’ duties to ensure that private entities met minimum wage 
requirements.  
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Though limited in ways, People’s Union is notable for the work it does to develop 
horizontal effect in Indian constitutional law, particularly on provisions that bear on 
equality. In spite of some language of state action in the Constitution, for example, 
People’s Union illustrates how “differently phrased rights may apply horizontally to a 
different extent and in a different manner.”153 The concern of this case is pretty clearly 
not to negotiate equality along a boundary of what is public and what is private. Rather 
the interpretation of the Court entails the more positively constructed question of whether 
a right to equality does charge private individuals and non-state actors to, in fact, act. 
This approach, Krishnaswamy suggests, justifiably serves as a kind of model, “as it pays 
attention to the constitutional text, the nature of the right, and the context in which the 
right is claimed.”154 In this way, the Court avoids making all disputes automatically 
subjects of public law, while carving out a space to understand equality as creating 
constitutional obligations for private citizens.155  
The approach the Court takes in People’s Union is largely a product of the judges’ 
ability to appeal to a foundation for horizontal effect in the first place. The logic of state 
action, for example, would not offer the conceptual space to consider the possibility of 
citizens’ duties as such. It might have expanded the concept of state action so as to 
encompass non-state actors as a practical matter, an approach employed in both the 
United State and the Indian context at times. However, no concept of individual 
constitutional duty follows from this reasoning. On the other hand, in People’s Union, the 
                                               






Court can draw from a pre-existing lexicon to formulate an understanding of 
constitutional duty. Admittedly, the concept of horizontal effect was still developing at 
this stage in Indian constitutionalism. Nevertheless, the sort of space that People’s Union 
makes for private obligation finds its origins in the priorities of the framers as well as the 
constitutional text itself. “Appealing to the framers’ understandings,” Justice Bhagwati 
explains that Article 23, 
is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against the State but 
also against other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited in its 
application against the State but it prohibits ‘traffic in human beings and 
beggar and other similar forms of forced labour’ wherever they are 
found.156  
 
That the framers laid groundwork for the concept of horizontal effect, therefore, likely 
spared the Indian Supreme Court some of the concerns the Warren Court faced in the 
1960s.  
 The Indian Constitution’s stronger foundation for horizontal effect in its 
constitutional vision comes to the fore in the outcomes of a couple of cases that have 
analogs in the canon of American constitutional law. First the case Vishaka v. State of 
Rajasthan (1997)157 speaks to the issue of the state’s duty to protect in ways not unlike 
the American case DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989).158 Apart from the usefulness 
of this case for its parallels with DeShaney, Vishaka is often considered an important case 
in its own right for horizontal effect in India. Vishaka involved a social worker employed 
by the State of Rajasthan who was brutally gang raped on the premises of her workplace 
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after she attempted to stop a child marriage. A trial court’s acquittal of her attackers 
served as the impetus for others to file a class suit to establish laws against sexual 
harassment. Before Vishaka was decided in 1997, the only relevant provisions against 
such abuses were those couple of provisions of the penal code under which the social 
worker had sued. The petitioners argued that these did not adequately address the hazards 
to women in the workplace and that the issue should take on a sounder constitutional 
status.159 The petitioners stated, 
The failure of the state to establish a legal framework to tackle sexual 
harassment in the workplace resulted in the violation of a woman’s right to 
equality and against discrimination under Articles 14 and 15, her right to 
life under Article 21, and her right to ‘practice any profession…’protected 
by Article 19(1)(g).160 
 
Thus, petitioners sought to highlight the state’s failure to protect rights by way of 
legislation and, by extension, how this failure directly resulted in the violation of 
women’s rights by private actors.  
In his careful reading of the case, Stephen Gardbaum points out that it is not 
entirely clear from the opinion whom the Court thought responsible for the harm of 
Vishaka. Indeed, given the facts of the case, the primary harm was arguably that which 
the assailants inflicted against the social worker.161 Clearer in the judgment is the 
interpretation that the state inflicted a harm in failing in its duty to protect citizens from 
such crimes and from sexual harassment in general. Though this understanding falls short 
of direct horizontal effect, since the perpetrators are not themselves responsible for 
                                               
159 Robinson 9. 
160 Krishnawamy 53. 




upholding rights, this latter reading would be a clear instance of indirect horizontal effect. 
Indeed, private actors would still be held to the rubric of constitutional principles in the 
positive action that the state would take to regulate behavior. What previously would 
have been a matter of mere tort, contract, and criminal law became “a constitutional 
wrong” in Vishaka.162  
Recall Justice Rehnquist’s general argument in the American case DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County, that the Constitution’s purpose “was to protect the people from the 
State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other. The Framers were 
content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic 
political processes.”163  This reasoning and accompanying interpretation of the founding 
are a far cry from either of the two suggested readings of Vishaka. However one reads it, 
Vishaka does entail the state’s positive duty to protect. Moreover, while in both India and 
the United States, the framers did look to the democratic political processes to execute 
such protections, it does not follow from this in Vishaka that such protections are 
discretionary. Indeed, the Parliament was compelled to undertake such action as a 
constitutional matter. In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court insisted on the 
presence of state action to trigger constitutional rights protections, and that an absence of 
action that led to a private harm was not adequate. In Vishaka, on the other hand, Chief 
Justice Verma does identify such a positive obligation of the state, thus “widening the 
scope of application of rights as the court enforces a positive obligation on the state to 
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intervene and decisively alter the relationship between private parties....”164 Beyond the 
particular issues of gender equality which this case concerned, this reflects the more 
general divergence between the United States and Indian constitutional projects, the latter 
being much more concerned with positive steps which the state ought to take to remediate 
such abuses—historical, proximate, and the proximate rooted in the historical. 
Also in Vishaka, and absent from DeShaney, is the understanding that citizens 
might have duties to one another under the Constitution. While the remedy in Vishaka did 
not necessarily come by way of the constitutional duties outlined in Article 51A, insofar 
as they are not justiciable,165 the very fact that Chief Justice Verma cites them shows 
some continuity with the convictions aired in the Constituent Assembly debates. 
Krishnaswamy understands these constitutional duties as an “interpretive aid” to the 
Court.166 Even if not controlling the case as a doctrinal matter, therefore, Verma’s citing 
these duties suggests that, on some level, “all citizens are under the constitutional 
obligation not to engage in sexually discriminatory behavior in the workplace.”167 
Contrast this outlook with Mary Ann Glendon’s account of the constitutional state of 
affairs in the United States, wherein she describes as “deafening” the silence of anything 
like citizens’ duties in law and in fact.168 
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Another United States case that serves as a useful comparison to this moment in 
Indian constitutionalism is United States v. Morrison (2000). Indeed, both Morrison and 
Vishaka concern the introduction of legislation to deter and penalize gender-based 
violence and harassment. However, in passing the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, 
the United States Congress was not acting to fulfill any constitutional duty to protect. 
Indeed, in this Rehnquist opinion, the Supreme Court decided that the Commerce Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause did not empower Congress to enact certain sections of the 
law. Respecting the Commerce Clause, the Court argued that punishing gender-based 
crimes as VAWA proposed to do was beyond the purview of the national government, 
and ought to be left to the states to govern. Moreover, the Court argued that the 
legislature could not rely on the Equal Protection Clause in regulating private 
relationships. Citing the Civil Rights Cases as precedent, the Court maintained that the 
state action doctrine did not permit bringing constitutional commitments to bear on 
private actors. Neither did the state action doctrine empower the national government to 
hold to account state actors, such as the state legislatures, for their inaction to legislate 
against gender-based crimes.  
The decision in Morrison illustrates plainly the contention that the United States 
Congress did not have the same constitutional duty to protect, and indeed could not 
assume such a duty, as did the Indian Parliament. On the one hand, one could argue that 
the role of federalism in American constitutionalism makes sense of the outcome in 
Morrison. Even though India is also a federal country, the arc of its constitutional 




perhaps symptomatic of differences in its larger constitutional vision.169 Nick Robinson 
explains that, “In contrast to the American Constitution, which largely solidified the 
economic and social status quo even while bringing momentous political changes, India's 
Constitution was born with an eye towards multiple transformations.”170 Moreover, as the 
1994 Bommai decision discussed below reveals, such a transformative, national-scale 
project does not easily allow for significant deference to subnational units. However, it is 
worth noting, and noting separately from the federalism question, the general absence of 
anything like a duty to protect in the United States. The American states could regulate 
gender-based violence as they wished, but they also could do nothing if they wished and 
face no repercussions even as state actors. Thus, while the variable of federalism 
certainly influences the constitutional story in the United States, a more complete 
explanation of the difference between Morrison and Vishaka also requires attention to 
Glendon’s insight about the dearth of “duties talk” in the United States. Whereas the 
Indian Supreme Court in Vishaka mandated Parliamentary action as a constitutional 
matter, the United States Supreme Court rejected Congress’s initiative as a constitutional 
matter.  
Another case, which has an American analog in the decision Shelley v. Kramer, 
may seem to undercut this chapter’s argument at first blush. In 2005, the Indian Supreme 
Court decided Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society v. District Registrar.171 This 
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case involved a society that restricted membership only to Parsis. Since housing could 
only be transferred to members, the practical effect of the agreement was that only Parsis 
were permitted to purchase in the cooperative society. Both cases thus involved housing 
restrictions on the basis of classifications that had particular political salience in their 
respective contexts—race in Shelley and religion in Zoroastrian Cooperative. To this 
extent, comparing these cases offers a glimpse into how each polity has addressed 
solidarity among citizens in the area of housing. Recall that the United States Supreme 
Court decided Shelley based on the fact that it, the Court, was an arm of the state, and 
would have been implicated in discrimination contra the Fourteenth Amendment if it 
were to uphold the restrictive housing covenant. While the Court in Shelley technically 
toes the state action line and still decided the case in terms of different public and private 
spheres, the result clearly approaches something like horizontal effect and, according to 
some typologies, even represents a form of horizontal effect. Indeed, the case is rightly 
understood as an anomaly in the long history of state action in the United States. And yet, 
the Court’s conforming to the doctrine of state action still serves to turn attention away 
from the actual issue of the case, which was a private harm, and instead make it about the 
courts’ acts of enforcement. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Indian Supreme Court comes to a result in Zoroastrian 
Cooperative that more closely conforms to a strict state action line, at least in the 
particular outcome it reaches. Rather than rely on the fact that the Court would in effect 
be upholding the restrictive housing covenant in deciding in favor of the cooperative 




agreement itself. While the cooperative society argued its cases on the basis of its right to 
association (Article 19(1)(c)) and minorities’ right to cultural preservation (Article 
29(1)), the respondents argued that the restrictive covenant violated public policy, 
specifically Article 15 of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination in both public and 
private spaces. Thus, the arguments from both sides invited the kind of substantive 
analysis that the United States Court had avoided in Shelley. Although the Court ruled in 
favor of the cooperative society, however, it is unclear whether they based their decision 
on the constitutional rights to association and cultural preservation.  
Legal scholars have acknowledged that the reasoning in Zoroastrian Cooperative 
is “obtuse,” making it difficult to contend with and near impossible to come to any 
definitive conclusions about this case. For these reasons, as well as the potentially 
important fact that this case was decided only by a two-judge panel,172 the present 
analysis is necessarily tentative. On Stephen Gardbaum’s telling, there seem to be two 
lines of reasoning in Zoroastrian Cooperative.173 On the one hand, although the 
cooperative society’s bylaw preventing the sale of land to non-Parsis had to conform with 
“public policy,” the Court argued that conformity with relevant statutory law, namely the 
Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act,174 rather than directly to the Constitution was enough. 
It states:  
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So long as there is no legislative intervention of that nature [to eliminate a 
qualification for membership in the cooperative society based on sex or 
religion], it is not open to the court to coin a theory that a particular by-law 
is not desirable and would be opposed to public policy as indicated by the 
Constitution.175 
 
Thus, the Court’s argument amounts to a fairly robust state action requirement, insofar as 
it maintains some separation between the Parliament’s ability to legislate private 
interchange and the Constitution. On this reading, Parliament has wide discretion in 
setting the parameters of such societies without running the risk of implicating the state in 
any discrimination in which the society chooses to participate.176 On this reading, 
Zoroastrian Cooperative seems to involve a similar reasoning as in Shelley, only 
reaching the opposite outcome.  
An alternative reading of Zoroastrian Cooperative, that Bhatia and Gardbaum 
both acknowledge as plausible albeit not fleshed out in the Court’s judgment, is that the 
Court did engage in constitutional balancing here, that “its narrow conception of public 
policy was the conclusion and not the premise of its analysis.” In other words, the Court 
did question and ascertain that the cooperative society’s particular bylaw conformed to 
the Constitution, and therefore proceeded on this basis to balance the rights to freedom of 
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association and cultural preservation versus the right against discrimination. And indeed, 
there is some evidence for this in the opinion. The Court states: 
…it is open to that community to try to preserve its culture and way of life 
and in that process, to work for the advancement of members of that 
community by enabling them to acquire membership in a society and 
allotments of lands or buildings in one’s capacity as a member of that 
society, to preserve its object of advancement of the community.177 
 
This discussion about preserving one’s “culture and way of life” suggests that such rights 
did factor into the Court’s judgment, and that the decision in Zoroastrian Cooperative did 
not hinge simply on the right of private actors to enter any manner of contract under 
statutory law. Rather than base its decision primarily on a state action requirement, the 
Court did apply these rights horizontally on this reading. In balancing these constitutional 
commitments against each other, it simply came down in favor of the rights to association 
and cultural preservation rather than antidiscrimination. Apart from the fact that the Court 
seems to make reference to these competing constitutional rights, this reading is further 
corroborated by the fact that the liberty to enter contracts has never been understood as 
absolute in Indian constitutionalism.178  
If there is any merit to this second reading, then this case does involve horizontal 
effect to a greater degree than does Shelley. Indeed, on this latter reading, Zoroastrian 
Cooperative actually takes up the constitutional substance of the question at stake rather 
than rely on the fact of judicial enforcement of contracts.  One might question, then, how 
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this decision that seemingly favors discrimination comports with the larger purpose of the 
Indian Constitution. Is not the Indian project founded on the goal of equality and 
solidarity among all constituent religions, ethnicities, cultures? The key here may be the 
fact that the Parsis are a minority population in India. Bhatia cites the American case 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, in which the Court allowed Amish persons to make alternative 
educational choices for their children, thus acknowledging a need to accommodate 
differences of particular populations, even as they may sit in some tension with other 
constitutional commitments.179 Indeed, such efforts toward accommodation are rooted in 
other constitutional commitments, as to cultural preservation in Zoroastrian Cooperative. 
This is not to say that rights of association and cultural preservation would always trump 
rights of antidiscrimination. It is less likely that such majority populations as adherents to 
the Hindu faith would have succeeded with the same arguments, for example, since 
Article 29 of the Constitution refers specifically to minorities’ rights to cultural 
preservation.  
 While one cannot easily sum up the Zoroastrian Cooperative case, one also 
cannot ignore it when considering the development of horizontal effect in India, 
particularly given the case’s implications for the larger constitutional object of solidarity. 
Bhatia and Gardbaum show that there are good reasons to adopt different readings of the 
case. Moreover, both express relative certainty that the case’s outcome is circumscribed 
to the unique set of facts before the Court.180 While one might be justified to draw 
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conclusions about this case only hesitantly, the later Indian Medical Association v. Union 
of India (IMA) sheds additional light on Zoroastrian Cooperative and the trajectory of 
horizontal effect in India more generally. Indeed, whereas Shelley has proved to be the 
highwater mark for horizontal effect in the United States, it is now clear that Zoroastrian 
Cooperative was only one episode in the Court’s increasing efforts to render a doctrine of 
horizontal effect that conforms to the larger egalitarian constitutional project. In the IMA 
case that followed a few years later, we see converge in the issue of horizontal effect the 
different commitments adopted in Indian constitutionalism mentioned above, namely, the 
commitment to rights in Part III and the commitment to a more compensatory scheme of 
social justice in Part IV. In this later case the Indian Supreme Court showed itself willing 
to engage fully with these questions. 
In its early years, the Indian Supreme Court supported what Jacobsohn and 
Roznai call the “static element” of the Constitution.181 This manifested in its drawn-out 
battle with Parliament, including such episodes as the passing of the First Amendment 
and the Kesavananda case. Moreover, this manifested in its treatment of horizontal effect 
as early decisions adhered to a state action requirement with respect to Part III of the 
Constitution. Such cases as People’s Union after the Emergency Era and, later on, 
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Vishaka show a marked shift in the Court on the reach of Part III rights. While 
Zoroastrian Cooperative may suggest that some actors seek to maintain a strict state 
action requirement, the obscure nature of this decision could be interpreted as additional 
evidence of the Court’s desire actually to break from prior understandings. Indeed, later 
cases reveal a more ambitious trajectory with respect to horizontal effect than some 
readings of Zoroastrian Cooperative might by themselves suggest. In particular, the 
Court has incorporated Part IV of the Constitution, containing the directive principles, 
into its own constitutional purview, a development which has also influenced the 
horizontal application of rights to private actors.  
In 1994, the Court decided S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, a case that Jacobsohn 
and Roznai describe as the “linchpin in Nehru’s step-by-step progression.”182 The case 
arose amid ongoing violence between Hindus and Muslims following the destruction of a 
mosque in Ayodhya in the state Uttar Pradesh. The party in power in the state 
government, the Hindu nationalist BJP, was clearly complicit in its negligence to quell 
the violence.  And so, pursuant to Article 356 of the Constitution, the President of India 
assumed rule over the state government. When the state challenged this action, the 
Supreme Court explained that, in its failure to take steps to put down the violence, the 
BJP-led government demonstrated that it “could not be trusted to follow the objective of 
secularism which was part of the basic structure of the Constitution and also the soul of 
the Constitution.”183 Furthermore, since the Constitution “does not provide for its own 
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demise,”184 the President’s actions were justified as necessary to save the basic structure 
of the Constitution, including such fundamental principles as secularism as an instrument 
of equality and the larger catalog of Directive Principles in Part IV.  
Jacobsohn and Roznai explain how, in Bommai, the Court extended the basic 
structure doctrine of Kesavananda beyond constitutional amendments to bear on the 
actions that political actors pursue in the course of ordinary politics. Put differently, apart 
from the electoral repercussions politicians risk in ignoring the Directive Principles, the 
decision in Bommai established that “a Government will also have to answer for ignoring 
the Directive Principles of State Policy in a court of law.”185 In this way, the Court 
embraced within its purview the same Directive Principles before considered 
unenforceable, assuming a conviction that motivated many in the Constituent Assembly, 
namely, that the real soul of the Constitution necessarily included both Part III and Part 
IV.186 Bommai thus marks an important development in the larger constitutional 
revolution at hand, rendering state inaction respecting the Directive Principles 
constitutionally liable and subject to the judgment of the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
Bommai set the stage for a practice of horizontal effect that also accounted for the 
Directive Principles, as became evident in the IMA case.  
Indian Medical Association v. Union of India (IMA) marks another moment in 
which the Supreme Court brought the basic structure doctrine to bear on Parliament’s 
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efforts to effectuate the Directive Principles by way of constitutional amendment. In 
addition to the usual issues surrounding the enforceability of social policy and 
reservations in particular, the Court faced the additional question of how such initiatives 
applied horizontally. Specifically, it considered the validity of the 93rd Amendment to the 
Constitution, adopted in 2005, that laid groundwork for legislatures to extend to private 
actors the charge to maintain reservations in education. The Amendment added a fifth 
section to Article 15 of the Constitution that read:     
Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall 
prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of 
citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as 
such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions 
including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the 
State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause 
(1) of article 30.187 
 
Similar to the First Amendment discussed above, this 93rd Amendment aimed to ensure 
that Article 15’s guarantee of formal equality would not be deployed against efforts to 
realize a more substantive equality. This Amendment was importantly different from 
prior efforts, however, in that it applied to both public and private educational 
institutions, according to the capacious vision of the Indian constitution project.  
Pursuant to this new amendment, the Delhi Act of 2007 prohibited certain 
educational fees and mandated that a number of seats in all educational institutions be 
reserved for “Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other socially and economically 
backward classes.”188 In the very next year, a private, unaided professional school in 
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Delhi called the Army College of Medical Sciences was founded, admitting to their 
student body only “wards, or children of current and former army personnel and widows 
of army personnel, who, the school’s defenders claimed, had experienced educational 
disadvantages relative to the civilian population.”189 While the school did rank applicants 
matching this description according to their test scores, it made no distinction on the basis 
of social, economic, or cultural background. This admissions policy thus ran up against 
the Delhi Act and, by extension, the 93rd Amendment. The appellant argued that the law 
and amendment were both contrary to the basic structure of the Constitution insofar as 
they constituted “unreasonable restrictions” under Article 19 (detailing the “Right to 
Freedom”) and were likely to destroy the freedom to maintain such unaided nonminority 
educational institutions.190  
In prior years, the Court might have invoked the basic structure doctrine of 
Kesavananda to uphold an understanding of formal equality that favored the Army 
College of Medical Sciences’ case. Instead, however, the Court followed Bommai here in 
that it acknowledged Parliament’s efforts to implement the Directive Principles and 
thereby secure a more substantive equality as part and parcel of the larger constitutional 
project. On this understanding, the 93rd Amendment did not betray the basic structure 
doctrine, but rather moved the country forward in its protracted constitutional revolution. 
Moreover, the particular fact that the Amendment and subsequent law included such 
private institutions as the Army College of Medical Sciences in its efforts to achieve 
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greater equality did not detract from the constitutional vision. Rather, this effort to reach 
into private spaces was in line with early explanations of members of the Constituent 
Assembly, to bring private actors into the fold of the constitutional project and inculcate a 
conception of solidarity among citizens. Insofar as abuse occurred and inequality existed 
without distinction between public and private spaces, so too would the Constitution 
ultimately reach these spaces. The Court seems to adopt this position for itself in the IMA 
case, stating “[T]he same concerns of national purpose, goal and objectives that inform 
the constitutional identity [do not] miraculously disappear in the context of the private 
sector.”191 Although IMA concerned a constitutional amendment, the amendment in 
question was not only consistent with the Constitution, on the Court’s telling, but actually 
augmented the fundamental constitutional project which had long aimed at transforming 
the private sphere to effect solidarity among citizens.  
This effort to bring equality into private spaces took many forms, involving 
different rights of Part III and, as in IMA, different directive principles of Part IV. The 
area of education was of particular importance in the question of horizontal effect insofar 
as many Indian schools were privately-run. Any efforts to bring education into line with 
constitutional principles, therefore, necessarily raised the question of horizontal effect. 
Moreover, education was a natural sector in which to give effect to the constitutional 
project insofar as education influences so much of the life and future of a polity. The 
upshot of such regulation, however, was that schools, including private schools, faced a 
real call to action when the Delhi Act required the implementation of reservations. In 
                                               




other words, this was not a simple or self-executing instance of horizontal effect. 
Moreover, these regulations also entailed a fundamental shift in the mission of the Army 
College of Medical Sciences as initially conceived. But then, the Indian Constitution was 
never a simple or self-executing project. As Jacobsohn and Roznai explain, “Since the 
greatest potential societal effect of group-based admissions policies implicates the private 
domain, it is only appropriate that a case confronting that issue directly became the 
occasion for instructive reflection on India’s constitutional revolution.”192  
Observers of Indian constitutional politics may find a new area for the 
development horizontal rights in gay rights. In 2009, the Delhi High Court decided Naz 
Foundation v. Union of India, overturning a colonial-era provision in the Penal Code that 
criminalized homosexual activity on the basis of Article 14 (Equality Before Law), 
Article 15 (Prohibition of Discrimination), and Article 21 (Protection of Life and 
Personal Liberty).193 Soon after the case was decided, Tarunabh Khaitan described the 
judgment as a natural conclusion given the principles of the Indian Constitution. He 
states, “Given the liberal, secular and egalitarian Constitution of India, it is the opposite 
result that would have surprised constitutional lawyers.”194 And yet, reach the opposite 
result is exactly what the Supreme Court did a mere four years later. In Koushal v. Naz 
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Foundation, the Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High Court’s 2009 decision and, 
with it, what Khaitan had seen as a “new deal for all minorities.”195 The Court cited as 
reasons to overturn the 2009 judgment the “principle of presumption of constitutionality” 
and the need to ground important decisions in the polity’s own principles rather than 
those of foreign jurisdictions (as the Delhi Court had).196 Finally, in the same back and 
forth movement that Jacobsohn and Roznai argue defines the whole of India’s 
constitutional history, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 2018, this time ruling in 
favor of decriminalization. The Court stated: 
[T]he Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The 
majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of 
the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing the 
conditions necessary for its achievement….The Constitution of India 
recognises, protects and celebrates diversity. To stigmatise or to criminalise 
homosexuals only on account of their sexual orientation would be against 
the constitutional morality.197 
 
In this way, the Court ultimately argued in its unanimous decision for continuity between 
the constitutional project and this new frontier for equality in India.  
Insofar as the decriminalization of consensual homosexual activity involved 
questions about the state of the Penal Code, this particular sequence of cases implicated 
only the state and state action. It may seem surprising, therefore, that the Court seized the 
opportunity in its 2018 decision to lay groundwork to extend rights obligations further. It 
stated: 
It is not only the duty of the State and the Judiciary to protect this basic 
right to dignity, but the collective at large also owes a responsibility to 
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respect one another's dignity, for showing respect for the dignity of 
another is a constitutional duty. It is an expression of the component of 
constitutional fraternity.198 
 
From the beginning, the Indian constitutional vision was one of “fraternity” or solidarity. 
In this light, it is unsurprising that the Court would gesture toward implications for 
private actors even as the case itself created obligations only for the state. As a practical 
matter, we can see this digression as foreshadowing future moves to hold public 
accommodations accountable for this extension of the Constitution to gay rights. But a 
symbolic element also pervades this and similar passages of the decision,199 in much the 
same way as the Constitution as a whole includes both material and expressive elements. 
In discussing the significance of the Directive Principles, Marc Galanter explains, “The 
compensatory discrimination policy is not to be judged only for its instrumental qualities.  
It is also expressive: through it Indians tell themselves what kind of people they are and 
what kind of nation.”200 In a similar vein, the public and the private were never 
essentially distinct questions in the Indian constitutional project; rather, both spheres 
speak equally and speak together to what “kind of people” and “what kind of nation” 
India aims to be.  
 
Conclusion 
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The early adoption of a classical liberal line in the United States, that there exists 
a separate private sphere not subject to constitutional standards, continues to define 
constitutional presuppositions and debates, even after the Civil Rights Movement shifted 
the polity’s orientation on the particular issue of equality. On the other hand, the Indian 
framers entrenched the application of equality rights against private actors in the Indian 
Constitution from the outset. Even while this commitment to equality has only gradually 
taken root in private spaces in India as a practical matter, the early entrenchment in the 
Constitution has shaped debates to presuppose that individuals do have constitutional 
duties to one another. Different legal-constitutional frameworks thus shaped 
constitutional politics in importantly different ways in the United States and India, both in 
their presuppositions concerning public and private spaces and in framing the very 
questions that the courts must answer.  
More to the point of the larger project, the original formulation and ensuing 
development of these different versions of equality directly relate to each country’s larger 
perspective on solidarity as part of its constitutional project. The Indian framers’ 
understanding that equality required solidarity among citizens fit comfortably with the 
republican aspects of horizontal effect; thus, the Indian Court’s apparent trajectory of 
applying horizontal effect more widely and more frequently is unsurprising. In contrast, 
early interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment among Centrist Republicans and in the 
Supreme Court were content to enforce mere formal equality, a standard that falls short 
of republican ideals that citizens together enjoy a more substantive equality and even 




strict separation between public and private spheres was thus entrenched and has had 
great staying power, even as public opinion has shifted to embrace something closer to 






III. Uniformity in Germany and South Africa 
 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated how decisions to apply (or not to apply) 
rights horizontally are directly linked to political actors’ intentions to foster solidarity 
among citizens of a place. Both the United States and India have at various points faced 
the decision of whether equality rights should hold in privately-owned spaces such as 
public accommodations and housing. In the Civil Rights Cases, the United States 
Supreme Court roundly rejected Congress’s efforts to give equality horizontal effect. 
Against Justice Harlan’s admonitions that such protections and solidarity were requisite 
to republican citizenship, Justice Bradley and the rest of the Court argued that relegating 
the reach of this right to state actors only was necessary if the country was to avoid 
“another kind of slavery.” The Indian framers, on the other hand, deliberately entrenched 
the application of equality rights against private actors in Article 15 of the Constitution. 
Even while this right to equality has taken time to be activated in private spaces as a 
practical matter, the framers’ concern with cultivating solidarity in the polity led the 
Constituent Assembly to give equality in private spaces constitutional status from the 
beginning. And indeed, observers of Indian constitutional politics are beginning to see the 
actualization of the foundations originally laid in other areas of rights. In examining these 
two countries alongside each other we see how horizontal effect has been construed and 
applied as an instrument to propagate solidarity among citizens.  
In the present chapter, I examine the feature of horizontal effect that I have called 




common standard of governance, a common good, motivated the introduction and 
development of horizontal effect. In their respective constitutional moments, we find 
these countries confronting their histories of systemic injustice and genocide, hence 
acting to enshrine from the outset such values as human dignity. These values would 
govern and, moreover, govern the polity understood as a whole. As Chapter I’s 
discussion of uniformity suggested, the horizontal application of rights is about 
transforming private spaces to implement a uniform standard at least as much as it is 
about the protection of rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that the German and South 
African framers and founding jurists would introduce horizontal effect in light of the 
immense transformations1 required to realize their constitutional projects.  
Fairly early on, each country departed from the conventional liberal logic that 
rights only create obligations for the state. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
introduced indirect horizontal effect, or Drittwirkung, soon after its institution in the Lüth 
case. Moreover, South Africa explicitly provided for horizontal effect in both its Interim 
and Final Constitutions. The constitutional histories of both countries reveal that behind 
the specific decisions to implement horizontal effect were aspirations to create a new 
kind of society. German scholar, Georg Sommeregger, describes horizontality in terms of 
promoting a kind of constitutional morality or introducing “society’s common moral 
yardstick” into private spaces.2  Moreover, he characterizes the later expansion of 
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horizontal effect to equality rights as part of a process of “enlarging the circle of 
members of the polis.”3 Similarly, Nick Friedman explains how South Africa’s doctrine 
of horizontal effect was part and parcel of the constitution’s transformative project.4 The 
motivation for bringing constitutional values into private spaces is intelligible in light of 
the deep change each polity sought in their new constitutions.  
In both contexts, however, horizontal effect was also contested from the 
beginning. Academics and jurists alike debated the virtues and vices of this new legal-
constitutional mechanism. Would accepting the Basic Law as a standard for Germany’s 
entire legal system threaten its time-honored civil law and specialized courts? Would 
horizontal effect usurp the function of the South African legislature to decide political 
questions and such matters as appropriations? What would become of such values as 
autonomy if private actors were now also responsible for protecting and promoting 
constitutional rights? As Frank Michelman puts it, the “ghosts” of the conventional 
liberal wisdom5 persisted in different ways, even as both Germany and South Africa 
committed to real and thoroughgoing transformation. Some wariness is not altogether 
surprising, however, given the extent to which horizontal effect does depart from the 
conventional understanding of constitutionalism. Indeed, the German courts had 
particular incentive to tread lightly as no court had argued for a doctrine of horizontal 
effect when the Labor and Constitutional Courts were acting in the 1950s.6  
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In observing how horizontal effect emanates from larger constitutional visions, 
we see how uniformity is manifested as a feature of horizontal effect. However, we can 
also learn much from simultaneously studying those instances in which political actors 
try to stem horizontal effect. When is uniformity considered unnecessary or undesirable? 
Put differently, when actors are reticent to apply rights horizontally, the rationale is often 
related to the feature and result of uniformity.7 Though both countries adopted horizontal 
effect early on, therefore, they did so only after much debate and after some concrete 
steps to limit its reach. Most obviously, both Germany and South Africa have 
predominantly adopted indirect, rather than direct, horizontal effect, ostensibly creating a 
buffer in the way public values come to bear on private actors.  
We see further limits on closer examination of the constitutional projects 
themselves, and especially the substance of particular foundational principles. Germany 
has valued autonomy (Privatautonomie) throughout its legal-constitutional history. While 
this value has certainly undergone transformation since the reframing of the Civil Code in 
the nineteenth century, Germany recommitted to such individual rights in the wake of 
World War II. This has allowed elements of the conventional liberal wisdom to live on, 
even as jurists have embraced horizontal effect. Perhaps symptomatic of this, equality 
claims and nondiscrimination long received the lower standard of reasonableness review, 
while most other enumerated freedoms in the German Basic Law enjoyed more robust 
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proportionality review.8 In fact, the few times that equality rights have been applied 
horizontally, it has been through the Federal Labor Court rather than the Constitutional 
Court. Moreover, the relatively recent intervention of EU directives requiring heightened 
antidiscrimination policies in Member States initially met much resistance in Germany, 
as private actors voiced objections reminiscent of the early concerns of scholars and 
jurists in the 1950s. These events reveal something about the content of the commitments 
and constitutional project in which horizontal effect operates. Jurists accept that the 
principles of the Basic Law have a radiating effect such that constitutional values inform 
the polity understood as a whole. However, that these values tend toward autonomy and 
individual rights bears on how easily the polity has accepted horizontal effect in the 
context of other rights (as to equality or against indirect discrimination), and particularly 
those that seem to require more of individual citizens.9  
On the other hand, equality comprises the heart of the South African vision, 
enjoying pride of place alongside dignity and freedom. On the South African telling and 
in understanding the South African project, these three values are impossible to separate 
from one another and even define one another according to former Justice of the 
Constitutional Court Laurie Ackermann.10 Horizontal effect is limited in this context 
insofar as the South African Court primarily understands the Constitution as bearing on 
private life indirectly, that is, by way of common law and statutory law. Nevertheless, no 
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one area of rights, such as equality, has proved to be a limit to how far the Court is 
willing to apply horizontal effect. Indeed, to effect equality across spheres has defined the 
South African vision from the beginning, such that even definitions of autonomy in South 
Africa are suffused with a concern for equality. Though South Africa’s Constitution is 
much younger, the practice of horizontal effect has steadily expanded, evinced in the shift 
from Du Plessis v. De Klerk in 1996 (which showed some signs of Michelman’s liberal 
ghosts, even while laying the groundwork for the expansion of horizontal effect) to the 
most recent case Daniels v. Scribante in 2017 (which suggests that private actors 
potentially have duties with respect to their fellow citizens’ socioeconomic rights). In 
general, the South African Court has largely embraced the uniformity that horizontal 
effect actuates and embraced it in the context of a range of values of the South African 
Constitution. For the feature of uniformity itself fulfills the core of South Africa’s 
constitutional vision to transform private spaces.  
Scholars often identify Germany and South Africa as archetypes for horizontal 
effect. And indeed, horizontal effect seems naturally to grow out of their respective 
constitutional projects. Nevertheless, their different histories lead them to take somewhat 
different paths which, I argue, can be understood in terms of each country’s posture with 
respect to horizontality’s characteristic uniformity. In particular, South Africa’s more 
egalitarian bent lends itself to a more expansive approach in contrast with the liberal 
commitments built into the content and structure of German law. That both Germany and 




opportunity for comparison and study of horizontal effect.11 Indeed, their deliberations 
make clear that each country wrestled with the role horizontal effect would play in their 
respective legal orders and reveal how, at base, the choice to apply horizontal effect is 
nothing less than a choice about the character of a constitution. 
 
German Drittwirkung12: Persistent Liberalism and Radiating Constitutional Values   
Given the argument of the present project, one might expect the republican 
tradition to loom large in such a country as Germany that is a bastion for horizontal 
effect. Nevertheless,  Germany’s body of law is often described as finding its roots in 
liberalism and, at least in the nineteenth century, a kind of libertarian liberalism, at that.13 
Taking a cue from Louis Hartz,14 legal scholar Peter Quint explains that the German 
Basic Law reflects the same concern with classical liberal rights that we find in American 
constitutional-political history.15 From the insistence on maintaining the integrity of 
private law as separate that we find in the civil law tradition, to the Basic Law’s 
codification of autonomy and other classical liberal rights, a new disharmony16 emerges 
with the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949, one that maintains the real regard for private 
life that pervades German legal history while also enshrining a set of values that would 
govern the German polity uniformly, that is, the polity understood as a whole.  
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How, then, does horizontal effect develop in this context? Is it, and in what sense 
is it, republican? How do the debates and particular decisions concerning horizontal 
effect in German constitutionalism reflect the characteristic of uniformity given the 
essentially liberal assumptions of its legal history? This line of questioning is not to 
suggest that the liberal and republican traditions are incompatible or diametrically 
opposed. As explained in Chapter I, the fact that there are myriad versions of each 
tradition, to say nothing of the fact that apparently liberal philosophers such as John 
Locke clearly maintain republican commitments,17 renders such a simplistic account 
implausible. Prior scholarship aims to show the complex ways in which these traditions 
relate.18 Nevertheless, certain characteristics of liberalism—including the kind of 
individualism and autonomy that permeate Germany’s legal tradition, as I will recount—
do not naturally tend toward emphasizing the common good, citizens’ duties, the 
cultivation of virtue. This raises questions about how horizontal effect has manifested 
amid the liberal principles built into the civil law tradition and that evolved to serve as the 
lodestar for postwar Germany. Somewhat paradoxically, these liberal principles have 
been adapted to furnish the content for a kind of constitutional morality in Germany that, 
with the development of Drittwirkung, applies uniformly19 to public and private alike.   
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In adopting horizontal effect, the Constitutional Court effectively took these 
liberal values as the content for the new German constitutional order, to serve as a 
standard both for public and private actors. In this way, horizontal effect, makes these 
values over into a conception of the common good, obliging the polity understood as a 
whole. As Jacobsohn and Roznai explain, the adoption of the Basic Law “signals the 
moment when the foundation for achieving a new identity in that country was 
established.”20 And indeed, horizontal effect is nothing less than an instrument to ensure 
this new identity is realized in toto.21 Thus, the liberal tradition shaped the development 
of horizontal effect in Germany, keeping alive typical liberal arguments in the longer-
term trajectory and making any extension to egalitarian concerns more difficult. Of 
course, Germany was committed to social democracy and equality from the very 
beginning, but to require that such values govern uniformly across spheres was another 
question altogether. 
 I will proceed as follows. I will demonstrate the deep liberal roots of Germany’s 
civil law tradition, and how these principles went on to inform the commitments of the 
Basic Law. I will then recount the development of horizontal effect in legal scholarship 
and in doctrine, showing how theoretical and institutional commitments related to 
Germany’s civil law tradition resurfaced alongside aspirations to secure a new 
constitutional identity for the polity. Thus, the search for uniformity in horizontal effect 
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was inflected by particular principles that potentially tended to the contrary. I will 
conclude by highlighting important developments in horizontal effect over the decades, 
culminating with anti-discrimination legislation the German Parliament proposed to 
fulfill directives of the European Union. As this anti-discrimination legislation caused 
quite a stir among private actors in such arenas as business and religion, I point to this 
legislation and ensuing controversy as evidence of an enduring liberal ethos and what is 
still occasionally an uneasy fit with horizontal effect’s tendency toward building a 
cohesive polity uniformly committed to the same principles.  
German law long maintained individualistic and laissez-faire presuppositions. 
This was true of both the structure of the legal system and the content of the law itself. As 
was the case in many European countries in the nineteenth century, the German system 
was developed to comprise two distinct categories of law and, corresponding to those 
categories, independent systems of courts. 22 The Civil Code constitutes the private law, 
“the body of rules that seeks to do justice between private individuals and which does not 
ordinarily concern the state as a party,”23 while the public law pertains to “obligations or 
regulations of the political organs of the state.”24 These systems of law originally 
operated independently of one another and, in general, did not intersect.  
Germans jurists located the Civil Code in the ancient tradition of Roman law, so 
endowing private law and its practitioners with great prestige. On the other hand, the 
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public law was relatively new and primarily concerned with administration, as of social 
insurance and welfare programs following Bismarck’s 1890 reforms.25 Public law thus 
lacked the same storied history and reputation for rigor that came to be associated with 
the Civil Code. Nevertheless, jurists understood the distinction as indispensable. Indeed, 
by separating the rules governing the state from those that governed private relations, the 
law both delineated a separate sphere of private life and outlined ostensibly neutral rules 
of engagement for private interchange.26 Quint explains, 
The apparatus of the state was excluded from private law, except to the 
extent necessary for the judiciary to allocate the private rights recognized 
by the Civil Code, and these rights generally implied a maximum of 
individual autonomy and a minimum of intervention to redress individual 
or group inequalities already existing in society.27 
 
Thus, the Civil Code presumed formal equality and reflected what Philip Pettit calls 
freedom as noninterference.28 Though both public and private law were necessary to 
governance, it was the Civil Code, the private law, that jurists credited with preserving 
freedom for Germany. In contrast, even when the Weimar Constitution later adopted a 
long list of rights, these rights were deemed judicially unenforceable,29 and still failed to 
occupy the same position as did the Civil Code in the German imaginary.  
Apart from the civil law system’s structure that allowed for the referee of private 
relationships separately from the constraints of public law, the substantive content of law 
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and belief in the Civil Code’s neutrality also shows the liberal predilections of the 
contemporaneous legal world. In particular, the rules of private law “were thought to 
enhance a more general freedom of individuals not to be interfered with by the state—
particularly in commercial relationships but also in other areas of everyday life.”30 Thus 
the Civil Code promised order and protection in such areas of private interchange as 
contracts, torts, inheritance, and family relationships. Indeed, some continue to point to 
the Civil Code as an essential source of freedom for the German people, even after the 
adoption of the Basic Law.31 Moreover, such guarantees as that of private autonomy 
(Privatautonomie) were “highly cherished” for their role in securing a new middle class 
seeking economic freedom in the nineteenth century.32 Notwithstanding a few 
exceptions,33 therefore, the bourgeois idea “that contracting parties are formally free and 
equal”34 and that private transactions ought not be hindered defined the substance of 
German law until the early twentieth century, when these liberal precepts were called into 
question.  
The perception of the neutrality of the Civil Code was disputed in the early 
twentieth century as scholars and political actors observed that political choices 
undergirded decisions pertaining to both the code’s legislation and interpretation. Severe 
economic crisis also generated a new urgency to modify the private law to meet the 
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escalating needs of the country.35 Later, in the wake of World War II, the realization that 
the Weimar Constitution could be so easily leveraged to serve odious political ends 
further exposed the problems of striving for value neutrality in the law.36 As Germany 
moved to amend its Civil Code and adopt a new Basic Law, therefore, its constitutive 
liberal principles underwent a kind of transformation. To be sure, the Weimar 
Constitution was a significant influence on the new constitution and the Civil Code was 
initially imported into the new regime unamended. Nevertheless, new commitments and 
historical memory both imbued the law with new meanings. Most notably, dignity 
figured prominently in the new constitution. The very first provision of the Basic Law 
states, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority.”37 Such an emphasis on dignity is certainly consistent with liberalism’s 
concern for the individual, and even expands on Kantian strains that some scholars 
identify in earlier instantiations of German law.38 In his book Human Dignity, Aharon 
Barak states that there is “no other constitution in which human dignity has such a central 
role.”39 Indeed, that Germany has enshrined dignity as its supreme constitutional value, 
never to be amended, reflects its uncompromising rejection of the violations of human 
dignity inflicted by the Third Reich.40 
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While this new commitment to dignity certainly comports with Germany’s long 
liberal tradition, it depends less on the liberal conception of separate public and private 
spheres, even as it continues to operate in a civil law system. Indeed, with this and other 
additions to the Basic Law, the content and very purpose of fundamental law expands.41 
Barak explains that most approaches to understanding the role of dignity in German 
constitutionalism understand it in the context of “the framework of society. Human 
dignity is not the human dignity of a person on a desert island.”42 In this way, we see a 
shift from the pure individualism and aspiration to value neutrality of the nineteenth 
century to something of a moral proposition for how the individual ought to be treated in 
German society and, by extension, what society itself ought to look like. Returning to the 
provision of the Basic Law, the second clause reads that “To respect and protect [dignity] 
shall be the duty of all state authority.”43 Barak explains that this provision has the 
potential to make both negative and positive demands of government.44 The duty to 
respect requires that the state not do anything to limit human dignity, a principle that 
seems to grow fairly naturally out of the liberalism of the German legal tradition. The 
duty to protect, on the other hand, seems instead to require that the state take some 
positive action in pursuance of human dignity, though the text itself does not specify 
what this ought to entail. Almost a decade after the adoption of the Basic Law, the 
Federal Constitutional Court offered additional meaning and clarity on this duty to 
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protect, interpreting it to require the defense of human dignity against violations by 
private actors.45 
In this way, human dignity emerges as both a value of the German constitution 
and an enforceable right. As a value, it constitutes the basis of the German polity and, to 
this extent, engenders a kind of “common good.” Robert Alexy’s important distinction 
between subjective and objective rights further illuminates this development. Subjective 
rights align with the typical conception of rights as justiciable and as giving rise to claims 
against particular parties, usually the state. In contrast, objective rights comprise the 
broader values of a given constitutional order.46 Objective rights are not immediately 
justiciable, though sometimes judges may decide cases in ways that derive duties from 
them. Discussing this shift to extract some understanding of a common good out of what 
formerly would have been mere rights claims, Habermas discusses the now recurring 
commitment to human dignity in national constitutions today. He states: 
“Human dignity” performs the function of a seismograph that registers 
what is constitutive for a democratic legal order, namely, just those rights 
that citizens of a political community must grant themselves if they are to 
be able to respect one another as members of a voluntary association of 
free and equal persons. The guarantee of these human rights gives rise to 
the status of citizens who, as subjects of equal rights, have a claim to be 
respected in their human dignity.47  
 
If a constitution proposes an encompassing principle to guide a polity, a “seismograph” 
as Habermas puts it, then it is no longer a stretch to argue that citizens, too, ought to 
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conform to this standard. Put differently, human dignity begins to clear the path formerly 
occupied by the nineteenth century commitment to laissez-faire thinking, so preparing 
German liberalism for the kind of uniformity that horizontal effect would ultimately 
actuate.48 
This concept of objective rights thus served as an intellectual bridge in 
constitutionalism, expanding the meaning of rights to encompass a kind of public 
morality. In the terms of the present project, we might say that this move to conceive of 
dignity as the moral basis for the new constitutional order gestures toward a new 
paradigm of governing all spheres according to a common standard. While the Basic Law 
does not explicitly take this step, its inherent vision as well as its specific content laid 
groundwork for such an interpretation. We get such a glimpse into the expanse of the 
German constitutional project from Jorg Fedtke’s explanation of the years during the 
Third Reich, of the “climate of fear, terror and oppression, which went far beyond the 
many single instances of human rights infringements by the regime.”49 He states, 
Nazi ideology permeated society as a whole—the working environment, 
the arts, journalism, the scientific community, architecture, the church, 
schools and universities, social relationships, local communities where 
people went about their daily lives, and even the allegedly safe nucleus of 
the family home.50  
 
As the pathologies and abuses had transcended spheres of life, therefore, the reconstituted 
German law had to be adequately equipped to effect change across spheres as well. 
Specific provisions in the original text of the Basic Law suggest as much. In addition to 
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the commitment to human dignity, Article 1 Section 3’s statement that rights bind the 
judiciary “as directly applicable law” begins to challenge the understanding of the role of 
courts in the civil law tradition, that the judiciary’s role was simply to administer the 
Civil Code amid private transactions.51 Indeed, the idea that rights bind the judiciary 
could be interpreted as a charge that judges continued to remain accountable to 
constitutional rights and values in the very process of applying the Civil Code.  
On such questions, Article 9 Section 3 states explicitly that certain private 
relationships had to meet a constitutional standard, guaranteeing the “right to form 
associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions” against all 
actors, regardless of occupation or profession.52 Thus, the constitutional drafters left little 
guesswork about the extent of this provision’s application. Though this and the 
aforementioned provisions in the Basic Law in some sense signaled the capaciousness of 
the constitutional project, however, their presence also seemed to cut in the opposite 
direction to contemporaneous observers. Specifically, the act of stating explicitly when 
private actors were implicated by the commitments of the Basic Law was construed as 
implying that the remainder of the text obligated only state actors. And indeed, it was not 
long after the Basic Law was adopted that jurists and legal scholars began contemplating 
these questions.  
Although the apex courts of the German legal system had already been charged 
with ensuring consistency within each branch of civil law,53 the prospect of horizontal 
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effect suggested for the first time the possibility of consistency, or uniformity, across 
areas of law. While some of the content of the Basic Law set the stage to break from the 
old paradigm and to adopt some version of horizontal effect, however, it did not 
necessarily entail horizontal effect by itself.54 Indeed, the reconstituted law provoked 
more questions than it answered with respect to the relationship between private law and 
public law, and the obligations of private actors with respect to public law. And it 
certainly did not settle the question of German constitutional identity, particularly with 
respect to the weight that old liberal values of the civil law system would hold in light of 
the evidently transformative additions made to German fundamental law. The potential 
for disharmony was clear, and much depended on how jurists sorted out these tensions in 
the ensuing years.   
Given Germany’s plural court system, these questions were as much about 
constitutional identity as they were about institutional power. Indeed, jurists from every 
area of law weighed in. Many jurists and legal scholars initially reacted by falling back 
on the orthodoxy of civil law systems, namely, that public law, now the Basic Law, had 
no influence on private disputes.55 Some argued that the constituent assembly simply was 
not authorized to adopt a Basic Law that affected private relationships, even if it wanted 
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to.56 Public law was, by definition, meant to protect against government institutions 
insofar as they possessed more power, in contrast with private law which was framed to 
govern relationships among equals.57  Still others argued against horizontal effect in 
terms of the Basic Law itself. As explained above, a few specific provisions suggest that 
the state has a duty to protect against private abuses (Article 1, Section 1, 3) or that 
certain private relationships are, in fact, held to a constitutional standard (Article 9, 
Section 3). The presence of such provisions could imply that other parts of the Basic Law 
were not intended to bear on private relationships.  
Other scholars challenged this conventional wisdom that the civil law system 
required a strict separation between public and private law. Quint explains the argument 
of some, that early conceptions of basic rights did not, in fact, distinguish between public 
and private offenders.58 Presumably, too, recent events demonstrated to scholars of the 
day the ways in which private entities could inflict great harm, whether in consort with 
state authorities or independently. Hans Carl Nipperdey, Chief Judge of the Federal 
Labor Court from 1954 to 1963, believed as much and led the Labor Court in arguing not 
merely for a conception of horizontal effect, but of direct horizontal effect, meaning the 
Constitution itself could create duties of private individuals rather than simply influence 
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private interchange through private law.59 In a series of cases, before and even after the 
Constitutional Court decided Lüth, the Labor Court adopted this position that basic rights, 
and particularly those rights that are most constitutive to the German project, could be 
deployed directly against private individuals. Indeed, these rights were so important as to 
constitute  “general rules for the governance of all of society.”60 Nipperdey and other 
advocates of direct horizontal effect cited elements of the Basic Law itself in support of 
their position. For example, Article 20 Section 1’s description of the polity as “a 
democratic and social federal state” suggests that some intervention of the state in private 
affairs was permitted “to ameliorate various forms of societal, rather than governmental, 
oppression.”61  
 The Labor Court certainly had strategic incentives to argue in favor of direct 
horizontal effect, insofar as this move allowed the Labor Court to participate, without 
mediation, in giving meaning to the Basic Law. Indeed, this approach would effectively 
place the Labor Court alongside the Constitutional Court as “an alternative source of 
constitutional adjudication.”62 Other jurists and scholars of private law came to opposite 
conclusions, however, fearing that the ultimate result of horizontal effect would be not to 
expand the domain of the private law courts but to expand the role of the Constitutional 
Court as overseer of private law. Thus, such jurists and scholars argued against horizontal 
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effect to ensure they retained their status as experts and final arbiters in their respective 
areas of law.63  
Within these strategic considerations was a real intellectual disagreement, a clash 
of visions, about the identity of the new German constitution and how seemingly 
competing values would relate moving forward. Some scholars understood the system of 
law to be essentially the same as before. Human dignity and other values that gained 
expression in the Basic Law certainly changed the landscape of constitutional law but, 
such arguments maintained, bore neither on the essential civil law framework, nor on the 
governance of private relations. Others, most notably Nipperdey, took the new content of 
German fundamental law to be more transformative, to include a new charge to order 
civil society according to the principles of the Basic Law.64 In this way, many parties had 
a stake in these questions and found support for their preferred answers in the particular 
factors they chose to emphasize out of the disharmony—whether the institutional 
separation built into the civil law, thought also to support individual autonomy, or instead 
a new social character that the Basic Law introduced to the constitutional-legal schema. 
We see such interpretations in particular decisions of the Civil Courts leading up to the 
Constitutional Court’s decision in Lüth.  
In 1954, the Federal Court of Justice first held that personality rights had 
horizontal effect in the Schacht case.65 This gave Nipperdey and the Labor Court 
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additional basis on which to argue for direct horizontal effect.66 And indeed, just six 
months later, the Labor Court declared that certain rights were so constitutive to the Basic 
Law that they ought to apply to public and private actors alike.67 The case involved an 
employee who was fired for distributing pamphlets in support of the Communist Party at 
his workplace, thus implicating Article 3 Section 3 (prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of political views) and Article 5 Section 1 (guaranteeing the freedom of 
expression).68 Though the Court decided in this particular case that the employer had 
dismissed the employee for reasons not related to political censorship, they took the 
opportunity to declare that the Basic Law did create rights obligations for employers and 
other private actors. Quint translates part of the opinion, that certain fundamental values 
“‘entered into [the basic legal] framework, and neither the organization of a workplace 
nor agreements nor acts of legal peers should be allowed to contradict those 
values….Thus these basic rights affect not only the relationship of the individual citizen 
to the state, but also the interrelationship of the citizens as legal equals.’”69  
The Labor Court thus staked its ground in the debate over the nature of the Basic 
Law and its ability to command the nature of private relationships. Indeed, the 
constitutional choices of the Basic Law, the Court argued, furnished guidelines (or an 
ordre public) for organizing the larger German society. While the classical-liberal 
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catalogue of rights in the Basic Law70 certainly factored into these decisions and 
continued to form the content of German law, the Court also drew from the idea of social 
justice (Sozialstaatsprinzip) present in Articles 20 and 28 to justify their broader view of 
what the Basic Law aimed to accomplish.71 Although their reasoning was grounded in a 
conception of freedom, therefore, it was a more expansive conception that sought to 
account for the realities of power relationships and discrepancies in bargaining 
positions.72  
The Labor Court would continue in this vein a few years later in the Zölibat73 
decision. In this case, a woman was dismissed from her job at a hospital when she got 
married as she had violated the terms of employment requiring that workers remain 
single. The Court considered deciding the case on the basis of certain potentially relevant 
provisions of the Civil Code.74 However, it instead opted to continue developing the 
concept of direct horizontal effect of constitutional rights, deciding the case on the basis 
of Article 6 Section 1 (protecting marriage and the family) as well as Article 2 Section 1 
(guaranteeing free development of personality).75 In the spirit of its previous 1954 
decision, the Court doubled down on the claim that private relationships and transactions 
ought not to contradict the ordre public established by the Basic Law. Nipperdey argued: 
A number of constitutional rights do not merely guarantee individual 
freedom against the power of the state, but rather are ordering principles 
for society, which have immediate significance even for the private legal 
dealings of citizens amongst one another. The Senate [of the Court] has 
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also previously indicated, that private law agreements, legal transactions 
and undertakings may not be set in opposition to that which one may call 
the ordering structure, the ordre public of the actual political and legal 
regime.76  
 
The immediate result of this line of argument was to expand the protections offered by 
constitutional rights by recognizing employers and other private actors as themselves 
having constitutional duties. Nevertheless, Nipperdey’s reasoning reveals an additional 
innovation that constitutional rights mandated a particular social order. What in one sense 
was an expansion of rights protections, was in another sense a directive that private actors 
“uphold the public order and the common good.”77  In this way, the Labor Court argued 
for a Constitution that ranked the uniformity of the new commitments of the Basic Law 
higher than the preexisting frameworks of the civil law system.  
In arguing specifically for direct horizontal effect, moreover, the Labor Court 
showed some readiness to dismantle the distinction between public and private, 
previously thought essential in guaranteeing individual freedom.78 Jud Mathews suggests 
that the constitutional theory underlying such decisions in the Labor Court had an “anti-
individualistic and antiliberal” bent.79 Others find even more in these decisions, arguing 
that “this orientation toward the priority of collective interests over individual interests 
reflects a holdover from the labor law doctrines of the Third Reich...”80 Notwithstanding 
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the accuracy of this more extreme suggestion, it is at least clear that the Labor Court put 
much weight on a new capacity of rights to dictate social goods, and thereby transform 
structures that were previously thought necessary to protect freedom in the German 
constitutional order. In other words, it was ready to adopt a kind of conception of the 
common good to govern directly the polity understood as a whole.  
Despite the Labor Court’s arguing that the Basic Law established a new ordre 
public, the question of horizontal effect was by no means settled. In its decisions, the 
Labor Court had identified one possible equilibrium amid the disharmony in German law 
as it had been reconstituted, choosing to emphasize the principles of the Basic Law as 
obligating all of German society and even obligating private actors directly. This was in 
stark contrast with the legal orthodoxy that still persisted even after 1949 when the Basic 
Law was adopted, that separation between public and private was essential to the service 
of such values as Privatautonomie. The Federal Constitutional Court would refer to these 
positions as two “extreme” views,81 suggestive that there could be another interpretation 
of the German constitutional order and, moreover, that such an alternative may be 
preferable. And indeed, just a few months after the Labor Court decided the Zölibat case, 
the Constitutional Court offered its own take on the question of horizontal effect as the 
supreme authority responsible for interpreting the Basic Law. 
In 1958, the Constitutional Court handed down the Lüth decision,82 a case that 
continually features in scholarship as seminal for the practice of horizontal effect. The 
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facts of the case appear in Chapter I, but I present them again here for the sake of a full 
analysis. In 1950, a former Nazi propagandist by the name of Veit Harlan produced an 
anti-Semitic film, the title of which translates to Immortal Beloved, even after having 
been acquitted of the war crimes for producing similar films during the war. In response, 
journalist Erich Lüth called for a boycott against Harlan’s new film. Harlan, in turn, 
called for an injunction against Lüth on the grounds that he intended to harm Harlan’s 
economic prospects. The district court in Hamburg granted the injunction, only for it to 
be overturned in 1958 when the Federal Constitutional Court finally weighed in. As 
explained in Chapter I, the Constitutional Court took issue with the fact that the lower 
court had not properly accounted for the Basic Law as establishing “an order of objective 
moral and legal principles”—that is, the fact that the Basic Law not only establishes 
subjective rights (that create rights obligations between particular parties), but also 
principles to guide the life of the polity understood as a whole. These principles had a 
“radiating effect” on all sectors of German law for which all courts had to account. The 
lower court had thus erred when it held that the Civil Code alone governed the case’s 
outcome without considering how the values of the Basic Law might intervene in the 
calculus. The Constitutional Court was careful to stipulate that this was still ultimately a 
dispute between private persons and, as such, ultimately governed by the Civil Code. 
Nevertheless, Lüth’s right to freedom of expression (guaranteed under Article 5 Section 
1) was relevant to the question at hand as a commitment of the Basic Law. Moreover, 
though all provisions of the Basic Law were potentially relevant to such calculations, the 




constitutive” (schlechthin konstituierend) in a liberal constitutional order.83 Thus, the fact 
that this was a dispute between private actors did not exempt the courts from considering 
how the relevant provisions of the Civil Code themselves comported with the 
commitments of the Basic Law, and particularly such foremost guarantees as that to 
freedom of expression.  
That the Constitutional Court’s decision in Lüth employed a doctrine of horizontal 
effect would seem to follow the Labor Court’s preceding decisions. Indeed, both Courts 
conceive of rights as objective values aiming toward a common good of society. 
Moreover, both grounded their decisions in a concession that such values could be 
impaired in the context of private relationships and interactions with the state alike. 
Crucial, however, was the different mechanisms employed by each court in their 
respective decisions. In Lüth the Constitutional Court struck a kind of middle ground in 
deciding that the values of the Basic Law applied to private actors only indirectly, that is, 
by way of their influence on private law. In so reasoning, the Constitutional Court charted 
a middle path between two extremes, departing from a strict understanding of the 
separation between public and private law as well as from the Labor Court’s argument 
that the Basic Law itself created duties of private actors. First proposed by eminent law 
professor Günter Dürig, this intermediate position of indirect horizontal effect was 
quickly accepted, even praised, by scholars and jurists alike.84  
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The decision in Lüth and the particular way in which the Constitutional Court 
developed horizontal effect for the German polity marked a sort of moment of truth with 
respect to both the larger architecture of law and courts, as well as the actual content of 
law. With respect to the architecture of law and courts, some legal scholars have 
questioned whether the indirect effect that Lüth introduces actually produces outcomes 
different from those under direct horizontal effect. Both ultimately entail the balancing of 
rights, the argument goes, even if the indirect method involves the intermediate 
translation into private law.85 While this is an important point and likely true in at least 
some cases, it does not fully appreciate the symbolic difference between these methods of 
horizontal effect, specifically when one accounts for the particularities of the German 
system. Indeed, it was because the position that the Constitutional Court adopted 
managed to balance competing values of the old civil law system and new constitutional 
values that its version of horizontal effect was so quickly accepted as both a theoretical 
and a practical matter. Moreover, what may seem to be a mere symbolic difference in 
indirect horizontal effect at first blush has the practical result of keeping the civil law 
relevant in such balancing of rights. Indeed, the Constitutional Court did not decide that 
the Basic Law controlled all outcomes, but that it had to be considered against the 
existing rules of the civil law. In this way, the Court preserved the potential of the Civil 
Code to factor into cases as a separate source of content and values. 
In navigating old and the new legal traditions in this way, moreover, the 
compromise in Lüth had the practical effect of preserving largely intact separate systems 
                                               




of law and courts. As Michelman explains, horizontal effect in Germany is limited by the 
very fact that it operates in a dualist system of civil law and constitutional law.86 
Following Lüth, the Constitutional Court did expand its domain to be able to hold 
questions under civil law to a constitutional standard.87  Nevertheless, even after Lüth, the 
Court seemed intent on “honoring this restriction of its competence”88 and not using its 
power to encroach on the interpretive role of its counterpart apex courts. It insisted that 
courts at every level and even the legislature show due consideration for the principles of 
the Basic Law, but did not insist on any particular interpretation of these principles. 
Furthermore, the private law courts remained the final interpreters in their respective 
areas of law, wherein the Constitutional Court largely refrained from interfering. Indeed, 
beginning in Lüth and continuing in subsequent horizontality cases, the Basic Law’s 
influence reaches only to a couple of specific provisions in the Civil Code known as the 
“general clauses.” One of the most important of these, Section 826 of the Civil Code, 
states “Whoever intentionally causes injury to another person in a manner contrary to 
good morals has the duty of compensating for that injury.”89 The Civil Code’s reference 
to “good morals” seems to admit of some external standard of evaluation, and the 
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Constitutional Court exploited this opening to bring the principles of the Basic Law to 
bear on private law. In so doing, however, it effectively limited its own interpretive 
authority to these particular provisions, so as not to fashion itself as a “super ordinary 
court”90 that interprets any provision of the Code it wishes. In those instances when the 
Constitutional Court cannot reach a “constitutionally satisfactory solution” without 
breaching jurisdictional divides, it actually looks to the legislature to revise the law.91 
Thus, “simultaneous, colliding commitments”92 persist in Germany’s practice of indirect 
horizontal effect, as the polity remains wedded to separate systems of law and courts as 
well as the idea that the Basic Law sets the standard for the polity as a whole. 
In addition to serving as an important moment in preserving the liberal character 
of the legal structure, Lüth also preserved a liberal character in the very content of the 
law. Of course, the Court endorsed the need to propagate a society committed to certain 
uniform norms—indeed, the freedom of expression was prioritized in Lüth, at least in 
part, for its public value and not solely for Lüth’s private interests as an individual.93 
Nevertheless, the content of such societal norms applied horizontally is firmly rooted in 
the liberalism of both the Basic Law and Germany’s enduring civil law. In short, 
liberalism was the constitutional project. On the very same day that the Court decided the 
Lüth case, it handed down another decision in which the right to freedom of expression 
gave way to “certain traditional property interests.”94 Granted, the new content which the 
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Basic Law brought to the law was a far cry from the laissez-faire values of the nineteenth 
century. To this extent, liberal principles certainly underwent some revision in its turn 
from neutrality of Weimar toward objective values. Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Court kept relevant a particular liberal understanding, present in the Civil Code and the 
Basic Law alike, that might have lost its strength had the Labor Court’s interpretation 
gained more traction. Although new obligations of private individuals emerged, this new 
societal morality was decidedly liberal in character and, as such, committed to private 
autonomy even as it was adapted to yield individual duties. 
The years that followed evince this preservation of liberal norms. Indeed, the 
history shows persistent disharmony, traceable to the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
Lüth to keep alive old liberal structures and values amid its push to foster a society 
uniformly obligated to constitutional norms. Specific cases reveal how Lüth had set a 
course that supported a kind of individualism in opting for indirect effect and, more 
specifically, in reserving a space for the private law. And indeed, we see the “reassertion 
of private law” in the Mephisto case.95 In this 1971 decision, the Court interpreted the 
constitutional rights of human dignity and free development of personality (Articles 1 and 
2, respectively) to encompass, that is, elevate to constitutional status, traditional rights 
that protect against injury to “the life, the body, the health, the freedom, the property …” 
as found in general clause 823(1) of the Civil Code.96 In other words, the Civil Code 
actually gave content to the Basic Law, insofar as it was incorporated into the Court’s 
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understanding of human dignity and personality. In this way, it could be balanced against 
and even take precedence over such rights as to artistic endeavor (Article 5, Section 3) 
that occur in the Basic Law explicitly.97 One might speculate how Mephisto and other 
cases might have had differed had the Labor Court’s approach of direct horizontal effect 
gained traction. With direct horizontal effect, constitutional rights obligations would 
apply to private actors directly. Thus, private law would not serve as a necessary 
intermediary, nor enjoy the same opportunity to bear on decisions as a unique source of 
values.  
While Mephisto goes further than many cases in the extent to which the Civil 
Code informs constitutional interpretations, it is not unique in putting into dialogue 
private law and the Basic Law and, more to the point, holding up the private law as a 
source of values in its own right. The earlier Blinkfüer case also translated the Civil Code 
into constitutional terms, finding that the freedom of the press (Article 5, Section 1) 
supported claims under the aforementioned clause 823(1) of the Civil Code. In this case, 
the leftist magazine Blinkfüer won against the freedom of expression of a conservative 
publisher calling for a political boycott of the magazine. Moreover, in the 1973 Soraya 
case, the Constitutional Court leveraged the constitutional right to personality in order to 
compel a remedy corresponding to the Civil Code’s protection of personality rights. On 
the one hand, some argue this step constitutes a rewriting of the Civil Code to align it 
with the Basic Law, insofar as the Code expressly states that “intangible and 
                                               




nonpecuniary harms” could not be rewarded for damages.98 However, with the 
introduction of horizontal effect, even indirect horizontal effect, we would expect that 
constitutional values would bear on private law in such ways. What is unique in the 
German jurisprudence, and what we see in such cases as Blinkfüer, is the way the Civil 
Code maintains a certain stature and is put into dialogue with the Basic Law, in spite of 
the primacy and “radiating effect” of the latter.99 That this is extraordinary (or at least not 
universal) will come into sharper relief in the next section that considers the common law 
of South Africa, which is more completely beholden to the South African Constitution 
and, importantly, entirely within the jurisdiction of South African Constitutional Court to 
uphold or to modify.   
Liberal values that would seem to exist in tension with the move toward 
horizontality persist not only in the continued institutional and legal division between the 
private law and public law, but in the content of the Basic law itself. The Basic Law 
offered a revised liberalism that transcended classical laissez-faire values in favor of such 
commitments as to human dignity.  Nonetheless, Fedtke views the catalogue of rights in 
the Basic Law as still “classical-liberal in character.” 100 Following human dignity as the 
foundational value come “an extensive range of individual freedoms,” including, 
the right to life and physical integrity, religious freedom, free speech and 
freedom of the press and the media, protection of marriage and the family, 
freedom of assembly and association, privacy of correspondence and 
telecommunications, freedom of movement with the federal territory, the 
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protection of economic activity, inviolability of the home, and the 
protection of property.101 
 
In addition to these enumerated rights, the right to free development of personality” has 
been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as a kind of “catch-all right,” protecting a 
vast range of liberty interests so as to make the Bill of Rights basically comprehensive.102 
After a couple of decades, moreover, the priority of such rights settled into the popular 
imaginary. Jud Mathews explains that 1959 to 1974 constituted “the high phase of 
liberalization in Germany.”103 Mathews cites as evidence a series of public opinion polls 
conducted in Germany between 1949 and 1963. The poll asked respondents to rank 
different rights in order of importance. In 1949, 35 percent of respondents identified 
freedom from want as most important, in contrast with 26 percent who selected freedom 
of expression. By 1963, in contrast, only 15 percent of respondents selected freedom 
from want, while 56 percent identified freedom of expression as most important. 
Moreover, in a 1964 poll, German voters ranked freedom as a more important value than 
either order or prosperity.104 
More to the point, this surge in liberal values reflected in the sorts of rights that 
tended to be applied horizontally, in this particular era and in general. Considering the 
aforementioned cases, we see the prevalence of such rights as the freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press, and the free development of personality as constituting the subject 
of the earliest horizontal effect cases. And indeed, most of the core horizontality cases in 
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Germany involved such classical liberal values.105 While the horizontal application of 
rights necessarily created obligations of private actors, the values underlying those rights 
obligations were widely accepted and, crucially, required only negative action on the part 
of these private actors.  
One could say that this emphasis on classical liberal values acted for a long time 
as a kind of in-built limit on how far horizontal effect would be applied in Germany. 
Indeed, on the opposite side of this same coin, the right to equality (Article 3) was rarely 
applied horizontally. It took the outside force of the European Union to change this, when 
the European Council directed Member States to implement anti-discrimination measures 
in 2000.106 Until these more recent developments, however, the German Constitutional 
Court took a fairly conservative approach to Article 3’s equality provisions. Stone Sweet 
and Mathews both explain how the Court considered equality cases under the lower 
standard of “arbitrariness review as opposed to a more intensive proportionality 
review.”107 Laurie Ackermann, former justice of the South African Constitutional Court, 
tells a similar story of the German constitutionalism: 
As point of departure the Basic Law by ‘upgrading’ (‘Aufwertung’) the 
freedom ‘flowing from human worth’ and by making a primary choice in 
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favour of personal freedom, places it beyond doubt that thereby freedom is 
also sanctioned as between equals, as against demands of equality. 108  
 
None other than Günter Dürig offers a coinciding account, seeing freedom under the 
Basic Law as “the primary manifestation” of human dignity,109 and, moreover that “a 
preference for freedom as against equality has been established.”110  
The few times that equality was applied horizontally before the EU introduced its 
directives was in the Labor Court. Indeed, this is the exception that proves the rule, and 
consistent with the Labor Court’s approach to horizontal effect since the 1950s.111  The 
Labor Court has been quicker to rely on the constitutional commitment to equality in 
adjudicating fair relations between employer and employee.112 Insofar as the labor courts’ 
jurisdiction is circumscribed to labor law, the German legal community generally 
acknowledges that they operate in an area warranting a more thorough consideration of 
social power, and even the continued application of direct horizontal effect.113 In light of 
this tendency to give more weight to equality in the labor courts, it is not surprising that 
they largely allied with the European Court of Justice after the issuance of the 2000 
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antidiscrimination directives. The High Labor Court even asked the ECJ for preliminary 
references about the requirements of these new policies, while the Constitutional Court 
instead followed along to the extent that was required. 
 While equality was certainly present in the Basic Law, therefore, it did not feature 
prominently in the context of private relations, a fact consistent with the long German 
emphasis on Privatautonomie. Indeed, it took the external force of the EU to change the 
status quo and push equality to have a stronger horizontal presence. The two directives 
that the European Council required in national law included Council Directive 
2000/43/EC (the Racial Equality Directive) and Council Directive 2000/78/EC (the 
Employment Equality Framework Directive). The former aimed to bring all public and 
private law into line with EU equality norms, specifically as concerned racial and ethnic 
discrimination. The latter directive, in contrast, aimed only to influence employment law, 
but required equal treatment across a range of classifications including “sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”114 The German 
Parliament first attempted to implement these directives in the Anti-Discrimination Act 
(ADG) of 2001.115 The Act generated much controversy from all sectors of German 
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was the intended reversal of the burden of proof in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant would, in other 
words, be called to adequately and convincingly prove his/her lack of intent to discriminate. Another new 
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society, as politicians, jurists, and many others in civil society argued the Act “would go 
too far in curtailing the principle of private autonomy.”116 Others argued that it was, in 
fact, necessary not to exempt “predominant sectors of social life from scrutinization” in 
order to take non-discrimination seriously.117 
In his contemporaneous analysis of the arguments surrounding the ADG, Georg 
Sommeregger recounts the worries of some scholars at the time, that “the introduction of 
equality in the private sphere by doctrines of horizontality is in substance mandated 
virtue imposed by the state on the individual….In this criticism the state appears as a 
missionary that tries to make citizens morally ‘good.’”118 Whereas recognition of some 
private sphere admits the potential for some diversity of views, the abolishment of the 
public-private divide, as some characterized the effects of the new legislation, would 
entail “subjecting private action to the same moral yardstick (or values) as are valid for 
public agents.”119 If such came to pass, the argument continues, the result would be the 
“crushing of the possibility of private choice by ‘public virtue.’”120 Thus, the prospect of 
bringing the value of equality to bear on private spaces yielded strong reactions for the 
very reason that it would require a kind of uniformity. Sommeregger stipulates, however, 
that this uniformity (what he calls “value monism”) was only required in select areas and 
with respect to particular categories. The legislation did not entail a blanket requirement 
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that all private choice conform to public standards, but only that some private choices 
conform. On this basis, he concludes that the legislation “did not introduce a new 
paradigm but shifted the line between uncensored and censored private behavior (too far 
for some), with the result that the private sphere is decimated without being liquidated 
conceptually.”121 Such shifting of the line that comes with the transmission of the public 
moral yardstick into private spaces ultimately amounts to a political question, the answer 
to which likely depends on a given country’s particular history, commitments, and shifts 
in public opinion. 
In many ways, these fears about the consequences for autonomy echo those same 
fears articulated in the run-up to the Lüth case in the 1950s. Nevertheless, this anti-
discrimination legislation is different from the initial move to horizontality in a couple of 
ways. First, the content of the rights in question is qualitatively different from those that 
had been given horizontal effect in prior decades.122 Sommeregger explains, “In the 
horizontalization of other fundamental rights the fundamental tension between liberty and 
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equality is in the background, whereas in the case of the anti-discrimination legislation it 
comes to the fore because of the fact that equality itself is the object of 
horizontalization.”123 The argument of the present project presumes that horizontal effect 
always entails uniformity, insofar as it always brings public values to bear in private 
spaces. Even when classical liberal rights are at issue in a case, therefore, one of the 
parties will still be required to conform to those classical liberal values of the 
constitution—for example, the freedom to develop human personality in Mephisto or the 
freedom of the press in Blinkfüer. To this extent, the EU directives and subsequent 
legislation of the German Parliament were not different, but simply added new rights to 
the catalogue of those that would in some way have horizontal effect.  
In the particular context of Germany, however, with its civil law tradition and 
generally liberal orientation, a good deal of the population subscribed to the values 
underlying that liberal catalogue of rights that had applied horizontally historically. These 
values inspired consensus (evinced by the liberal surge in the post-war years) that such a 
liberal ethos was necessary if society was to avoid the recurrence of past tragedy. In 
Sommeregger’s terms, a kind of “value monism” with respect to these rights did not give 
rise to controversy. When the prospect of individual duties pertaining to 
antidiscrimination arose, however, many worried (whether justifiably or not) that the new 
duties that would arise would touch subjects that did comprise a continued “value 
pluralism” in German society. With the ADG, some believed the content of those rights 
                                               




for which private actors would be held responsible held the potential for conflict with 
their priors.124  
Also different from the early debates that preceded Lüth, the move to give 
equality and, more specifically, antidiscrimination horizontal effect was initiated through 
legislation, first through the European Council and then the German Parliament. 125 
Whereas the practice of horizontal effect in courts applies rights obligations to private 
actors in single, isolated cases, the developments following the EU directives came 
through legislation and therefore amounted to a change in the very “base-line of private 
law.”126 Claims to autonomy, people feared, would no longer be balanced or weighed on 
a case-by-case basis, but would necessarily yield to equality. As Sommeregger puts it, 
“The moral standard (one and only) of the community trumps the individual moral 
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standards (resting on personal choice) of the individuals in the specific fields.”127 While a 
common objection to horizontal effect is that courts are not politically accountable in the 
same way as legislatures, people in this instance were concerned less about the venue of 
decision than they were generally about “this move of public virtue into the private 
sphere.”128 In the terms of the current project, one might say the full republican potential 
of horizontal effect came to the fore when it extended to equality rights, in the 
recognition that public values were governing the polity as a whole and, moreover, that 
this might actually entail the compromise of private interests. Given that German 
horizontal effect had developed around the classical liberal canon of rights, instances of 
horizontal effect did not typically require great positive action on the part of private 
actors, and so the full potential of horizontal effect had been muted. Although on some 
level the country recognized a need to build a polity on certain common values after 
World War II, this commonality only extended so far as the liberal canon. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that the impetus to extend horizontal effect further came from EU 
institutions, that is, sources external to Germany. 
Ultimately the ADG failed under this political pressure. Moreover, Mathews 
suggests, the ensuing controversy led Parliament to change the law actually to allow more 
discrimination, specifically in lessening protections for workers dismissed from their jobs 
on the basis of age.129 The debate and failure surrounding the ADG attests to the informal 
limits of horizontal effect that had long permeated the structure, content, and ethos of the 
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German legal system. Nevertheless, EU institutions stood their ground on the issues at 
stake when, in the Mangold case, the European Court of Justice described 
antidiscrimination as one of the EU’s “general principles” that ran deeper than the recent 
directives, thereby insisting on German compliance. While the Constitutional Court 
might have reasserted “control over equality law in Germany,” it instead followed the 
ECJ, and the Labor Court as it were, so as not to appear an opponent of equality.130  
 In 2006, the German Parliament finally managed to pass the General Equal 
Treatment Act (AGG) in fulfillment of the EU directives. Though not substantially 
different from the original ADG legislation, it passed with much less controversy, 
perhaps a sign of a shift in the larger polity not unlike the shift in political culture 
following World War II. Nevertheless, most decisions related to the anti-discrimination 
legislation have since been issued by the civil courts and labor courts rather than the 
Constitutional Court,131 possibly an additional sign of continued hesitance to have 
equality apply to private actors as a constitutional matter.  
In Lüth, the Constitutional Court declared that the Basic Law engendered an 
objective order of values, and thus, that the constitutional project aspired to influence 
German society as a whole. Nevertheless, the fundamental structure of legal system 
remained in place with Lüth, as the Court acknowledged that private law contributed to 
“the autonomy of the individual—and to the public good—and therefore should remain in 
effect…even when confronted by the countervailing objective and public values of 
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constitutional law.”132 The Constitutional Court thus reaffirmed the presuppositions of 
the civil law system so that the Basic Law could influence the private law but not 
supplant it.133 In pursuing a moderate course the Constitutional Court opted to rest in the 
disharmony that had emerged between an enduring liberal system and the propagation of 
certain values (albeit liberal values) in private spaces. As a practical matter, this 
preserved a general liberal ethos at a critical moment when the Court might have chosen 
a different direction, as in following the Labor Court’s approach, for example. This 
liberal equilibrium that the Court maintained in Lüth endured until the EU’s 2000 
directives. These upset the equilibrium in adding the rights to equality and anti-
discrimination to the catalogue of those for which private actors would be responsible. 
With this development, the public morality of Germany expanded to encompass a new 
egalitarianism and the uniformity that horizontal effect had always required became 
salient.  
That this particular development marked a shift for horizontal effect in Germany 
becomes even clearer when compared with South African constitutional history. Indeed, 
South Africa was site to similar debates about horizontal effect, related to the 
constitutional commitments that would apply across public and private spaces alike. As 
will become clear in the next section, the primary difference between these countries was 
the more ambitious nature of South Africa’s constitutional project which forced the 
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polity, and the Constitutional Court in particular, to come to terms earlier with the 
uniformity that horizontal effect entailed. Indeed, the Constitution of South Africa was 
never a moderate or limited project. Though both the German and South African 
constitutions engendered transformative projects, South Africa’s egalitarian vision relied 
much more on the uniform application of new moral commitments that horizontal effect 
entailed.  
 
Horizontal Effect in South Africa: Instrument of Societal Transformation  
Amid the numerous national constitutions adopted throughout the twentieth 
century, that of South Africa stands out in the transformation to which it aspires. Frank 
Michelman goes so far as to describe it as “post-liberal.”134 After years of apartheid, 
political imprisonment, and protests, the situation in the early to mid 1990s finally 
allowed the South African people to reconstitute itself and form a nation out of a history 
of division.  
As the previous section demonstrated, horizontal effect was an issue of major 
debate in Germany, in that its characteristic uniformity had to be reconciled with other 
commitments and aspects of the country’s civil law system. A certain disharmony 
emerged as prototypical liberal values became the stuff of German constitutional morality 
ultimately to be applied uniformly across public and private legal relationships. Whereas 
Germany’s adoption of horizontal effect came through the Court’s constitutional 
interpretation in the Lüth case, the major part of the debate over horizontal effect in South 
                                               




Africa transpired in the deliberations over the Interim and Final Constitutions. And in 
general, horizontal effect fits more easily in South Africa’s larger project. That such 
values as dignity, equality, freedom135 might suffuse the polity as a whole was the 
essence of the project. Granted, we see in South African scholarship many of the same 
objections that appear in Germany and elsewhere. Nevertheless, a certain egalitarian bent 
characterized the South African vision that distanced the polity from a firm classical 
liberal line. Response to such objections therefore came more easily, as its constitutional 
project was not so easily undercut by the uniformity that horizontal effect promised. 
Speaking specifically about South African history, Nick Friedman, seems to suggest that 
horizontality is actually required. He states: 
Firstly, [horizontal effect] commits individuals to the rebuilding of the 
ethical relations so radically shattered during apartheid, through the 
undertaking of legal duties to improve their communities. Secondly, given 
the enormous task of reconstruction faced by the new South Africa, the 
limited resources of the state, and the grossly unequal and enormous 
wealth which resides in the private sector, horizontality breathes new hope 
into the possibility of creating a more equal and just society in the medium 
term. Thirdly, by requiring individuals to uphold their moral duties 
towards one another and to cooperate in realising a new vision for a shared 
future, horizontality reaffirms the human dignity of those who bear such 
duties as much as it does those who benefit from their performance. 
Insofar as direct horizontality contributes to the realisation of substantive 
equality and the establishment of the conditions necessary for an 
autonomous life, it promotes freedom and fosters a culture in which the 
infinite worth of each person is respected and valued.136 
 
                                               
135 South African Constitution, Chapter 1, Section 1. 
136 Friedman 67. See also Aoife Nolan, “Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic 
and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland.” International Journal 




The South African Constitution and the large-scale malaise it aims to ameliorate more 
easily accommodated horizontal effect and, specifically, the uniform constitutional 
standard it brings to public and private spaces. 
The process by which South Africa adopted its new constitution is well-known in 
comparative constitutional scholarship. The National Party (what historically had been 
the Afrikaner ethnic nationalist party) and the African National Congress (the still-
existing party founded to realize equality and end apartheid) agreed to pursue a two-stage 
constitution-making process, adopting an Interim Constitution after much debate in 
November 1993.137 This Interim Constitution along with certain key constitutional 
principles set the program for continuing deliberations over the Final Constitution. In the 
meantime, the first non-racial election was held in April 1994, allowing the African 
National Congress to assume its status as, in fact, representing the majority of South 
Africans. In 1996, the Constituent Assembly submitted the Final Constitution for the 
Constitutional Court’s review, so as to ensure conformity with the aforementioned 
constitutional principles. Ultimately, the Constitutional Court required nine changes to be 
incorporated into the final document. After the Assembly made the required changes, the 
Final Constitution was effective in February 1997, cementing the country’s new 
constitutional vision. 
The Constituent Assembly understood the legacy of racism as deep-seated in the 
social fabric, and thus aimed to secure more than formal equality. From the outset, the 
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drafters set their sights on an ambitious standard of equality, one that provided for 
socioeconomic rights, for example.138 With such goals figuring prominently in the 
deliberations, perhaps it is not surprising that both the Interim and the Final Constitutions 
considered at length the question of horizontal effect, as well. For various reasons, the 
drafters of the Interim Constitution proceeded with some caution. Even such ambitious 
justices as Albie Sachs were hesitant to give rights direct horizontal effect in the 1996 
decision Du Plessis v. De Klerk.139 However, the incremental development of horizontal 
effect jurisprudence thereafter largely has been one of expansion. Indeed, the latter Final 
Constitution stated unequivocally that, in fact, rights would apply horizontally to private 
actors.140 Certain doctrinal questions, such as whether horizontal effect applies to private 
actors directly or indirectly, remain subject to debate. Nevertheless, there is basic 
consensus that the text and the very nature of the constitutional project141 require some 
kind of horizontal effect.142 
I will proceed by first recounting the deliberations over horizontal effect in the 
drafting of the Interim Constitution. Indeed, much time was dedicated to the question of 
horizontal effect at this early phase. This set the stage for the foundational case, Du 
Plessis v. De Klerk, decided under this preliminary standard. The different opinions 
reveal simultaneously the Court’s general appreciation for the transformative project at 
hand as well as a lingering diffidence that the particular Interim Constitution operative at 
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that time did authorize this step toward uniformity. The lingering ambiguity on display in 
Du Plessis led the drafters to double down on the necessity of horizontal effect in the text 
of the Final Constitution, and subsequent cases reveal a Court and a Constitution come 
into their own on this question. Certainly in comparison with Du Plessis, later cases show 
less concern for traditional distinctions in law and more attention to the path laid before 
South African governing institutions to fully realize the new constitutional vision across 
the polity.  
That apartheid had propagated inequality across spheres of life in South Africa 
might suggest that the question of horizontal effect was always an easy one for the 
constitutional drafters. However, the prospect of applying rights horizontally was widely 
debated both among and within parties involved in the deliberations of the Interim 
Constitution. Richard Spitz offers a detailed account of the discussions and shifting 
positions on this question.143 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the National Party advocated a 
vertical model for the Bill of Rights that would obligate only state actors and, hence, not 
change so drastically the status quo that still privileged white populations.144 On the other 
hand, representatives of the African National Congress initially argued in favor of 
horizontal effect insofar as they did intend significant change with this new constitutional 
order.  
Some members of the ANC came to question the efficacy of horizontal effect to 
their cause, however. For one thing, they worried that cementing horizontal effect of 
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some rights in the Interim Constitution would prevent courts from employing the range of 
their interpretive powers to apply additional rights horizontally as well. Spitz also 
attributes the split between members of the ANC who did and did not support horizontal 
effect to Halton Cheadle’s consultation with American law professor Laurence Tribe. 
Apparently, Tribe cautioned Cheadle against horizontal effect, for the commonly offered 
reason that legislatures, rather than courts, are better suited to regulating private 
relations.145 Cheadle was persuaded by such arguments from democratic accountability, 
not least because of the real possibility that National Party judges would be among those 
determining the outcomes of such important questions if they were constitutionalized. 
Moreover, himself as a practitioner of labor law, Cheadle worried that horizontal effect 
would bring too much within the purview of the Constitutional Court to the detriment of 
those issues and institutions dedicated more specifically to fair labor practices. Indeed, 
his concern was not unlike that of some German practitioners of labor law in the years 
leading up to Lüth. Spitz explains how such worries over horizontal effect were 
symptomatic of the joint presence and different preoccupations of practitioners and 
academics in the Assembly.146 While the former were more inclined to preserve 
traditional distinctions in law, the latter were convinced that some provision of horizontal 
effect was essential to realizing constitutional values writ large.  
In this way, Cheadle brought not a few concerns to the ANC and larger Assembly 
on the subject of horizontal effect, making this particular debate one that began to cut 
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across party lines.147 Indeed, a serious dispute broke out between Cheadle and Albie 
Sachs on this question, Sachs counting himself among those who thought horizontal 
effect necessary to prevent the privatization of apartheid.148 Cheadle had the upper hand, 
however, as he served on the Ad Hoc Committee charged with these issues concerning 
the application of rights.149 Though ultimately comprising a vertical model of rights, the 
Interim Constitution permitted the possibility of some kind of horizontal effect in two 
sections at the end of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. First, Section 33(4) stated: 
“This chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by 
bodies and persons other than those bound in terms of 7(1) [concerning legislative and 
executive organs of state].” That the Interim Constitution adopted a vertical framework 
did not prevent the legislature from passing laws that would effectively pursue 
constitutional values in private spaces, including and perhaps especially anti-
discrimination. Presumably, this achieved a kind of middle ground, still far from direct 
horizontal effect, but also taking deliberate steps to avoid such outcomes as the Civil 
Rights Cases that facilitated Jim Crow in the United States. 
The second section of the Interim Constitution that provided for horizontal effect 
was Section 35(3) which stated, “In the interpretation of any law and the application and 
development of the common law and customary law, a court shall have regard to the 
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spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter.”150 This formulation would not be all that 
unusual as justification for the horizontal application of rights in other contexts. Indeed, it 
resembles Stephen Gardbaum’s argument (admittedly unorthodox in the U.S. context) 
that the supremacy clause offers some foundation for horizontal effect in the United 
States. In particular, he argues that it can be interpreted as requiring courts to apply 
common law and statutory law only as it coheres with the Constitution.151 Moreover, this 
language in 35(3) in the Interim Constitution also resembles the reasoning of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in Lüth, namely, that inhering in the Basic Law was an 
objective order of values that necessarily informed the interpretation of all other areas of 
law. To this extent, the Interim Constitution left an opening for some form of horizontal 
effect, but was not so conclusive as to obviate debate. 
In the years that the Interim Constitution was effective, from 1993 to 1997, the 
question of horizontal effect remained a live one.152 Indeed, the Constitution was 
sufficiently indeterminate to give rise to real debate when the newly established 
Constitutional Court decided the case Du Plessis v. De Klerk. This judgment has received 
much attention since it was decided in 1996, largely because the majority assumed the 
conventional liberal line of argument in filling in the gaps of the Interim Constitution, 
thus opting for a more banal indirect horizontal effect rather than the direct horizontal 
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effect for which many were already arguing. In Du Plessis, a newspaper reported that 
South African citizens had been transporting weapons to rebel forces in Angola via 
covert flights. The newspaper suggested that such private air operators as Gert De Klerk 
were intentionally fueling the Angolan civil war in order to make a profit. De Klerk sued 
the newspaper for defamation, arguing that these articles had damaged both his reputation 
and his business.153  
The decision itself hinged on whether the Interim Constitution could be applied 
retrospectively insofar as the newspaper (the plaintiffs) sought to rely on section 15, 
protecting the freedom of speech and expression, including “freedom of the press and 
other media.” However, the fact that the Interim Constitution was not adopted until after 
the articles were published and damages were incurred posed some difficulty to their 
argument. Implicit in this question of retrospectivity, moreover, was the further question 
of whether an article of the Constitution could even be brought to bear on a private 
relationship in the way that the newspaper argued. The case made its way to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal which decided against the newspaper. Specifically, the Court decided 
that the Interim Constitution could not apply retrospectively and that the Bill of Rights of 
the Interim Constitution only had vertical effect, that is, it only applied directly against 
the state actors.154 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal was considered to be the final court of appeal in all 
areas of ordinary law. Both the question of retrospectivity and horizontality in the case at 
hand seemed to implicate constitutional questions, however. Crucial to the outcome of 
this case was the question of how the common law related to the Constitution—were such 
aspects of the common law, such as the rule governing defamation, ultimately subject to 
the Article 15 commitment to free expression? With such questions straddling the divide 
between ordinary and constitutional law, the case went to the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court, in turn, agreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal that the Interim 
Constitution could not apply retrospectively. While this judgment alone would have been 
sufficient to determine the case’s outcome, the Court took the additional step of deciding 
the question of horizontal effect as well.155 Justice Kentridge cited the Interim 
Constitution’s aforementioned Section 7 to argue that the Constitution included no basis 
for direct horizontal effect; indeed, Section 7 only obligated the Executive and 
Legislature to uphold the Bill of Rights. The Court thus reasoned that the text of the 
Interim Constitution provided a foundation for a kind of indirect horizontal effect that, in 
fact, closely resembled the German practice of Drittwirkung.156 On this understanding, 
the Bill of Rights of the Interim Constitution obligated private relationships only insofar 
as statutes attempted to regulate them.   
South Africa was also importantly different from Germany, however, in that it 
maintained a system of common law. This common law, the Court concluded, was not 
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subject to the Constitution in the same way. Of course, Section 35(3) of the Interim 
Constitution required that a court should have regard for “the spirit purport and objects” 
of the Bill of Rights in interpreting any law, and the provision explicitly included the 
common law in this.157 Nevertheless, Justice Kentridge betrayed his belief that the 
Constitutional Court was not up to this task, explaining that it simply did not have the 
capacity to balance matters of common law in the way that would be required in applying 
horizontal effect. In particular, he worried that in deeming some rule of common law as 
incompatible with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court would then be charged with 
making law to fill the resulting gap.158 In addition to such steps that Parliament could take 
in the realm of statutory law, the ordinary courts and particularly the Supreme Court of 
Appeal were better equipped to apply horizontal effect in their “routine common law 
interpretive work.”159 Kentridge’s argument is premised on a specific understanding of 
law and the work that common law does to balance private relationships. Such new 
constitutional rights as to dignity, Kentridge argued, could not effectively be balanced 
against old common law rights and certainly could not be subject to the same sort of 
balancing that transpired in common law decision-making.160 In this way, the 
Constitutional Court’s initial formulation of horizontal effect was one that preserved 
traditional boundaries of law, largely intended to isolate private relationships from 
constitutional obligations directed to the state.161  
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Early critics of the Du Plessis decision, Stuart Woolman and Dennis Davis, 
suggest that the Interim Constitution pointed just as easily if not more easily to the 
opposite conclusion than that which Kentridge reached. They argue that Kentridge’s 
interpretation is by no means required by the constitutional text itself and that, in fact, 
there is good evidence that the Interim Constitution was designed to govern all aspects of 
law and life, including the common law, evinced by Section 35(3).162 The very fact of 
Justice Albie Sach’s concurring opinion and, especially, Justice Kriegler’s dissenting 
opinion illustrate the plausibility of such alternative reads of the Interim Constitution. We 
see this tension in Justice Sachs’s opinion, in particular. On the one hand, he recognizes 
the capaciousness of the South African constitutional project. He states:  
I have no doubt that given the circumstances in which our Constitution 
came into being, the principles of freedom and equality which it proclaims 
are intended to be all-pervasive and transformatory in character….Given 
the divisions and injustices referred to in the postscript, it would be 
strange indeed if the massive inequalities in our societies were somehow 
relegated to the realm of private law, in respect of which government 
could only intrude if it did not interfere with the vested individual property 
and privacy rights of the presently privileged classes….I accept that there 
is no sector where law dwells, that is not reached by the principles and 
values of the Constitution.163  
 
In this way, we see clear recognition that the purpose of the South African Constitution 
differed from the conventional liberal model that prioritized negative rights and sought 
only to protect against government interference. Indeed, Sachs cites “the circumstances in 
which [the] Constitution came into being,” rooting its normative commitments in a larger 
understanding of the history of the South African polity.  But this understanding was not 
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enough ultimately for Justice Sachs to depart from the majority, as he saw this 
consideration of constitutional purpose as “not the issue” of the case at hand.164 He 
explains his more immediate concern that the Constitution is not necessarily self-
enforcing, and that it does rely on the actions of Parliament and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in order to realize all of the commitments to which it aspires.165 Moreover, 
following Kentridge, he questions whether the Constitutional Court is even equipped to 
undertake the sort of “social, political, and economic questions,” that would inevitably 
accompany the horizontal application of rights.166 In this way, Sachs straddles the line 
between the concerns to which Kentridge gives voice in the majority opinion, and 
acknowledging certain normative commitments that would seem to accommodate a larger 
for the role of the Constitutional Court. 
That “the most radical member of the court”167 could not bring himself to endorse 
horizontal effect in this instance is revelatory of the sort of crossroad the Court faced in 
Du Plessis v. De Klerk. The tension with which Sachs wrestled, however—of a 
constitutional vision that clearly implicated the polity as a whole but did not decidedly 
abandon certain “ghosts” of liberal thinking168—was not felt as saliently for dissenting 
Justice Kriegler. After “castigating the majority,”169 Kriegler states: 
No one familiar with the stark reality of South Africa and the power 
relationships in its society can believe that protection of the individual 
only against the State can possibly bring those benefits [of democratic 
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society and justice]. The fine line drawn by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in the Dolphin Delivery case and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelley v. 
Kraemer between private relationships involving organs of the State and 
those which do not, have no place in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
….We do not operate under a constitution in which the avowed purpose of 
the drafters was to place limitations on governmental control. Our 
Constitution aims at establishing freedom and equality in a grossly 
disparate society. And I am grateful to the drafters of our Constitution for 
having spared us the jurisprudential gymnastics forced on some courts 
abroad. 170 
 
Kriegler thus had little patience for the sorts of distinctions which Kentridge and Sachs 
imported into their own opinions. Indeed, Section 35(3) and others Kriegler cites suggest 
that the “spirit, purport, and objects” of the Bill of Rights do govern all law and life in the 
polity, regardless of the particular institution or court that happens to be acting. Even 
beyond such specific provisions, however, Kriegler insists on the need to consider the 
South African constitutional vision conceived as a whole. Due appreciation for the power 
relationships embedded in South African society and the Constitution’s frontal assault on 
these public and private power structures do not permit the queasiness that Kentridge and 
others display with respect to the intervention that horizontal effect would entail. Kriegler 
brings his rejection of liberal presuppositions into sharp relief when he accuses the 
majority of “preying on the fears of privileged whites, cosseted in the past by laissez faire 
capitalism thriving in an environment where the black underclass had limited opportunity 
to share in the bounty.”171 Laissez-faire priors may work for other polities, but it is not 
the basis of the South African polity, Kriegler argues, and in fact represents much of what 
the Constitution is combatting. 
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It is not difficult to see how the questions of Du Plessis could yield such an array 
of answers. Indeed, different provisions of the Interim Constitution potentially point in 
different directions on the question of horizontal effect. Much seemed to hinge on the 
judges’ own presuppositions and the particular provisions they chose to emphasize in 
interpretation. Kentridge found some grounding for traditional liberal commitments in the 
Interim Constitution, while Kriegler’s more teleological lens of constitutional purpose led 
to a very different conclusion. And indeed, these disparate readings pointed toward a real 
choice here—Robertson describes this as a choice between “thin” and “thick” 
constitutionalism,172 while Woolman and Davis articulate the same choice in terms of 
classical and “creole” liberalism.173 An additional reason for this impasse was the fact 
that the Interim Constitution maintained separate jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal. Insofar as the Supreme Court had been the highest 
court until this time of transition, there was good reason to keep it as supreme in its 
jurisdiction even after the Constitutional Court was established. Michelman speculates 
that the continued separation at this stage was either indicative of a general distrust of the 
extent of the old Supreme Court’s loyalty to the new Constitution or, on the other hand, a 
concession to appease those who worried that the Supreme Court no longer would enjoy 
primacy in its jurisdiction.174 Whatever the motive, this separation that the Interim 
Constitution preserved gave rise to the questions we find in Du Plessis concerning the 
relationship between ordinary law, common law, and constitutional law. 
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This kind of separation is not all that different from that which informed the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in Lüth. Indeed, underlying Lüth was the 
similar question of how the Federal Labor Court, as well as other private law courts, 
related to the Constitutional Court. In Lüth, the Constitutional Court asserted itself as the 
primary and final interpreter of the Constitution, however it did not prevent other 
institutions from also engaging in constitutional interpretation. Neither did the 
Constitutional Court presume to have final interpretive authority with respect to the Civil 
Code. Indeed its decision to focus primarily on the general clauses, explained above, 
shows a kind of self-imposed limit and even deference to other apex courts. Michelman 
sees all of this as evidence that Germany preserved separate systems of law and courts, 
even as Lüth required that principles of the Basic Law influence the private law. In the 
South African context, on the other hand, the separation between the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and that of the Constitutional Court Michelman thinks “was 
always headed for instability.”175 He goes so far as to describe such a system as a “design 
error” of the Interim Constitution in need of correction,176 especially given the vast 
transformation that the South African Constitution sought. And indeed, the Final 
Constitution of 1996 brought significant change to the structure of the South African 
courts, making the Constitutional Court the final arbiter in all areas of law, including 
matters of common law, and introducing direct horizontal effect of the Bill of Rights as a 
constitutional requirement. “Under pressure from the idea of a socially transformative, 
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constitutional bill of rights,” the Final Constitution could not but unite the South African 
systems of law and courts under the commitments set by the Constitution itself.177 With 
the adoption of the Final Constitution, the institutional structures were more clearly 
harmonized with the new substantive commitments.   
Before moving on to discuss the specific changes of the Final Constitution and 
subsequent caselaw on horizontal effect, it is worth briefly digressing to flesh out some 
comparisons between South Africa and Germany, not least because some of the judges 
writing in Du Plessis found occasion to mention explicitly the German case.178 In 
particular, Justice Laurie Ackermann’s opinion in Du Plessis compares the South African 
situation with post-war Germany, finding in these apparent similarities justification to 
develop also a similar understanding of horizontal effect. Ackermann maintained that the 
German Basic law “was no less powerful a response to totalitarianism, the degradation of 
human dignity and the denial of freedom and equality than our Constitution.”179 Indeed, 
he continues, that each country’s constitution was born of a troubled history sets a similar 
stage for the development of horizontal effect in each country. If indirect (in contrast with 
direct) horizontal effect was good enough for Germany, therefore, Ackermann suggests it 
ought to be good enough for South Africa, too.   
Picking up on this discussion from Du Plessis, Woolman and Davis insist on 
recognizing the upshots of important differences between Germany and South Africa 
that, in their view, Ackermann and other judges papered over. While conceding that the 
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German and South African Constitutions were both responses to serious rights abuses and 
totalitarian regimes, the state of affairs in each post-conflict situation were vastly 
different. After World War II, Germany was a “modern, industrialized and relatively 
egalitarian society. It was into these less than dire circumstances that the GBL was 
born.”180 On the other hand, they wrote around the time that the Final Constitution was 
adopted, 
Post-Apartheid South Africa could not be more different than post-WWII 
Germany. It is not united as a nation. It is not linguistically, culturally or 
politically homogenous. It is not modern, not industrialized, not 
egalitarian. Thus while vast inequalities in private power may not have 
been such a problem in post-WWII Germany—and thus made indirect 
application of the Basic Law palatable—vast inequalities in private power 
are an inextricable part of the fabric of post-Apartheid South African 
society—and make indirect application of our Constitution an anathema 
for the majority of our country’s citizens.181 
 
This explanation gives some historical context for Germany’s ability continually to cling 
to old legal structures, even importing directly much from the Weimar years. Whereas Du 
Plessis v. De Klerk initially seemed to put South Africa on that same track of preserving 
some insulation of private relations from constitutional standards, such expressions as 
Kiegler’s condemnation of laissez-faire structures pick up on a progressive shift. And 
indeed, the new Constitution would make explicit the expanse of the constitutional 
project insofar as it expanded the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and clarified a 
doctrine of direct horizontal effect. This way, the drafters ensured that future judgements 
were not so tortured as was Albie Sachs’s opinion in Du Plessis, as he contended with 
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institutional structures that did not facilitate full pursuit of South Africa’s constitutional 
commitments. In the Final Constitution, the text and institutions aligned with the project, 
and that project was one that supported direct horizontal effect.  
Though the decision of whether and how to apply horizontal effect came through 
different fora in Germany and South Africa (through the Constitutional Court and the 
Constitutional Assembly, respectively), in both cases these decisions were rooted in a 
commitment to ameliorate histories of violence and abuse. To this extent, Ackermann’s 
comparison in Du Plessis is accurate. Furthermore, the introduction of horizontal effect in 
both countries reflected a belief that to confront successfully their respective histories, 
constitutional values needed to influence the broader social order (the “constitution” in 
the Aristotelian sense). In this way, both countries agreed that some degree of uniformity 
in constitutional governance across public and private spaces was necessary. This goal of 
uniformity manifested differently in each country, however, corresponding to differences 
in the content and nature of their respective constitutional visions. As explained with 
respect to Germany, the fact of its long tradition of civil law and system of specialized 
courts, as well as the persistence of the principle of Privatautonomie, shaped the 
development of horizontal effect following Lüth. Though horizontal effect has 
continually developed, most cases have developed in the context of such classic rights as 
freedom of speech and assembly—which is to say, notably less work has been done with 
respect to equality.182 And when horizontal effect was applied in the context of equality 
rights, it was received only with serious pushback. The more conventionally liberal 
                                               




values that make up the content of the German Basic Law as well as certain structural and 
doctrinal features aided in the general persistence of a liberal ethos and led horizontal 
effect to follow suit.  
Comparing the German jurisprudential history with the development of horizontal 
effect in South Africa therefore bears out Woolman and Davis in their desire to lend 
nuance to Ackermann’s account in Du Plessis. In particular, the movement on the subject 
of horizontal effect from the Interim Constitution to the settlement of the Final 
Constitution, to say nothing of the tension internal to Du Plessis, point to a real 
disconnect between the priors of some framers and judges and the larger constitutional 
project. This was the problem that Du Plessis hit upon, and that a comparison of 
Germany and South Africa brings into sharper relief. The formulation of horizontal effect 
in the Interim Constitution was too like that of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
in Lüth, in spite of the fact that the countries actually faced very different problems and 
set out different projects for themselves. To be sure, the classical liberal rights and 
freedoms were represented in South African constitutionalism. Indeed, the Constitution 
founds the polity on “Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms.”183 But these commitments carried unique status and 
meaning in South Africa. For example, both freedom and equality encompassed more 
than their formal meanings, in that they encompassed certain material prerequisites as 
well.184 Moreover, rather than shy away from equality in the context of horizontal effect 
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as in the German case, the South African Constitution actually singles out equality by 
name as requiring horizontal effect. Chapter 2, Section 9(4) guaranteeing the right to 
Equality states:  
No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds… [including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital 
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth]. National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.185 
 
Of course, merely providing that the right to equality or right against discrimination has 
horizontal effect does not entail that a person’s right to equality will always prevail 
against the countervailing right in question. (Section 9(5), for example, suggests that 
there are instances in which discrimination may be “fair.”) Nevertheless, the very fact 
that the South African Constitution so prioritizes equality to specify its horizontal effect 
diverges from the German treatment of the same question.  
In terms of institutional structures, doctrinal specifics, and constitutional content, 
therefore, the shift from the Interim to the Final Constitution also entailed a shift away 
from the German model. In implementing some version of horizontal effect, both sought 
uniform constitutional standards to govern public and private spaces alike. Nevertheless, 
this feature of uniformity manifested differently in each country, as the nature of their 
respective constitutional commitments led to a different range of obligations for private 
actors.  The jurisprudential development discussed in what remains of this chapter 
evinces how the particularities of the South African history and Constitution raised issues 
that ultimately resulted in a more extensive understanding of horizontal effect than in 
                                               




Germany. While only a limited number of horizontality cases have come before the Court 
in the Constitution’s short history, the cases that do exist reveal a clear progressive 
trajectory.  
The 1996 Constitution established the Constitutional Court as “the highest court 
in the republic,” with authority to decide constitutional matters as well as any other 
matter it decides is within its own jurisdiction.186 It was within this new institutional 
context that the framers entrenched direct horizontal effect as a legal-constitutional 
practice.187 In contrast with the ambiguity of the Interim Constitution, the constitutional 
drafters established direct horizontal effect of constitutional rights with uncommon 
clarity, seemingly taking pains to avoid the sort of confusion exhibited in Du Plessis v. 
De Klerk given the finality of the 1996 Constitution. Several provisions across different 
sections collectively establish horizontal effect. In contrast to the Interim Constitution 
that obligated only the actions of the legislature and the executive to the Bill of Rights, 
for example, Chapter 2, Section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides that the Bill of 
Rights binds the judiciary as well. In addition, several entirely new provisions concerning 
horizontal effect were added. Among them were Section 9(4) on the right to equality, 
described above, as well as Sections 8(2): 
A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.  
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In stating that the Bill of Rights binds “a natural or a juristic person,” Section 8(2) 
establishes that rights apply horizontally to obligate both private individuals (natural 
persons) as well as other private entities such as firms and corporations (juristic persons). 
It goes on to suggest that the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the 
right may influence the outcomes of particular cases, as through proportionality analysis 
that balances one right against another. Although horizontal effect establishes uniformity 
in applying South African constitutional values across spheres, therefore, Section 8(2) 
creates some space for variation in the way rights obligations apply to private actors as 
opposed to state actors.188 
Also in Section 8, the Constitution explains how specifically a court will apply a 
right horizontally, stating that a court must apply or develop the common law in applying 
horizontal effect. The provision reads: 
When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2), a court  
 
a. in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect 
to that right; and  
 
b. may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1).  
 
This section seems to take Du Plessis v. De Klerk head on, giving all courts, including the 
Constitutional Court, authority to develop the common law in order to hold private actors 
accountable for the Bill of Rights. Moreover, as was the case in Section 8 (1), the 
Constitution acknowledges that some rights will necessarily be limited in the process of 
                                               




balancing. Taken together, these several additions to the Final Constitution mark a clear 
departure from foregoing takes on horizontal effect.  
In their very different manner of argument in the case Carmichele v. Minister of 
Safety and Security,189 Albie Sachs and several other justices who had concurred with 
Kentridge’s Du Plessis opinion acknowledged that a sea change had occurred under this 
new Constitution. Carmichele (2001) established that the courts had an obligation to 
develop the common law in the light of the Constitution. The facts of the case concerned 
a man, convicted and jailed for assault, who committed another assault after law 
enforcement had released him on bail. The victim of the subsequent attack argued that 
police and public prosecutors had “negligently failed to comply with a legal duty” to 
protect her from a known aggressor.190 The High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
decided there was no evidence that law enforcement had “acted wrongfully.” And so, the 
applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, in contrast, 
rejected tendencies to distinguish between action and inaction on which, for example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court had relied in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services.191 Rather, a provision similar (though, importantly, not identical) to Section 
35(3) of the Interim Constitution, provided the basis for the Constitutional Court’s 
decision. Section 39(2) of the Final Constitution states, “When interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal 
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or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”192 In contrast 
with the counterpart provision in the Interim Constitution, Section 39(2) explicitly 
obligates every court to attend to the constitutional commitments. And so, in a unanimous 
opinion, the Constitutional Court recognized that it had an obligation to ensure that the 
common law developed according to such constitutional standards that inhered in the 
rights as to life, human dignity, freedom, and security.193 Citing the German Basic Law 
once again, the Constitutional Court argued that the South African Constitution also 
encompassed an “objective, normative value system,” and that it was within this value 
system that the common law needed be developed. Conceding that the common law 
admitted of different possible modifications to accord with constitutional values and that 
the particular approach chosen largely depended on the facts of a given case, the 
Constitutional Court referred the case back to the initial High Court, but charged them to 
account for the relevant constitutional values.194  
Some question just how radical a break Carmichele really was from Du Plessis. 
Michelman, for example, argues that the case reveals that the Constitutional Court 
“internalized some separation,” as between systems of law and courts, according to the 
same liberal paradigm on display in Du Plessis. Though all South African law had to 
conform to the Constitution, he explains, the common law was still developed within its 
own framework, evinced by the fact that the Constitutional Court sent the case back to 
the High Court. This, Michelman argues, is not all that different from the system of 
                                               
192 South African Constitution of 1996, Section 39 (2) 
193 Para. 44. 




separate courts and, by extension, the indirect horizontal effect that Germany 
maintains.195 Chirwa, on the other hand, points out that the duty to protect that emerges 
from Carmichele is a step removed from a liberal framework, and particularly from the 
requirement that state action be present in order to enforce constitutional rights. He 
highlights how in the South African context the state is “liable for an infringement of a 
constitutional right by a non-state actor if it fails to take ‘reasonable and appropriate 
measures’ to prevent it.”196  
Considering the Constitution’s full treatment of rights in private spaces as in 
Section 8, moreover, the South African model proves to go far beyond German 
Drittwirkung insofar as private actors can be charged with rights violations themselves, 
and not simply through the distillation of private law.197 Though such doctrinal 
differences are important, more important to the present project are shifts in the terms of 
debate and how such differences reflect understandings of the constitution’s role in the 
larger society. Does it provide a standard for the polity as a whole, and how does this 
society ultimately look given the particular commitments of the Constitution? Looking at 
longer trajectories is a more valuable exercise for this purpose. And indeed, on this 
standard, it does seem Carmichele set the stage for future, more ambitious cases 
discussed below. Robertson explains how “a stream of cases” followed Carmichele in 
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2001, all taking as granted that “nothing should stand in the way of the instantiation of 
constitutional values in the working of the law.”198  
 Only the year after Carmichele, the Court decided Khumalo v. Holomisa199 which 
dealt specifically with the Constitution’s provision for horizontal effect in Section 8. Like 
Du Plessis and so many other horizontality cases, Khumalo concerned a defamation 
action. A South African newspaper accused prominent politician Bantu Holomisa of 
involvement in criminal activities and he, in turn, sued for damages of defamation. The 
case came down to the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression (Section 16) against 
Holomisa’s right to dignity (Section 10). The newspaper (the applicant) argued that the 
common law rule of defamation needed to be developed further in order to comply with 
the constitutional right to freedom of expression. In particular, the newspaper argued that, 
under a proper understanding of freedom of expression, plaintiffs ought never to succeed 
in defamation cases “unless they can establish that a defamatory statement was false.”200 
Writing for the Constitutional Court, Justice O’Regan acknowledged that the freedom of 
expression had horizontal effect, “given the intensity of the constitutional right in 
question, coupled with the potential invasion of that right which could be occasioned by 
persons other than the State or organs of State.”201 Nevertheless, this right had to be 
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balanced against the right to dignity, as it also had horizontal effect. Weighing these two 
against each other, O’Regan concluded that the common law rules of defamation, in their 
current state, struck a balance that was, in fact, compliant with both of these 
constitutional rights commitments. She explained that newspapers and other media would 
only be charged for defamation when they could not establish that “the statement was 
true and its publication in the public interest, nor that the publication was reasonable in 
all the circumstances.”202 However, she also drew attention to the great limitation that 
shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff would entail for the right to dignity since it 
was sometimes impossible to demonstrate the falsity of a claim. Since the newspaper 
could establish neither the truth nor the reasonableness of the accusations, the Court 
decided that the common law rules were sound and favored the right to dignity on 
balance in this particular case.  
On Robertson’s telling, the earlier Carmichele decision had been necessary “to 
bring the jurisprudence on the development of the common law into line with the much 
firmer stand taken by the final Constitution after the weakness of the court’s decision in 
Du Plessis.”203 Khumalo thus fortified and built on this earlier decision by extending its 
logic also to apply to relations between private actors. Indeed, with Khumalo 
constitutional commitments came to comprise the very content of those common law 
rules governing private relations. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the concepts 
of constitutional rights and duties are not excised as they enter private spaces. Rather, 
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individuals are faced with the prospect that they, too, are accountable for such 
constitutional rights commitments as to freedom of expression or dignity. Justice 
O’Regan does stipulate the need to consider the intensity and nature of the right before 
applying it horizontally,204 and other of the judges have been at pains to emphasize that 
the processes of determining constitutional duties of state and nonstate actors are not 
equivalent.205 Even with these caveats, however, the process of balancing and ultimate 
judgment in Khumalo still rest on the understanding that the constitution is source to both 
rights and duties of private actors.  
Questions of dignity, free speech, and defamation are by no means novel to law in 
general or horizontal effect jurisprudence in particular. Nevertheless, in securing the 
Final Constitution’s provision for horizontal effect of these rights, Khumalo paved the 
way for other, more distinctive rights of the South African constitutional order also to 
obligate private actors. Indeed, as far as rights go in the Constitution, so too might 
horizontal effect go. We see this theoretical potential as early as Du Plessis, in the way 
interpreters understood horizontal effect to augment South Africa’s larger constitutional 
project. Moreover, we see the potential for expansion in practice, as cases related to 
housing have already emerged despite the relatively short history of horizontality 
jurisprudence. 
 Housing is a salient and complex issue in South African history.  From the onset 
of European colonialism in the mid seventeenth century through the Apartheid regime of 
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the twentieth century, racially-based laws and evictions displaced indigenous peoples 
leading to widespread impoverishment of black populations.206 Thus, the South African 
Constitution provided “Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.”207 
The issue of housing is complicated, however, in that it necessarily raises separation of 
powers issues and questions of property rights. In recounting his experience in deciding 
the important Grootboom case,208 Justice Albie Sachs acknowledges the unique 
difficulties that come with enforcing something such as a right to housing, when so much 
depends on the actions of and resources of legislatures and even private proprietors.209 In 
the end, the Court decided that Mrs. Grootboom was not entitled to emergency housing, 
but charged Parliament with taking positive action on the issue of housing in general. In 
the words of Justice Yakoob, “The case brings home the harsh reality that the 
Constitution’s promise of dignity and equality for all remains for many a distant 
dream.”210 The right to housing is, therefore, aspirational in the fullest sense. It exists at 
the very core of the South African constitutional vision, and yet involves such balancing 
of interests and capacities as to prevent full and immediate realization. 
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While the Constitution specifies that the duty to provide adequate housing falls on 
the state, the very nature of housing is such that cases frequently involve private 
relationships. Even in Grootboom the Court recognized that a “right of access to adequate 
housing also suggests that it is not only the State who is responsible for the provision of 
houses, but that other agents within our society, including individuals themselves, must 
be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide housing.”211 And indeed, a series 
of judgments on housing have raised or explicitly addressed the question of horizontal 
effect. In 2005, for example, the Court handed down the Modderklip decision.212 When 
thousands of squatters occupied land on the Modderklip company’s farm, the owners 
offered to sell the land to local authorities to accommodate the new occupants. However, 
the authorities refused to purchase and local police refused to enforce the eviction order 
Modderklip obtained from a court. 213 In the Supreme Court, Justice Harms 
acknowledged that the right to housing could be enforced horizontally in theory, but 
decided that it could not in the present case.214 On appeal, the Constitutional Court did 
not technically rely on horizontal effect, but instead ruled that the state had failed both in 
protecting the Modderklip company’s property rights and in securing the occupants’ right 
to housing. 215 Although the Court chose not to apply horizontal effect, the Court’s 
remedy still involved balancing rights against each other and, to this extent, necessarily 
involved cooperation of the parties in securing the rights in question. In particular, the 
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Court argued that eviction was at that point impossible given that, over five years, 40,000 
people had come to settle on the farm and form their own community.216 As a remedy, 
therefore, the Court ordered that the state compensate Modderklip for the use of the land. 
Although Modderklip was not responsible for the occupants’ right to housing per 
se, the owners were, ultimately, still responsible in some sense for their housing. 
Moreover, although the occupants were not ultimately understood as trespassing, 
Modderklip was still entitled to compensation. One could argue that the practical logistics 
and financial cost of relocating 40,000 people were prohibitive of any other solution than 
that which the Court reached. Nevertheless, such consideration of financial costs was not 
the final word in the judgment of the Court.217 Rather, quoting Albie Sachs in a prior 
decision, Justice Langa recounts the need “to balance competing interests in a principled 
way and promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good 
neighbourliness and shared concern.”218 In the context of the Modderklip case, the 
difficulty of the immediate circumstances, to say nothing of the longer history that 
occasioned these circumstances, asks of the parties these same characteristics of 
neighbourliness and shared concern. Put differently, the Court seems to presuppose that 
the actors involved identify with and share in the values of the constitutional project. 
Indeed, the very fact that the Court avoided the language of rights in discussing the 
relationship between the owners and the occupants brings this point into sharper relief. 
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With this choice, “[t]he Court looked to social and economic norms as reflecting a 
constitutional vision of solidarity that altered the relation of the property owner to the 
settlers.”219 Thus, the whole case actually takes on a more republican cadence. 
From an analytical perspective, moreover, attention to the larger constitutional 
vision articulated in Modderklip rather than the fact that the Court does not understand 
itself as applying horizontal effect per se allows the observer to appreciate the extent to 
which the actors do retain responsibility here and participate in the constitutional project 
in the ultimate resolution. Indeed, the articulation of the Constitution’s commitments in 
terms of rights is only one possible articulation of these commitments, seeing as the 
South African Constitution itself understands the Republic as founded on the more 
general values of human dignity, equality, freedom, nonracialism, nonsexism, etc.220  
Helen Hershkoff finds this approach of avoiding rights language in other contexts too.221 
This is worth acknowledging for the aforementioned analytical reasons as well as more 
substantive reasons to which  Hershkoff draws attention. Speaking specifically of 
Modderklip, she explains,  
In the classical conception, common law powers can be used in the 
holder’s discretion to maximize self-utility; the egoistic exercise of power 
is assumed to conduce toward the general welfare. The presence of social 
welfare norms in a constitution alters this background assumption. From a 
constitutive theory of law, the powers assigned to individuals must now be 
interpreted and applied within the orbit of constitutional commitment and 
not simply within that of self-regarding concern….The South Africa 
Court, thus, made clear that Modderklip’s power to control access to the 
farm could not be extended in a way that would unduly burden the 
occupants’ background right to housing, notwithstanding the fact that the 
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farm owner does not owe a duty of shelter to the settlers. By constraining 
the exercise of the common law power, the court effectively altered the 
occupants’ legal relation in the sense that they now possessed shelter. But, 
rather than prescribing rights directly owed from one individual to 
another, the court instead reshaped a power relationship in a specific 
context in the light of different facts and circumstances.222  
 
While Modderklip does not technically employ language of rights and duties between the 
private actors, therefore, the Court does “reshape a power relationship,” as Hershkoff 
puts it, to balance their conflicting interests against each other. Whereas in most 
countries, Modderklip’s right to property likely would have controlled the outcome of the 
case, here the owners’ rights were subject to the broader framework of social welfare 
norms or, in republican terms, to a particular conception of the common good. This 
broader normative context does not negate Modderklip’s property rights entirely; 
nevertheless, it does require a general compliance with the constitutional vision. As these 
norms thus apply uniformly, private actors such as Modderklip are brought into the fold 
of the larger constitutional project.223   
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 In the years following Modderklip, the Court had other opportunities to develop 
further its jurisprudence on horizontality. In Juma Musjid (2011), it considered whether a 
socio-economic right imposed an obligation on a private actor when a private Trust took 
steps to evict a public school that convened on its property. The Constitutional Court 
decided that the Trust had “no primary positive obligation”224 to provide an education for 
the students, nor an obligation to make available its property for public use as a school. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Trust did have “a negative constitutional 
obligation not to impair the learners’ right to a basic education,”225 pursuant to Section 29 
of the Constitution. The Court concluded that the Trust had every right to seek an 
eviction order, but that the courts were not obliged to grant one. Indeed, in evaluating the 
eviction request, the lower courts were required to consider “the best interest of the 
learners”226 and their right to a basic education. Thus, the particular question at issue in 
Juma Musjid was how to balance the right to a basic education and the right to 
property.227 
Following the reasoning in Khumalo, the Court explained that this horizontal 
application of rights, including such socio-economic rights as to education, depended in 
part on  “the intensity of the constitutional right in question.”228 In the context of South 
African history, the basic right to education did rise to such a level of intensity  as to call 
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for a more uniform application to public and private actors alike. The Court explains the 
particular significance of the right to education in light of the history:  
The inadequacy of schooling facilities, particularly for many blacks was 
entrenched by the formal institution of apartheid, after 1948, when 
segregation even in education and schools in South Africa was codified. 
Today, the lasting effects of the educational segregation of apartheid are 
discernible in the systemic problems of inadequate facilities and the 
discrepancy in the level of basic education for the majority of learners.229 
 
Thus, the decision to apply horizontally this basic right to education was grounded in the 
fundamental purpose of the South African Constitution itself. The crucial nature of the 
issue of education, the Court held, warranted summoning private actors also to participate 
in its remediation (or at least not to foreclose the possibility of their participation). 
Indeed, both the nature of past abuses and the unique position of many private actors to 
exercise influence in education were cause to involve such institutions as the Juma 
Musjid Trust in the constitutional project. As property rights had been formulated to 
disadvantage the black population during apartheid,230 putting other rights, as to 
education, on equal footing ensured that claims to private property did not have undue 
weight and were calibrated to constitutional ends.231 Moreover, as this decision of the 
Court to balance these as competing rights departed from the pre-constitutional status 
quo, so too did the decision to cast the issue in terms of the duties of private actors. Aoife 
Nolan observes how, in Juma Musjid, the Court had the option to employ strategies 
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similar to those in Carmichele and Modderklip that did not invoke constitutional duties of 
private actors. Instead, however, the Court did speak of duties and found the source of 
these private obligations in the Constitution itself.232  
Some amici in Juma Musjid expressed concern that the Court would be wary to 
apply horizontality any further as, for example, to give horizontal effect to positive 
rights.233 Nevertheless, the Court did just this in the 2017 case Daniels v. Scribante. As 
explained in Chapter I, the Constitutional Court in Daniels decided that a landlord had a 
constitutional obligation to ensure that his tenant lived in conditions consonant with 
human dignity. This was not simply a negative duty as in Juma Musjid, but a positive 
duty that, the Court recognized, could require positive steps on the part of a landlord. 
That the Court ought to consider the “nature of a right” before applying rights obligations 
to private actors, according to the earlier Khumalo decision, did not foreclose the 
possibility that a socio-economic right could create such an obligation. And the majority 
in Daniels decided just this.  
Just a few months after the Court handed down its judgment in Daniels v. 
Scribante, it decided Baron v. Claytile Ltd234 which again raised questions of horizontal 
effect in the context of housing and eviction. Baron followed Modderklip in the sense 
that the Court was hesitant to assign a private actor the duty to guarantee the right to 
housing. In particular, the Court decided that an employer did not have an obligation to 
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continue providing former employees with housing, insofar as the Constitution 
designated this duty as belonging specifically to the state. To be sure, realizing a right to 
housing as a matter of fact is a major endeavor. While the primary obligation rested with 
the state, however, even after Baron it is conceivable that private actors be asked to 
cooperate in much the same way as in Modderklip. Indeed, courts still retained the ability 
to decide whether a particular eviction was “just and equitable.” While the duty to 
provide adequate housing was technically the state’s, therefore, a private actor could 
functionally assume responsibility for the right to housing. 
The proximate decisions of Daniels and Baron in the 2017 term of the 
Constitutional Court demonstrate how horizontal effect is as much a live issue as it is a 
complicated one. Baron in particular shows that the Court maintains some limits on the 
extent to which private actors have constitutional rights obligations. Nevertheless, in 
Baron as in other horizontality cases, the Court still operates on the presumption that 
private actors may have rights obligations, insofar as it accounts in every case for “the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right,” per Section 8 (2). 
Moreover, from a bird’s-eye view, the general trajectory of horizontal effect is clearly 
one of expansion in South Africa. Indeed, as such foundational cases as Du Plessis, 
Carmichele, and Khumalo grounded horizontal effect in the larger constitutional project, 
so too do we see later developments as growing directly out of South Africa’s troubled 






Both Germany and South Africa introduced doctrines of horizontal effect in an 
effort to break from their respective pasts and set a course for a future governed by new 
constitutional commitments. In their jurisprudential histories, we see that a common 
objective of this move to horizontality was a certain uniformity of governing principles 
across spheres. Nevertheless, the different content of their respective constitutional 
projects related differently to the expansion of horizontal effect as a legal-constitutional 
practice. Germany’s continued attachment to such liberal values as Privatautonomie and 
structures of its civil law tradition supported only a more limited scope of horizontal 
effect. While German Drittwirkung still effected uniformity, this uniformity only 
extended so far into private spaces before actors began to resist. On the other hand, the 
South African constitutional vision explicitly aims to upset certain background 
assumptions that the liberal tradition tends to take for granted, and upset these 
assumptions for the very purpose of effecting broad change across spheres. To this extent 
South Africa’s “constitutional priors” were more receptive to a uniformity of private 
spaces and public values, therefore permitting horizontal effect to expand basically from 
the outset of the new constitutional project. And indeed, even in recent years we see a 
continued move in South Africa toward charging private actors with duties corresponding 
to the aspirations of the Constitution.  
 In terms of the larger project, South Africa’s propensity to expand horizontal 
effect is unsurprising given the way its constitutional vision accords with republican 
ideas. Put differently, the essential object of the South African project is to transform 




political actors likely would be comfortable with the uniformity that horizontal effect 
engendered. On the other hand, although the German vision first articulated in Lüth also 
entails application of constitutional principles across spheres, the republican tendency to 
conceive of the polity as a whole, without distinguishing public and private, meets 
resistance in the principles of the Basic Law itself as well as those inherited from the civil 
law tradition. Thus, the uniformity horizontal effect engenders is stunted in this context 






IV. Horizontality in the European Union: Republicanism in 
Supranational Context 
 
As national courts have considered the horizontal application of rights obligations 
to private actors, so too has the Court of Justice of the European Union considered the 
extent to which European Union law creates obligations for private or non-state actors. 
EU law is typically understood as binding Member States,1 requiring national institutions 
to adopt specific legislation or policies. Nevertheless, certain instances of EU law have 
been interpreted to obligate private actors, as well.  That EU “regulations” apply to 
private actors is more or less analogous to national statutes doing the same, and thus, not 
an issue of serious debate given the legislative function of the European Commission and 
Council. On the other hand, that such a foundational document as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights might have horizontal effect has been a source of controversy. 
Indeed, the constitutional nature of this document raises all of the same objections that 
jurists and scholars have leveled against horizontal effect in national contexts, and a host 
of others stemming from the fact that the EU is a supranational body.  
Prior chapters discussed some of the common objections regarding the horizontal 
application of constitutional rights to non-state actors in general. Such issues only 
become more complicated in the context of the European Union. Indeed, whereas prior 
chapters demonstrated how republican political theory may explain and ground horizontal 
                                               




effect in spite of some of the common objections, further explanation is necessary to 
consider whether the republican framework works equally well for the fundamental law 
of a supranational union like the EU—that is, where one cannot so easily take for granted 
identification with shared commitments, bonds of citizenship, etc. Indeed, the ability of 
republican political theory to ground horizontal effect in the EU hinges on larger 
questions concerning integration and the extent to which the Union itself approximates a 
republic. The way the debate over horizontal effect in the EU has unfolded, both in 
scholarship and in cases of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tracks these large 
questions about the character and aspirations of European unity. Put differently, it is 
because the status of the EU as a political community and European citizenship are 
contested that we have seen scholars and jurists arguing about horizontal effect in the 
particular ways that they do. This chapter thus demonstrates how the republican 
framework is informative beyond national contexts, as it reveals the connection between 
the horizontal effect of the EU Charter and the larger foundational questions of a 
European res publica.  
The first section of this chapter will briefly recapitulate some of the theoretical 
background of prior chapters to lay out more fully the question of republican horizontal 
effect in the context of the European Union. The second section will then turn to 
scholarship on the EU, rehearsing debates concerning republican politics and citizenship, 
and drawing out the implications of European unity to the more specific subject of 
horizontal effect. Ultimately, this section will identify how particular republican 




final section will take a closer look at ECJ decisions and scholarly literature on horizontal 
effect. I demonstrate how my particular understanding of horizontal effect as republican 
makes sense of the debates in these fora.  
 
Theoretical Background 
As horizontal rights seek to bring private individuals into accord with public 
values, I have argued that horizontal effect constitutes a republican vein in 
constitutionalism. I identify this republican character in two specific features of 
horizontal effect. Briefly, the uniformity that horizontality creates between public and 
private obligations resembles the republican ideal that the common good should govern 
the polity as a whole, without great concern to distinguish between public and private 
spheres or public law and private law. Moreover, what one might call the solidarity of 
horizontality resembles the republican idea that people possess certain individual duties 
vis-à-vis others by virtue of being citizens of a common polity.  
While private law can also yield legal obligations for individual citizens and 
private entities in the traditional vertical model, these obligations accrue a different status 
when they come from the same source that yields and entrenches the duties of the state, 
namely a constitution. Indeed, when judges cite the constitution rather than statutory law 
or the common law as the source of individuals’ duties, those duties become nothing less 
than demands of fundamental law. Thus, horizontality has, on the one hand, the symbolic 
effect of bringing an entire polity into the fold of the same (constitutional) commitments. 




matter. Indeed, in the same way that constitutional rights are meant to place certain 
questions above the political process, with horizontal effect individual duties come to 
exist and be enforced beyond the political process. Horizontal effect thus expands the 
function of a constitution and the scope of constitutional rights by altering the conceptual 
distinction between public and private on which constitutionalism was premised.  
This republican framework may go further than the conventional liberal logic to 
help us understand and ground horizontal effect in national contexts. But can republican 
theory also explain horizontal effect in such supranational contexts as the European 
Union? Much in republican thought presupposes a common sense of polity and 
citizenship, concepts which many take for granted in national contexts,2 but which people 
question in the European Union. Thus, it seems scholars and jurists arguing for the 
horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights may not as easily appeal to a 
shared sense of purpose to justify horizontality’s uniformity, nor a sense of common 
membership to justify solidarity.  
To this extent, it is possible that neither horizontality’s aforementioned symbolic 
effect of encompassing private actors into constitutional projects, nor its practical effect 
of entrenching individual duties may find sufficient republican resources for justification 
at the continental level. Indeed, at this high level, horizontality would effectively entail 
the reshaping of all of European society, applying the values of the Charter uniformly to 
individuals across Member States. Moreover, this step would yield the additional result of 
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admitting rights claims of individuals within one Member State against individuals of a 
separate Member State. But could citizens of two different countries, albeit in the same 
global region, truly share solidarity with one another? Such suggestions are not beyond 
imagination and are certainly possible as a technical legal matter. Still, horizontal effect 
in the EU poses a unique set of challenges, prompting additional explanation to determine 
how the republican framework may apply in this context.  
 
Republican Aspirations and Resources in the European Union 
Scholars have debated at length whether the European Union is compatible with a 
republican conception of politics and citizenship. This broad, seemingly theoretical 
question speaks to the more practical issue of building and sustaining the EU as a genuine 
political community rather than just another international alliance. Moreover, the answer 
to this question directly bears on whether a republican explanation of horizontal effect is 
possible in this context or if, instead, the case of the EU constitutes a limitation to this 
argument. Scholars consider the republican credentials of the EU by asking two more 
specific questions. First, to what kind and degree of integration does the European project 
actually aspire? Second, to what extent does (or can) a European identity permeate the 
popular imaginary? If, per the first question, the ultimate goal is to establish a full-blown 
political community characterized by common rights and values rather than simply a 
close-knit international alliance revolving around economics and security,3 then the 
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ability to foster commitment to something like republican politics and citizenship, per the 
second question, becomes nothing less than an existential concern for the European 
Union. Indeed, the success of the European project comes to hinge on a widespread 
identification with, as well as some responsibility toward Europe and toward one’s fellow 
Europeans. I take up these two questions in turn, reviewing important debates concerning 
republicanism in the European Union in order to lay groundwork for ensuing discussion 
of horizontal effect.  
What is the nature of the European project? Did it originally or does it now 
include what we might characterize as republican aspirations, as to establishing a distinct 
“public thing” or a European citizenry? Initially, political actors, including judges serving 
on the European Court of Justice, proceeded as if Europe were primarily an alliance 
centered around free movement and economics.4 This mindset is manifested in the 
phenomenon that EU law sometimes is not effective unless a case involves some crossing 
of national borders, a fact that can prevent citizens’ residing within a country’s borders 
from invoking EU protections, so leading to the phenomenon of reverse discrimination.5 
The ability of law to touch individual citizens seems to be a crucial feature of political 
community in the full sense of the term.6 If, then, this sort of crossing of borders is 
necessary to trigger EU law, Europe would seem to be still more of an international 
community than a federal-supranational one. Indeed, in such case the practical reality of 
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the European project could not but fall short of a republican standard of the polis and 
civic feeling, even if Europeans aspired to something more. 
Through a lengthy process of development punctuated by numerous treaties, the 
European project now more explicitly aims at securing a shared set of rights and 
recognition of some sort of constitution.7 Some more reticent scholars have termed this 
expansion of the European project “competence creep.”8 Others maintain that this 
commitment to a common European identity has been the aim of the project from the 
very beginning.9 Wherever one falls on these issues, it is difficult to deny the 
capaciousness of the European project at least since the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, in 
response to the first question about the degree of integration intended, at least now it is 
clear that Europe aspires to something beyond mere economic alliance. To this extent, it 
must concern itself with questions of political community and citizenship, even if 
integration remains a somewhat stilted process evinced by such disruptions as Brexit. 
While the European project is one unity and integration, however, scholars and political 
actors still interpret differently what this means as a theoretical and practical matter. 
Some put greater weight on the limits of Lisbon and, previously, Maastricht, arguing that 
a robust national sovereignty remains a part of the larger plan.10 Others, in contrast, more 
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readily concede European primacy.11 However, even those who admit of a larger role for 
Union governance debate what this means for the Member States. Michel Rosenfeld, for 
example, understands integration as entailing some prior negation of national identity,12  
while others, such as Willem Maas, emphasize the possibility and practical reality of 
multilevel citizenship.13 In some ways, these arguments may appear to be different in 
emphasis rather than in substance. Nevertheless, these different positions do entail real 
consequences for the status of the EU vis-à-vis Member States with respect to 
sovereignty and governing authority.  
Of course, such debates are not restricted to academic fora. In the Lisbon Treaty 
Case the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany sought to protect democratic 
legitimacy and national-constitutional identity for Germany while remaining open to the 
EU project of unity.14 Essentially the Court was willing to cooperate with EU legislation 
and ECJ decisions, but not at the cost of Germany’s sovereignty. Accordingly, the FCC 
decided that it maintained competence to rule on whether the Treaty of Lisbon was 
compatible with Germany’s identity and fundamental commitments. While Germany 
would concede the “primacy of application of European law,” the fundamental principles 
of the Basic Law could not be annulled. In Rosenfeld’s terms, Germany would only 
participate in negation to a point. Nevertheless, this attempt by the German FCC to stake 
its ground in ongoing disputes over competence and jurisdiction came only after other 
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decisions that went a long way to assert EU primacy, including Van Gend en Loos and 
Costa discussed below.15  
Given the foregoing, it is patently difficult, even impossible, to give a definitive 
account of the nature and aspirations of the EU. Though there are certainly legal 
articulations of the European project, this is ultimately a political question (albeit a 
question of high, constitutional politics) that remains to be worked out. Still, how one 
understands the demands of European unity directly bears on whether one could properly 
call it now or in the future a political community of its own. Is there something akin to a 
European polis and common good? Is there, in any meaningful sense, European values or 
European citizens? Or are the Member States to remain the primary loci of politics and 
citizenship? Of course, the answers to these questions may exist along a continuum rather 
than as an either-or formulation. As Besselink says, this is not a zero-sum game.16 While 
one would not want to force the case of the EU to fit this lexicon of republican theory, 
these terms do shed light on some common concerns about how we understand Europe 
and understand it in relation to the Member States. In terms of the nature and aspirations 
of the European project, therefore, we can conclude (if somewhat tentatively) that a 
significant degree of integration remains the goal and that, at least in the minds of some, 
such integration will come to resemble something like political community as understood 
in the republican tradition.  
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Given this take on the nature of the European project, then, what can we say about 
the second question raised above, concerning the readiness or capacity of Europeans to, 
in fact, understand themselves as citizens of the European Union. In classical republican 
thought, one’s status as a citizen meant everything—it defined one’s rights, duties, and 
very way of life. It was with one’s fellow citizens that a person engaged in political 
deliberation and so determined the fate of the polity. What, then, does it take to have 
people identify as fellow citizens of a place? More specifically, can European identity 
plausibly constitute some degree of individuals’ understanding of self and duties? David 
Miller addresses this issue, explaining the need to have “something that can hold people 
together despite differences of class, religion, ethnicity, and so forth, and allow them to 
cooperate politically.” 17 He continues to explain that “The mere fact of being subject to 
the same political system is not sufficient.”18 However, the resources available to 
classical republics, such as a cultural identity manifested in a common nationality, 
language, religion, are not available to Europe. Moreover, cultural identity cannot be 
manufactured insofar as such an imposition of culture would violate the rights of 
minorities according to our contemporary standards.19 If Europe cannot turn to these 
characteristics to cultivate a sense of peoplehood in Europe, therefore, might it look 
elsewhere? 
Jürgen Habermas argues that a kind of “constitutional patriotism” may offer 
sufficient basis on which to found and cultivate a sense of peoplehood. Europeans include 
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individuals of various ethnicities, native languages, and even nationalities. However, one 
thing they may share and that may serve as a foundation for a common identity is 
devotion to a European constitution. Taking this idea to heart, EU institutions and 
Member States moved to adopt a European Constitution in the Constitution Treaty of 
2004. However, this effort failed when the treaty did not garner necessary support for 
ratification in the national referenda of France and the Netherlands. One arguing for 
Habermas’s constitutional patriotism post-2004 would have to contend with this mixed 
history, as a result. Perhaps one may argue more generally on the basis of certain 
common values or a shared commitment to such foundational principles as those 
articulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. If Europe could, in fact, cultivate and 
sustain a politics centered on such principles, then the prospect of a European identity 
may not be out of reach.  
Writing just a few years after the failure of the European Constitution, however, 
Miller maintains that these efforts toward constitutional patriotism still come up short. He 
highlights Habermas’s own articulation of the objection that constitutional patriotism is 
“too weak a bond to hold together complex societies.”20 Miller raises several issues on 
this point. For one thing, he questions whether the rights articulated in such treaty 
documents as the Charter are so different from national constitutions that they would, in 
fact, inspire the requisite devotion to what is distinctly European. After all, do not many 
countries express commitments as to a right of human dignity21 and of equality before the 
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law22? And how might unity emerge if different people, different Member States, 
interpret provisions in conflicting ways? In response to such objections, Habermas 
explains that the focus of loyalty need not be on any definitive account of the Treaties, 
but on the “common horizon of interpretation” that a constitution provides for a people.23 
In other words, it is the very debate about these principles that binds the people,24 an idea 
not unlike the contestatory politics that figures prominently in republican thought. 
Habermas similarly explains in other places that “what unites a nation of citizens as 
opposed to a Volksnation, is not some primordial substrate but rather an intersubjectively 
shared context of possible mutual understanding.”25 Miller remains unconvinced, 
however, maintaining that formulations such as this seem “tantamount to admitting 
defeat” since “possible mutual understanding is surely something that exists between 
people everywhere.”26 This point is well taken, but Miller seems to give short shrift to the 
prospect that what is “possible mutual understanding” may ultimately become actual and, 
moreover, develop a distinctly European character.  
To the extent that Miller does entertain the possibility of identifying a European 
common good, he is ultimately skeptical that this could have any meaning for or inspire 
devotion in the common EU citizen. He joins many in arguing that EU politics suffer 
from a democratic deficit and do not create sufficient space for popular participation,27 
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what should be a staple in any republican political community.  In a way, Habermas 
recognizes these deficiencies, too. The difference, again, is that Habermas sees a way 
forward notwithstanding. In particular he advocates the development of a European 
public sphere, “created on the one hand by a European-wide civil society of voluntary 
groups and on the other by a European party system whose members would address 
European rather than national issues.”28 He accepts that European politics and citizenship 
will remain perfunctory and merely legal in the absence of such a public sphere. Perhaps 
it is this exchange that reveals the real impasse on the question of cultivating a European 
people. Indeed, it is at this point that we begin to see how Miller’s objections are rooted 
in basic beliefs about the scale on which republican politics may be conducted.29 Miller 
states,   
Large conglomerates such as the EU are unsuited to republican politics not 
just because of their size, and the physical gap that separates the central 
institutions from most citizens, but because they are divided in such a way 
that citizens’ primary loyalties are inevitably directed toward their 
compatriots, as many empirical studies have shown.30 
 
On Miller’s telling, there does not seem to be much that anyone can do to foster 
republican politics and citizenship on the broad scale of the EU. Indeed, interests 
inevitably remain diverse31 and, it would seem, centered around state, regional, and 
municipal divisions so that individuals simply do not have a reason to invest in politics 
on a continental level.  
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Of course, European politics can develop in any number of ways in the coming 
years. And although the possibility of realizing republican politics on the broad scale that 
is Europe is an empirical question, it also depends on how we understand republican 
politics at all. Again, Maas shows us in his account of multilevel citizenship that these 
issues of national and supranational identity need not be either-or questions.32 Moreover, 
we learn that these questions are not unique to the European community but confront 
virtually all federal systems and even unitary countries that are diverse. On this 
understanding, it seems that Europe might have more resources at its disposal to cultivate 
a republican politics than some scholars concede. Time alone can shed further light on 
these questions where the theoretical and the practical intersect. 
What do these musings on the possibility of republican politics in the EU offer us 
on the more specific question of horizontal effect in the EU? Johan Van der Walt begins 
to answer this question when he demonstrates how the issue of horizontal effect, perhaps 
more than any other doctrinal issue courts confront, prompts questions about sovereignty. 
He points to the logic of the Lüth case to make this point.33 In this case, discussed 
previously in Chapters I and III, the German Federal Constitution Court (FCC) argued 
that the Basic Law included an “order of objective moral and legal principles” that 
“radiate” to affect public and private spheres alike. This sets up an understanding of the 
Basic Law as potentially speaking to all issues of law and life in Germany.34 Even though 
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Van der Walt ultimately takes issue with other aspects of Lüth35 he acknowledges that 
this kind of power to govern all spheres of life in a polity is definitive of sovereignty. 
When the FCC declared that values of the Basic Law radiated to all spheres, therefore, 
the Court both presupposed and accrued a certain sovereignty on behalf of the 
constitution and the institutions that give it effect—not least the Court itself which 
exercised its ability to regulate private spaces in Lüth.36 This connection between the 
regulation of private entities that comes of horizontal effect and the concept of 
sovereignty goes a long way in explaining the widespread reservations surrounding the 
horizontal effect of EU law.37 Indeed, the inevitable upshot of applying EU law 
horizontally is that the ECJ accumulates some measure of sovereignty to the EU, 
probably at the expense of Member States.38 It is for this reason that Van der Walt 
describes Lüth as having a dual destiny in Europe—while its initial instantiation in the 
case the FCC decided in 1958 presupposed and bolstered sovereignty of the German 
state, its subsequent applications in ECJ case law appropriate this same conception of 
sovereignty to the EU.39 
How, then, does republicanism figure into this account of horizontal effect and 
sovereignty? Though republican political theory employs different language, it may 
convey something similar to Van der Walt’s discussion of sovereignty. Moreover, the 
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republican framework does additional work to distinguish the phenomenon of horizontal 
effect from other claims of the ECJ to sovereignty, as in such earlier cases as Van Gend 
en Loos and Costa. 40 Put differently, republican theory and, specifically, the republican 
features conceptualized as uniformity and solidarity, move us beyond the language of 
sovereignty to offer a thicker, more detailed account of what is at stake in the horizontal 
application of EU law.  
First, Chapter I demonstrated how the fact of a uniform law governing both public 
and private spheres is a distinctive feature of horizontal effect. Indeed, the alternative to 
horizontal effect would be to maintain separate public and private laws as an effort to 
preserve a private sphere separate from the public. As horizontal effect necessarily rejects 
this separation in favor of uniformity, it may find grounding in the republican idea that 
there is a common good that encompasses and obliges the polity taken as a whole. 
Though government will always be in the business of regulating the private, instances of 
horizontal effect are distinct in that individual duties and duties of the state share a 
common origin in the principles of fundamental law. This common source of governance, 
of authority, is an implicit recognition of a distinct “public thing,” an accepted common 
good, that governs a particular area and a particular people understood as its own body 
politic. In other words, the horizontal application of rights both presupposes and 
reinforces borders of place and people. When the ECJ applies EU law horizontally, 
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therefore, it is akin to declaring a European “public thing” and a European people, 
perhaps even prior to those of the Member States.   
 Secondly, and relatedly, we may consider the concept of solidarity introduced in 
Chapter I. Horizontal effect, by definition, deduces from public commitments that 
individuals also have duties vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. This presumes a particular 
“public thing,” as stated above, but also a particular people, charged with duties toward 
one another insofar as they all recognize and live under the same fundamental law. One 
can understand this in formal terms concerning people’s legal obligations in a particular 
place, or in the more functional terms of what people actually recognize as their duties. In 
either case, horizontal effect depends on a discernable citizenry that recognizes the 
authority of a particular fundamental law giving rise to its duties. In order for this 
republican logic to have purchase with respect to the EU’s doctrine of horizontal effect, 
therefore, one would have to recognize a European “public thing” with which people 
identified as a legal and a practical matter.  
The value of employing the language of republicanism here comes into sharper 
relief when we consider how horizontal effect has developed and is debated differently in 
the context of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).41 The ECJ is one body 
among many others in the panoply of EU institutions. Indeed, the EU includes 
institutions that correspond to the classic three branches of government and, in this sense, 
mirrors the form and function of the national governments of the various Member States. 
While the scope of EU governance may be limited, therefore, its institutions comprise a 
                                               




fully operative government and its project, ultimately, is one of unity. In theory, the EU 
could begin to conceive of itself as a republic or, in Van der Walt’s terms, begin to 
assume a measure of sovereignty. On the other hand, the ECtHR is an international court, 
belonging to no particular government and maintaining no project beyond that of 
addressing violations of those rights in the European Convention of Human Rights. There 
is no associated legislative function, nor any encompassing project of unity. To this 
extent, the role of the ECtHR does not rival its Member States in the same sense as does 
the EU.  
Given these differences in institutional character, it is unsurprising that horizontal 
effect has figured into accounts of the ECtHR differently than in scholarship on and 
decisions of the ECJ. The question of horizontal effect would seem to be less salient for 
the ECtHR as the Convention constitutes an agreement among states without any 
aspiration to govern the people within individual countries. And indeed, the question of 
horizontal effect was not even raised when the Convention was drafted in 1950.42 While 
some provisions of the Convention do amount to a charge for national governments to 
protect their citizens from private harms, these ultimately remain charges to the national 
governments and do not obligate individual citizens.43 To the extent that horizontal effect 
has republican qualities, therefore, we would expect it to figure more prominently in the 
EU than in an international court lacking the same potential for republican depth. 
Moreover, for these same reasons, we see more resistance to the ECJ’s efforts to apply 
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horizontal effect, as national entities are wary of the implications of uniformity and 
solidarity at the EU level for the individual Member States.  
Even while horizontality in Europe might effect republican ends as of creating a 
uniform law and duties of citizens, it is not clear that Europe can yet count on republican 
resources, such as an acknowledged common good and a self-identifying citizenry, 
requisite to grounding horizontal effect. On the other hand, as Van der Walt and I both 
propose, a certain endogeneity seems plausible here, as the ECJ’s increasing application 
of horizontal effect may itself work to cultivate greater republican resources in the EU. 
As the very status of Europe as a political community continues to be debated,44 
therefore, so too does the possibility of a republican foundation for horizontal effect 
remain a live question. Notwithstanding these lingering theoretical issues, the ECJ has 
moved gradually to develop its doctrine of horizontality as the next section will explain.  
 
The Horizontal Effect of European Union Law 
How, then, have judges of the ECJ developed the concept of horizontal effect, and 
how have scholars understood this practice in the EU? In the foregoing sections, I 
explained some of the theoretical questions that arise from a republican understanding of 
horizontal effect in the context of the EU, including how the EU itself measures up 
against republican principles and the unique challenges it faces in grounding horizontal 
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effect in a republican logic. In contrast, this section examines jurists’ and commentators’ 
express concerns and the resources they recognize as available to them in developing 
horizontal effect in EU law. I gauge how EU jurists and commentators articulate the 
issues surrounding horizontality and how they propose to develop horizontal effect 
accordingly. While the perspectives articulated in some ECJ decisions and some 
scholarship are more ambitious, viewing horizontal effect as something which can be 
expanded, others prove more hesitant and aim to find some limits to this legal doctrine.  
The initial jurisprudential development that set the stage for the debate over 
horizontal effect came in the important Van Gend en Loos case (1963).45 Following the 
early treaties establishing the European Community, the relationship between European 
and domestic law was a real question and one that could not be avoided for long. In Van 
Gend, the European Court of Justice declared its understanding of the kind of integrated 
community it would have Europe become, even while, on some accounts, the Member 
States envisioned a future wherein there remained greater differentiation between states 
within the Community.46  In particular, the Court articulated the principle of direct effect, 
what scholars and jurists today describe as “the capacity of a provision of EU law to be 
invoked before a national court.”47 With the establishment of direct effect, litigants in 
domestic courts could rely on provisions of EU law against national governments. The 
upshot of this, then and now, is that European law could be introduced into what 
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previously might have been a purely domestic legal-political situation. Moreover, the 
principle necessarily enlists domestic courts to the task of enforcing Treaty provisions 
and directives.  
Insofar as Member States did not explicitly assent to this kind of direct effect, 
Alec Stone Sweet goes so far as to describe Van Gend en Loos as a “juridical coup 
d’état,”48 On the other hand, the “teleological methodology” that the Court employs in its 
judgment assumes an alternative account of the European vision. Speaking of the 
European Economic Community Treaty, the Court explains that this was more than an 
agreement of obligations between contracting states, citing as evidence the Treaty’s 
preamble which refers not only to governments but to peoples. Indeed, the Court argues, 
the Treaty establishes EU institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of 
which affects both the Member States and their citizens.49 On this telling, the European 
Community was intended to be a political community in the full sense. “[M]ore than an 
agreement” between states, European institutions were “endowed with sovereign rights” 
of the kind that permitted it to act as a government of people as well.50 In this way, the 
Court seized upon the opportunity to entrench a more Euro-centric vision, later cemented 
in the Costa case that declared the primacy of European law.51 
The establishment of the direct effect of EU law was debated alongside the 
additional question of horizontal direct effect—whether EU law could be invoked by 
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litigants in national courts against private individuals or non-state actors. This was, in 
fact, a separate question and one that needed to be answered. However, even at this high 
level of abstraction, it became complicated very quickly for a couple of reasons. Despite 
instances in European law that reference the actual people living in Europe, as the Van 
Gend en Loos Court finds in the EEC preamble, foundational documents of Europe are 
by and large addressed to the states. The 2009 Charter of Fundamental Rights, for 
example, specifically states in Article 51 that it obligates the Member States. While this is 
not necessarily the last word on the question, it has factored into the Court’s reasoning on 
horizontal direct effect.52  
The issue of whom treaties and the Charter address, moreover, speaks directly to 
the questions elaborated in the previous section—namely, whether these foundational 
documents establish a European “public thing” so as to hold the individuals within 
Member States accountable for EU commitments. Perhaps Van Gend  and later Costa 
gesture toward an affirmative answer here in that they are premised on the contention that 
European law is relevant and supreme even in the context of domestic questions.53 
Nevertheless, one would still have to make the argument that private entities are 
immediate participants in the European project and, therefore, that this law is equally 
binding on their actions. If this be the case, then it is not so surprising that European 
commitments and values should have a “radiating effect” through all spheres of life, to 
use the language of Lüth.54  
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The Court first took up the issue of horizontal direct effect of EU law in Defrenne 
v. Sabena (1976). 55 This case identified the principle of equal pay for equal work56 of the 
Treaty of the European Economic Community (now the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union) as having direct horizontal effect despite the fact that certain provisions 
of the Treaty formally addressed Member States. In this case, a woman named Gabrielle 
Defrenne was forced to retire from her job as an airline attendant since, under Belgian 
law, female flight attendants were required to retire upon turning forty. This policy, 
Defrenne argued, prevented her from collecting a pension equal to that of her male 
colleagues in retirement. The Court of Justice decided the case on the basis that the 
Treaty required equal treatment on grounds of gender. In particular, it argued that the 
prohibition of discrimination was “mandatory in nature”57 and so applied both to state 
actors and private actors. Defrenne thus ushered in a broad discussion about horizontal 
effect. Though the decision itself only established the possibility of horizontal effect for 
treaty law, and only “mandatory” treaty provisions for that matter, this decision was 
enormously consequential. Indeed, those treaties comprising the fundamental 
commitments of the EU would now apply to private individuals within Member States. 
The significance of this step is made clear in the words of the Court. Speaking of Article 
119, the Court states:  
[T]his provision forms part of the social objectives of the Community, 
which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, 
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by common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant 
improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples…58 
 
Thus, the Court in Defrenne understands the project of the European Community as being 
to propagate a particular kind of society. More to the point, its “social objectives” are of 
such a nature that they necessarily impact entities beyond the state. While the Court does 
identify the limiting principle only to apply horizontal effect for mandatory provisions, it 
ultimately acknowledges that the primary law of the EU has the power to create 
obligations for private actors within the Member States.   
That European law comes in so many forms raised the question of what kinds of 
law may be applied horizontally to nonstate actors following Defrenne. EU law includes 
regulations, directives, treaty articles, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Such 
distinctions have loomed large in debates over horizontal effect, as scholars and jurists 
argue the significance of these differences—whether to limit the ECJ’s extension of 
horizontal effect or to argue the ultimate arbitrariness of these distinctions and thereby 
extend its reach. As mentioned previously, EU regulations are akin to ordinary law, and 
so do not necessarily raise difficult questions with respect to horizontal effect. Similarly, 
directives are legal acts of the EU that bind Member States. Whereas regulations are self-
executing, however, directives require implementation, a fact which has resulted in their 
further debate. Traditionally directives do not have horizontal effect since Article 228 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union states that Member States are bound 
by a directive, and bound only to the extent that the directive specifies a particular 
                                               




obligation.59 Nevertheless, the ECJ has found ways to carve out exceptions to apply 
directives horizontally. For example, it has broadened the very concept of “the state” to 
incorporate what otherwise would be categorized as private actors60 and allowed private 
individuals to hold Member States accountable when they fail to implement directions. 
The fact of such distinctions points toward a general hesitance with respect to 
horizontal effect.61 Indeed, beginning with Defrenne’s distinction between “mandatory” 
and other provisions, we see a similar tendency to limit the reach of horizontal effect in 
treaty law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, areas in which the stakes are arguably 
even higher. As explained previously, these two areas of EU law are effectively 
constitutional in nature. In contrast with regulations and directives, applying treaty law 
and the Charter horizontally would be a clearer expression of movement (both symbolic 
and practical) toward increased integration and the primacy of EU commitments. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that Defrenne’s establishment of horizontal effect of treaty law 
was considered so groundbreaking. Indeed, even decades later, such scholars as Johann 
Van der Walt continue to worry about the horizontal effect of treaty law.  
                                               
59 See Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), ECJ 
152/84, ECR (1986). Scholars have been quick to point out that the way in which this provision obliges 
state actors need not preclude application to individuals and other non-state actors (Craig and De Búrca 
204-205.). Moreover, scholars have persuasively demonstrated that similar textual provisions have not 
stopped the Court from asserting possibility of horizontal direct effect in the case of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Frantziou 2015.). With such cases as Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm (ECJ 144/04, ECR 
(2005)), the Court seems to be moving away from the position that directives cannot have horizontal 
effect. Nevertheless, the Mangold met with much push back from the Member States and many continue 
to argue for this different treatment of primary law and directives (Craig and De Búrca 205.). The Court 
seems to have an interest in treading lightly, therefore, as it still relies on the Member States for 
implementation.  
60 Craig and De Búrca 206-209. Additionally, it has insisted on a principle of “harmonious 
interpretation,” that requires domestic courts to interpret national law “in the light of” directives (Craig 
and De Búrca 209-216.). 




While debates unfold in courts in terms of doctrinal technicalities, scholarship 
treats horizontal effect as raising deeper questions, as well. Indeed, even after Defrenne, 
the scholarly literature reveals real disagreement about the constitutional implications of 
horizontal effect, including the ability of the ECJ to define values and priorities for 
Europe and the ability of Europe to define value and priorities for the Member States. 
Johan Van der Walt, for example, worries that the original formulation of horizontal 
effect in the German FCC’s Lüth case, overlooks the possibility for disagreement over 
values and their ordering. When this logic was appropriated from German jurisprudence 
by the ECJ, therefore, not only was there reason for concern about which institutions 
were making these decisions (courts or legislatures), but the very government 
determining these values (individual countries or the EU).  
Van der Walt’s book focuses on the “Laval quartet,” of cases, including the 
Viking  (2007) case which determined that labor unions violated treaty provisions on 
freedom of establishment when they prevented the Viking shipping company from 
moving their legal base from Finland to Estonia.62 Following the reasoning in Defrenne, 
we see the horizontal effect of a treaty provision as it controls the actions of the labor 
union in relation to the shipping company. Though in earlier cases the Court established 
criteria requiring treaty provisions to be clear and precise if they were to be applied 
horizontally, Van der Walt sees Viking as based fundamentally on judicial fiat. In the ECJ 
rhetoric of “balancing” and “harmonizing” the opposing social and economic concerns 
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we find in Viking, Van der Walt finds the Court making crucial and constitutive decisions 
that, he argues, ought to be beyond its jurisdiction as a court and, more specifically as a 
court for Europe.63 He explains that the ECJ had no way to balance the right of the unions 
against that of the shipping company in a principled way. However, insofar as it did 
decide in favor of the shipping company, it yielded a “case specific prioritizing of market 
freedom” over bargaining rights.64 Not only is this result not desirable policy, as far as 
Van der Walt is concerned, but it is not a necessary interpretation of the Treaty. In 
deciding Viking, therefore, the Court improperly assumed authority to make such a 
constitutional decision. He thus describes the case as a “crucial moment in the 
federalization”65 of Europe, insofar as the ECJ, an EU institution, made this decision for 
Member States who may have chosen, and in fact had chosen, to order these values 
differently in governing private individuals. 
The Viking case faced severe criticism of legal scholars when it was decided, 
many worrying about its apparent derogation of certain principles of labor law. However, 
the general practice of applying treaty law horizontally, Van der Walt’s primary concern, 
is basically settled in ECJ jurisprudence. In Van der Walt’s assessment of Viking, we find 
a Court that is making claims about the kind of community the EU is as well as its status 
in relation to Member States. And indeed, the ECJ judgment follows what was a common 
line of thinking, especially early on in the Community’s history, that prioritized matters 
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of economics and trans-national exchange insofar as the EU’s original purpose had been 
to facilitate freedom of movement and economic cooperation.66  
Initially, one may take this prioritization of the economic as a sign of humility and 
restraint since the European Union, as represented by the Court, was not trying to be 
anything more than a union committed to economic cooperation. Nevertheless, Van der 
Walt argues that Viking did more than simply prioritize the economic as a matter of EU 
law. Rather, with the development of direct effect, the Court subverted the right of 
collective bargaining to the right of establishment within Member States.67 Moreover, 
and more specifically, with the development of horizontal direct effect, the Court created 
duties of unions (albeit negative duties) not to oppose companies’ choices to relocate, 
even if such choices came at the expense of those whom unions were obliged to protect. 
This latter result not only intervenes to limit the actions of a state, but assumes the role of 
government of the people within states. In establishing certain public values for Europe 
and arguing the uniform relevance of these values across spheres, therefore, the Court 
asserts a European res publica or “public thing,” to use the language of earlier sections, 
claiming itself as a locus of the most constitutive political decisions.  
Van der Walt’s solution to these concerns is simple in theory though more 
complicated in practice. He thinks that courts in general and the ECJ in particular should 
refrain from weighing in on these kinds of substantive value judgments. He suggests, 
instead, an emphasis on the procedural so that courts leave fundamentally political 
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questions to legislatures and, moreover, to national institutions that may better appreciate 
deep social and political division in a place.68 The key for Van der Walt, in other words, 
is that we continue to recognize difference, including different political communities 
between Member States, where it still exists. Van der Walt argues for this devolution 
back to national governance as helping mitigate the feeling among political losers that 
they are subject to rules “foreign” to them and rules that they cannot identify as “their 
own,”69 an admittedly republican rationale.   
While Van der Walt wrote before the entry into force of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in 2009, his misgivings about the horizontal effect of treaty 
provisions are largely applicable to the Charter, as well, insofar as both documents are 
considered primary law and constitutive for the European Union. Eleni Frantziou, on the 
other hand, does focus on the implications of the horizontal effect of the Charter 
specifically, and follows Van der Walt in emphasizing the weightiness of the question of 
horizontal effect for Europe. She states explicitly that “discussion of the horizontal effect 
of rights involves a deeper inquiry into the kind of society the EU is setting itself out to 
be and the values that lie in its core….”70 Moreover, Frantziou shares Van der Walt’s 
assessment of the particular choices the Court has confronted in cases concerning 
horizontal effect. Noting the Viking case in particular, she describes the confrontation 
between the values of a “laissez-faire market economy,” on the one hand, and the 
“radical, inclusionary impact” of collective bargaining and equal pay (as in Defrenne), on 
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the other.71  Frantziou worries that in continuing to develop its doctrine of horizontal 
effect, the ECJ will prioritize laissez-faire economic values at the cost of the EU’s more 
inclusionary project concerned with substantive equality.72 Nevertheless, Franziou’s 
solution is not to recoil from horizontal effect, pace Van der Walt. Rather, with the 
adoption of the Charter, Franziou would have the ECJ take up more fully these defining 
questions for Europe.  
Frantziou’s amenability to horizontal effect is rooted in a broader understanding 
of Europe as a community. Whereas Van der Walt continues to emphasize the Member 
States as the locus of politics and governance, Frantziou describes the EU as its own 
“polity” with its own common good.73 Her qualms concern not the practice of horizontal 
effect itself, therefore, but the prospect of the Court reducing it to a technical question 
and thus ignoring its normative (one might say, republican) potential. And indeed, the 
Court’s early decision on the question of horizontal effect of the Charter in the AMS case 
tended toward the technical.74 This case concerned whether Article 27 of the Charter, 
guaranteeing the rights of workers to information and timely consultation, could be 
applied horizontally. The Court considered but ultimately did not apply horizontal effect 
to this Charter provision, reasoning that the provision was not specific enough to ground 
a rights claim. Put differently, it was not so specific as to keep Member States from 
making their own exceptions with respect to the information and consultation workers 
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receive in their places of employment. Thus, the Court decided against horizontal effect 
in this instance, while leaving open the possibility that a Charter provision might apply 
horizontally, if sufficiently specific and precise.75  
Although, like treaty law, the Charter rises to the level of primary or fundamental 
law of the EU, the AMS case revealed continued insecurity on the part of the Court in 
giving these rights horizontal effect. Scholars such as Frantziou criticized the mechanical 
distinctions that the Court adopted from prior decisions, such as the requirement that a 
provision be “mandatory” or sufficiently specific. Rather than subjecting these cases to 
mechanical, what she views as arbitrary, limiting principles Frantziou would have the 
Court engage the substance of these questions, accounting for “what these claims can 
mean for people’s lives”—for example, “seeing one’s child, being able to work free from 
discrimination and receiving a pension.”76  A meaningful answer to cases of horizontal 
effect, she continues, will account for such things and determine “how much a particular 
society values them.”77  
Frantziou therefore argues that the ECJ should decide cases of horizontal effect in 
the light of these substantive issues for the very reason that they do implicate “the kind of 
society the EU is setting itself out to be.” To do anything else would be to give the 
important issues short shrift or even blindly decide against inclusionary rights 
                                               
75 Interestingly, the Advocates General in this and other Charter cases were more willing to extend 
horizontal effect, even to provisions like Article 27 that the Court deemed to be vague, if legislation such 
as an EU directive further narrowed and specified the principle in question. In the later case, Kücükdeveci, 
the ECJ seemed to accept this approach in the context of such rights as equality that it deemed 
fundamental or a “general principle” of EU law. See Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG, ECJ 555/07, 
ECR (2010); also Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, ECJ 144/04, ECR (2005). Craig and De Búrca 193-195. 
76 Frantziou 2015, 676. 




protections. In this way, she argues that the Court should engage the very questions van 
der Walt wants to avoid. Frantziou recognizes the political nature of these questions and 
does think there should be some limit to the scope of horizontal rights.78 Nevertheless, 
she takes as given a post-national context, referring to Europe as its own society.79 To 
take up such constitutive questions as the horizontal effect of Charter rights is necessary 
to the building up of a European society, à la Habermas, rather than a breach of national 
prerogatives.  Not only is Frantziou more optimistic than van der Walt with respect to 
what horizontal effect can accomplish, therefore, but she is also comfortable with what 
horizontal effect may accomplish in its mere application. Indeed, she understands 
horizontal effect as itself a key question, offering answers in the larger debate about the 
hierarchy of EU values. For Frantziou, the outlines of political community, of res 
publica, have already been drawn and what remains to be debated is exactly how Europe 
understands its common good.  
In November 2018, nearly a decade after the adoption of the Charter, the ECJ 
took the decisive step to give virtually all of the Charter horizontal effect.80 The judgment 
Bauer, et al actually concerned two separate cases, both involving women seeking 
compensation from their late husbands’ employers in lieu of annual leave not taken 
before their deaths. In support of their case, they cited Article 31(2) of the Charter which 
states, “every worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and 
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weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave.”81 In line with Frantziou’s own 
criticisms of the Court’s jurisprudence on horizontal effect, the Advocate General invited 
the Court to “reconsider previous categorisations based on general principles or 
‘particularly important principles of EU social law’…and to confirm, once and for all, 
that the social rights enshrined in the Charter are equally individual and fundamental as 
its other provisions.”82 In this way, the Advocate General encouraged the Court to move 
beyond the privileging of economic and property rights over social rights and, more to 
the point, recognize the complete range of the Charter as fundamental. Upon putting 
aside such distinctions, the Court affirmed that the Charter was “sufficient in itself to 
confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in a dispute with another 
individual.”83 In other words, there was no longer any need to render provisions more 
specific with additional legislation before considering their horizontal application; the 
Charter provisions could in themselves be applied horizontally.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered whether and how a republican understanding of 
horizontal effect applies in the European Union. In this supranational context, a 
republican understanding of horizontality calls for some European “public thing” or 
common good to justify the step of holding private entities within Member States 
accountable to these values. Whereas one may understand horizontal effect in national 
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contexts as fortifying pre-existing relationships among compatriots, some would say that 
horizontality in the EU portends the creation of new relationships and even individual 
duties across a supranational political community. Additionally, this chapter has 
demonstrated how the application of horizontal effect itself offers answers to larger 
questions about the European project. Indeed, in taking the step of applying public values 
to private entities at the continental level, the ECJ actually assumes a European common 
good and the priority of this European good to national commitments. While one should 
resist treating the nature of the European project as a zero-sum question, as between 
Member States and the EU, the practice of horizontal effect does seem to require some 
recognition of the values of a place. To the extent that the values of the EU may 
supersede those of member states in individual cases, so too may we see a European 
public thing taking precedence in legal, if not yet political, life with the horizontal 






In trying to understand, justify, and critique horizontal effect, legal scholars tend 
to presuppose liberal constitutionalism as a backdrop. The present project argues that we 
can instead conceptualize horizontal effect as a republican vein within liberal 
constitutionalism, that republican theory offers both normative and analytic value in 
understanding this legal-constitutional development. In particular, republicanism 
describes well the underlying moral logic that animates horizontality in general, and 
elucidates the politics animating the application of horizontal effect in particular cases. 
The republican framework thus serves a twofold purpose. First, it introduces new 
conceptual space for understanding horizontal effect, the ways in which it differs from 
more traditional models of constitutionalism as well as the different kinds of rationales 
(specifically, the republican rationales) that may justify horizontality as a normative 
matter. Chapter I does the most work to advance these initial theoretical arguments. 
Second, the republican framework makes clear and makes sense of the politics that drive 
the development of horizontal effect in actual constitutional orders. In this vein, the 
subsequent comparative chapters show how the republican logic of horizontal effect in 
fact shapes the development of constitutional politics. 
Chapter I makes the theoretical argument that the practice of horizontal effect 
amounts to a republican vein in liberal constitutionalism. This chapter highlights two key 
features of horizontal effect, namely uniformity and solidarity, as departing from liberal 




solidarity bear strong kinship to the respective republican ideas that the polity as a whole 
is obliged to a common good and that citizens have duties to one another. Chapter I’s 
analysis of these concepts thus shows how republicanism makes sense of horizontal 
effect and how it bears on normative assumptions of constitutionalism—for example, that 
the polity as a whole is governed according to the same standards and aimed at the same 
common good, as well as the need for a requisite solidarity among citizens. This 
compatibility of horizontal effect with republican theory may, by extension, offer 
sympathetic scholars and jurists normative grounding on which to argue for horizontality 
in constitutionalism.  
On the other hand, the fact that this republican account entails that horizontal 
effect departs from prior understandings may give some reason for consternation, 
particularly those that have reservations about republican political theory in general.1 
Gary Jacobsohn recounts a common argument made against the Republican Revivalists, 
for example:  
[T]he tradition of classical republicanism with which the founders were 
intimately acquainted was a fundamentally illiberal tradition that can serve 
as a model for contemporary republicans only if its problematic features 
are conveniently ignored....What these critics have in mind are the 
exclusivist, discriminatory tendencies of republican communalism, 
tendencies that liberal constitutional arrangements were largely designed 
to overcome.2 
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In light of this, a natural question is whether horizontality’s similarity with republicanism 
stops short of these problematic features, insofar as horizontality still occurs in a liberal 
context. Though this chapter primarily concerns horizontality in the abstract, its 
conceptual work brings into sharp relief the weight of these theoretical questions, 
including the relevant motivations and hesitations, thus laying groundwork to consider 
the constitutional politics of actual cases in the chapters that follow. 
Beyond the conceptual-theoretical reward it offers, the republican framework also 
helps explain the development of horizontal effect in actual countries. Chapters II 
through IV demonstrate how the republican logic of horizontal effect has animated 
specific debates in a variety of cases. In particular, these case comparisons show that the 
way the republican logic of horizontality corresponds (or does not correspond) to the 
larger constitutional project of each place goes a long way to explain the politics 
surrounding horizontal effect. Constitution-makers, jurists, and political actors show 
greater openness to introducing and applying horizontal effect to the extent that the 
constitutional vision itself accords with republican aims.  
In contrast with Chapter I’s theoretical argument, this move to examine actual 
cases in subsequent chapters relies on comparison in order to gain traction amid the 
inevitable complexity of constitutional politics. That is to say, while we may not find 
ideal types in the real world, we can observe relative tendencies and therefore make 
claims in comparing one constitutional context to another. In observing Germany and 
South Africa individually, for example, one may conclude that both countries maintain 




brings into sharp relief those features that do distinguish their respective jurisprudences. 
This comparative approach also corroborates an insight that the legal realists pointed out 
a century ago, namely that the outcome of cases depends largely on prior assumptions 
about social meanings, government’s responsibilities, the requirements of rights. Indeed, 
we see how different courts may reach similar outcomes although operating with 
different doctrinal structures. Even with the state action doctrine, for example, the United 
States Supreme Court has been able to expand and contract what constitutes “state 
action” depending on its intent to reach certain parties in private spaces. It is for this 
reason that, on some accounts, the decision in Shelley v. Kraemer seems to approach 
something like horizontal effect.3 
While granting this legal realist insight that doctrine is not determinative of 
outcomes, this project demonstrates the very real normative implications that do 
accompany doctrinal choices. Constitution-makers and jurists introduce and subsequently 
develop horizontal effect to the extent that its presuppositions4 comport with the 
constitutional project. While a state action requirement presupposes that separate public 
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and private spheres exist and ought to be preserved, horizontal effect presupposes that, at 
least sometimes, society ought to be governed according to a uniform standard and that 
individuals ought to be responsible for one another. To be sure, these differences carry 
with them symbolic weight. As Ulrich Preuss suggests, how a polity comes down on 
these questions signifies in a fundamental way the sort of society it is.5 Beyond this 
symbolic import, however, the comparisons of Chapters II and III show how these 
choices also set the terms of the debate and so shape the way rights develop. Therefore, 
though doctrine is not determinative, per the legal realists, doctrine does contain certain 
moral content in itself which this project conceptualizes as either liberal or republican in 
nature. Hence, the choice of whether to adopt a vertical or a horizontal model of rights as 
well as the ensuing judicial politics that comprise courts’ individual decisions involve 
fundamentally moral, political choices that ultimately do push constitutional development 
in either a liberal or republican direction over the long term. 
Chapter II’s comparison of the United States and India focuses on horizontality’s 
republican logic in the particular feature of solidarity. This chapter demonstrates how 
dominant views in each country regarding solidarity as a constitutional goal shaped 
subsequent decisions of whether or not to apply equality rights horizontally to private 
actors. Early rejection of something like solidarity as part of the United States’ 
constitutional project put the polity on course to maintain a state action doctrine even 
amid changes in public opinion. On the other hand, the Indian framers’ self-conscious 
aim to propagate solidarity furnished a stronger foundation for the continued 
                                               




development of horizontal effect in the decades since its constitution was adopted. In the 
comparison between Shelley v. Kraemer6 and Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society 
v. District Registrar,7 we see precisely how the liberal logic of state action and republican 
logic of horizontality operate in the larger story of these two countries. Moreover, we see 
how attending to the moral logics of doctrine, and particularly the republican logic of 
horizontal effect, enriches our understanding of the constitutional story beyond the 
traditional narratives of constitutionalism.  
As explained in Chapter II, both Shelley and Zoroastrian Cooperative may be cast 
as unlikely judgments in their respective contexts insofar as their outcomes seem to cut 
against the larger legal narrative of the place. It is not for no reason that Herbert Wechsler 
so fervidly criticized what he perceived as Shelley’s lack of neutrality.8 Focusing only on 
the proximate outcomes, however, misses important aspects of the larger constitutional 
story. Indeed, the reasoning in Shelley betrays a crucial consistency with the traditional 
liberal logic. Wechsler may have disapproved of Shelley, but neither was Louis Henkin 
satisfied with the Court’s persistent reliance on categories of state and non-state action,9 
categories that presupposed the liberal moral logic of distinct public and private spheres. 
While the U.S. Court may have expanded traditional notions of state action in Shelley, its 
judgment still reinforced the liberal logic in the sheer act of employing these categories. 
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We notice this and, indeed, notice it as part of a larger jurisprudential trajectory only in 
noting the liberal logic of the state action doctrine itself.  
In bringing to the fore this alternate level of analysis beyond proximate outcomes 
of cases, understanding horizontal effect in the light of republicanism and state action in 
terms of liberalism offers a more complete account of constitutional development. The 
more republican reasoning Henkin proposes in his alternate opinion would not have 
changed the outcome in Shelley—even in this alternate world, the Shelley family still 
would have been able to purchase their home contra the restrictive housing covenant. 
Nevertheless, Henkin’s proposal would define the question at issue in terms very 
different from Vinson’s majority opinion. Indeed, Henkin would have had the Court 
abandon altogether the project of drawing a line between public and private spaces, to 
recognize instead that both parties had rights at stake and, potentially, would have to 
yield to the right of the other.  
This admission, that a private individual might have a role in upholding a public 
commitment to a particular right, puts us on very different constitutional terrain than that 
involved in distinguishing public from private spaces. Indeed, this exercise imbues 
constitutional rights with fundamentally different meanings and different relationships. 
Moreover, this alternative reasoning ultimately could have consequences for the 
outcomes of future cases, insofar as the Court would confront instead fundamentally 
different questions that involved balancing rights against each other. But, as it stands, 




upshots of which we see in such later cases as the anticlimactic Bell v. Maryland.10 Even 
with the shifting popular opinion during the Civil Rights Movement that would 
understand desegregation as part of the public commitment to equality, the liberal logic 
persisted in the Court’s constitutional understanding and continually set the terms of the 
debate. In this light, the disappointment of Bell v. Maryland is not such a surprise, not 
even after Shelley. 
Contrast this trajectory with that of the Indian Constitution. As Shelley reveals in 
United States jurisprudence a persistent liberalism, even amid a shifting cultural tide, 
Zoroastrian Cooperative Housing Society11 offers a window into a republican logic in 
Indian constitutionalism. Indeed, this case is useful for its similarities to Shelley, both 
with respect to the facts of the case as well as the fact that it seems to be a comparably 
unlikely outcome. As explained in Chapter II, Zoroastrian Cooperative can be difficult to 
assess due to its opaque opinion. In particular, the judgment seems to allow for two 
different rationales, either that the cooperative was responsible to comply only with 
Indian statutory law which ostensibly permitted its exclusionary policy, or that it was in 
fact obligated to comply with the constitutional right to equality but that the cooperative’s 
right to cultural preservation prevailed on balance.12 These different possibilities bring 
into sharp relief a distinction between the doctrinal logic and the particular outcome. As 
Louis Henkin demonstrated the possibility of an alternate opinion reaching the same 
outcome in Shelley, the indeterminacy of the opinion in Zoroastrian Cooperative 
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demonstrates the same point in the Indian context. In particular, we see how the Court 
might have reached the outcome either through the liberal logic that would have the 
cooperative accountable only to statutory law, or the republican logic maintaining that it 
was ultimately subject to the public morality of the Constitution.  
Though legal scholars find the reasoning in Zoroastrian Cooperative 
ambiguous,13 the judgment does allow for an understanding of the public significances of 
private institutions and spaces in the very fact that it raises the constitutional values of 
equality and cultural preservation at all. Although the two-person panel deciding this case 
ruled in favor of the cooperative, the judges could not but acknowledge the relevance of 
certain constitutional values. Given India’s history of exclusion and constitutional vision 
of broad solidarity among citizens, these questions were basically unavoidable given the 
question at issue. And indeed, the step-by-step revolution Nehru envisioned for India 
necessarily involved private actors in the constitutional project insofar as the injustices 
the Constitution aimed to ameliorate largely afflicted private spaces.14 Contrast this 
position with Justice Bradley’s fear that broad interpretations of the United States 
Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment risked creating “another kind of slavery.”15 India’s 
Constitution instead pointed toward a longer trajectory, the ends of which were consistent 
with both the relational and moral implications of horizontality, that is, with its 
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republican logic. One might say that horizontal effect is both an instrument to realize 
solidarity and itself constitutive of solidarity, insofar as it necessarily entails relationships 
between private citizens, indeed, the very relationships rejected in the United States 
context. The republican framework thus makes clear the role of horizontal effect in the 
larger constitutional project and, conversely, how constitutional ends are connected to the 
development of horizontality.  
Chapter III’s comparison of Germany and South Africa focuses on horizontality’s 
republican logic in the particular feature of uniformity. This chapter demonstrates how 
different understandings of the relationship between public and private spaces translates 
into different limits to horizontal effect. Germany’s commitment to its civil law tradition 
manifested in some preservation of a public-private divide even amid the German 
Constitutional Court’s adoption of indirect horizonal effect in Lüth.16  We see the upshots 
of this persistent liberalism in the fact that, for several decades, horizontality was never 
applied to equality rights. On the other hand, we see horizontal effect continually 
expanding in South Africa, where comprehensive change across public and private spaces 
is integral to the constitutional vision. After the Constitutional Court initially acted to 
preserve conventional liberal conceptions of public and private in the early case Du 
Plessis v. De Klerk,17 the Court took a cue from the revised Final Constitution that shored 
up a more ambitious vision for South Africa. Again, in this chapter, the republican logic 
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of horizontality makes sense of these different constitutional stories and, more 
specifically, the different limits each country places on horizontal effect. 
Following much debate, the German Federal Constitutional Court introduced a 
practice of Drittwirkung, or indirect horizontal effect, that both acknowledged the sea 
change of the new Basic Law and maintained Germany’s system of separate public and 
private laws. The courts thus applied horizontal effect in the years that followed without 
much debate as the substantive focus of horizontality remained on traditional liberty 
rights to which the larger populace readily subscribed.18 While public and private actors 
shared some of the same obligations, the uniformity resulting from horizontal effect 
occurred within certain practical limits. Controversy ensued only with the proposal to 
expand private obligations beyond these limits so as also to incorporate equality rights 
against private entities. The EU directives responsible for the change19 thus upset a kind 
of liberal accommodation of German Drittwirkung, pushing toward a more uniform 
public morality, at least in the particular area of nondiscrimination, and arguably 
requiring more of some private entities than had been previously asked.  
Accounting for the proximate outcomes of cases in German constitutionalism 
reveals that the Court applied some version of horizontal effect through the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Indeed, Lüth seemed to achieve a certain modus vivendi that, by 
itself, would not necessarily lead observers to predict the outcry that followed the EU’s 
antidiscrimination directives. Nevertheless, the ADG and AGG did spark pushback for 
                                               
18 Fedtke 137. 




the very reason that the German constitutional imaginary still held fast to certain liberal 
predilections. Thus, many understood this move to expand the substance of private 
actors’ rights obligations as going too far to bring private entities into the constitutional 
project. The legal realist tradition might explain this sequence of events as the natural 
result of a new disjuncture in societal standards or, more precisely, a difference in the 
standards of a portion of the German polity in contrast with those held up by the 
European Union. In short, the relevant actors wished to move law along according to 
certain standards of nondiscrimination, an initiative that clashed with individuals’ priors, 
interests, and prejudices.  
While this account is not wrong, neither does it capture the full constitutional 
story, namely, that the EU directives ran up against a persistent liberalism, long engrained 
and even accommodated in the German constitutional milieu. On this understanding, the 
new laws presented not simply a conflict of preferences or a mere modification of the 
status quo, but the introduction of a new logic that implicated private entities further into 
the public project. In other words, the legislation pushed in the direction of a republican 
logic after Germany had straddled a more liberal line for so long. An appreciation for the 
republican logic of horizontal effect thus sheds light on the various stages of German 
constitutionalism as well as different reactions to them. When we see the logic of 
horizontal effect in a larger context, as for example the context of the civil law system, 
we see in the shift that came with the EU directives not only a clash of interests and 
standards, but also a larger departure from a kind of comfortable liberalism in favor of 




In the drafting of its Constitution, South Africa also confronted the question of 
whether rights would apply horizontally to private actors. Indeed, South Africa had its 
own moment of constitutional reckoning when it rejected a version of indirect horizontal 
effect, not unlike that in Germany, in favor of a more robust conception of horizontality 
in its Final Constitution. After contemplating this more limited approach in initial 
decisions,20 constitutional framers and jurists agreed that the South African constitutional 
project required a more robust practice of horizontality, and so adopted the republican 
position that the Constitution necessarily obligated all sectors of society21. This more 
extensive reach of rights obligations to private actors was essential to the constitutional 
vision itself. Similar to the Indian context, then, horizontal effect was both instrumental 
and constitutive to the South African Constitution, necessary to achieve the vast 
transformation of the polity and itself part of the transformation.  
The more republican proposition that a uniform standard governed all people was 
made explicit in the final text and arguably inherent to the essence of the South African 
constitutional project. Moreover, the judgments of subsequent cases that refer, for 
example, to the need for “neighbourliness”22 mark a clear break from the liberal 
sentiment that private spaces remain insulated from public values and even a more basic 
reliance on rights claims at all. Though the development of horizontal effect has been 
incremental, the South African Court has continually proceeded in a manner consistent 
with the republican idea that public values may govern the polity as whole, deciding most 
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recently that private actors are potentially responsible for positive constitutional rights in 
Daniels v. Scribante.23   
At first blush, we see that both Germany and South Africa have applied rights 
horizontally against private actors. However, Chapter III argues that, on balance, this 
practice has been more limited in Germany than in South Africa’s comparatively short 
constitutional history. This argument is made clear in looking beyond individual 
decisions to apply horizontality to appreciate the logics in play at different periods in 
each place. Germany may not have had an American style state action requirement but 
still remained tied to the separation between public and private as a defining feature of its 
legal order. The German Constitutional Court accommodated these liberal predilections 
accordingly by adopting indirect horizontal effect and subsequently restricting its 
application only to those more conventional liberal rights. In short, horizontal effect was 
bounded in Germany, so that even a step toward broader uniformity between the 
obligations of state and nonstate actors was met with resistance in the 2000s. On the other 
hand, the ends of the South African Constitution aligned much better with horizontal 
effect’s logic of uniformity. Consequently, the South African Constitutional Court has 
been more audacious in pushing horizontality to the full extent of its republican logic, 
such that it encompasses a range of rights commitments across spheres of society. In 
contrast with Germany, the goal here is, in fact, widespread congruence of society with 
constitutional values. Attention to the republican logic of horizontality thus reveals a 
                                               




doctrine and practice of horizontal effect less wary of uniformity, insofar as it aligns with 
the aspirations of the South African constitutional project. 
An appreciation for the significance of this doctrinal choice goes some way to 
explain the debate over the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union. Understanding horizontal effect as republican brings into sharp relief 
the weightiness of this legal-constitutional practice for a country let alone for a union of 
individual countries. Indeed, the decision to govern all spheres according to a uniform 
standard and to hold individual citizens accountable for each other seems to presume the 
prior existence of a community. On this understanding, accepting horizontal effect may 
be analogous to accepting something closer to the status of “polity” for Europe. Hence, 
those comfortable with the general proposition that Europe constitutes its own political 
community, even maintaining primacy over the traditional nation-states, find in 
horizontality a likely tool by which to realize this greater consolidation as a practical and 
a moral matter.24 On the other hand, the same people who are concerned about 
“competence creep” see in the ECJ’s application of horizontal effect a decisive step 
toward encroaching on the prerogatives of the Member States and how they choose to 
govern their respective private institutions.25 As in national contexts so too in this 
supranational context, the application of horizonal effect has moral, political 
implications, which can be summed up in what this project understands as its republican 
nature.  
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The benefit of viewing horizontal effect through the lens of republicanism comes 
in the occasion to understand this constitutional innovation on its own terms, both in 
theory and in practice, rather than simply assuming the conventional liberal wisdom. That 
horizontality entails a republican logic instead of the same liberalism as in traditional 
narratives, however, is not to say that the specific outcomes of cases will necessarily 
hinge on whether judges employ horizontal effect or not. Indeed, one of the core insights 
of judicial politics scholarship is that judges often rationalize rulings according to their 
own preferences. Nevertheless, it need not follow from this insight of political science 
that legal-constitutional choices are devoid of any meaning or moral content, nor that 
these choices are incapable of prompting downstream effects. These chapters show how 
the logic, or moral content, of horizontal effect has in fact influenced both initial 
decisions to adopt the doctrinal practice at all and later downstream applications. 
Horizontal effect rejects sharp divisions between public and private in favor of solidarity 
and uniformity. Moreover, the choice to adopt horizontal effect and so to take up 
questions of citizens’ duties, for example, influences long-term trajectories of 
constitutional development (and sometimes even the outcomes of particular cases). In this 
way, the case studies herein illustrate the upshots of the republican logic of horizontal 
effect as situated in larger constitutional projects. Law may not be all-constraining but 
viewing horizontal effect through the lens of republicanism reveals how legal structures 
can and do shape larger debates about constitutional politics in crucial ways. 
In the mere act of adopting a constitution, a polity commits to certain principles 




private spaces in both a vertical and a horizontal model of rights, these two models 
engender different narratives about the relationship between citizens and the public thing 
that is the constitution. The liberalism of the traditional vertical model permits a level of 
detachment, so that even if legislation regulates private actors, these actors need not 
themselves assume constitutional duties. On the other hand, polities with horizontal effect 
do not rest content with the “light touch”26 of the vertical model in maintaining and 
applying constitutional commitments. This is not to say that such polities will apply 
horizontal effect in every possible instance. Indeed, the present project demonstrates how 
countries often distinguish those commitments that are more constitutive to the larger 
constitutional vision in applying rights horizontally. The Indian Constitution singles out 
equality as having horizontal effect, for example, whereas in Germany equality rights 
were long understood to be a bridge too far to apply horizontally to private actors. Thus 
much depends, and much ought to depend, on the particularities of each country in the 
decisions to adopt and apply horizontal effect. Indeed, what model a polity adopts is a 
fundamentally political choice and, in turn, engenders different constitutional discourses, 
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